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There is something unique about human culture. Its complex technologies, customs, 
institutions, symbolisms and norms, which are shared and maintained and improved 
across countless generations, are what sets it apart from the ‘cultures’ of other 
animals. The fundamental question that researchers are only just beginning to unravel 
is: How do we account for the gap between their ‘cultures’ and ours? The answer lies 
in a deeper understanding of culture’s complex constituent components: from the 
micro-level psychological mechanisms that guide and facilitate accurate social 
learning, to the macro-level cultural processes that unfold within large-scale 
cooperative groups. This thesis attempts to contribute to two broad themes that are of 
relevance to this question. The first theme involves the evolution of accurate and 
high-fidelity cultural transmission. In Chapter 2, a meta-analysis conducted across 
primate social learning studies finds support for the common assumption that 
imitative and/or emulative learning mechanisms are required for the high-fidelity 
transmission of complex instrumental cultural goals. Chapter 3, adopting an 
experimental study with young children, then questions the claim that mechanisms of 
high-fidelity copying have reached such heights in our own species that they will even 
lead us to blindly copy irrelevant, and potentially costly, information. The second 
theme involves investigations of the mutually reinforcing relationship predicted 
between cultural complexity and ultra-cooperativeness in humans, employing a series 
of laboratory-based experimental investigations with adults.  Chapter 4 finds only 
limited support for a positive relationship between cooperative behaviour and 
behavioural imitation, which is believed to facilitate cultural group cohesion. Finally, 
Chapter 5 presents evidence suggesting that access to cultural information is 
positively associated with an individual’s cooperative reputation, and argues that this 
 vii 
dynamic might help to scaffold the evolution of increased cultural complexity and 
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1.1. Human culture and animal ‘culture’ 
 
Culture sets human beings apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Because culture 
is underpinned by social learning, human cultural processes are able to modify 
cognition and behaviour, bring about environmental change, and accumulate 
increasingly complex modifications, over a far shorter timeframe than genetic or 
individual-driven change (Laland & Janik, 2006; Thompson et al., 2016; Tomasello, 
1999). Social learning, broadly defined, refers to ‘learning that is facilitated by 
observation of, or interaction with, another individual, or its products’ (Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2013, p4). Behavioural patterns implicating social learning have also been 
identified across a range of non-human animals – notably fish, cetaceans, primates, 
birds and insects – but there is little consensus regarding which, or what, if any, 
socially transmitted behaviours in other species should be regarded as culture (Laland 
& Hoppitt, 2003; Price et al., 2010; Leadbeater & Chittka, 2007).  
The relative abundance or scarcity of culture in nature ultimately depends on 
where we etch culture’s boundaries. At one extreme, culture becomes the exclusive 
domain of Homo sapiens, replete with language, teaching and symbolism (e.g., Tuttle, 
2001). At the other, culture might be any inherited group level differences in 
behaviour that are not attributable to genetic variation; a definition that encompasses a 
wide range of species, including some bacteria (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). 
Throughout this thesis I employ a broad and inclusive definition of culture, requiring 
only that ‘group-typical patterns of behaviour’ exhibit evidence of ‘socially learned or 
transmitted information’ to be considered cultural (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013, p4). 
 Whether or not we allow other species the accolade of ‘culture’, many 
evolutionary minded scientists now accept that the so-called ‘proto-cultures’ or 
‘behavioural traditions’ of great apes, some species of monkey, cetaceans and birds 
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exhibit some semblance to human culture (Whiten et al., 1999; van Schaik et al., 
2003; Laland & Janik, 2006). Assuming the broad and inclusive definition of culture 
deployed above, there is now good evidence for culture in the chimpanzee (Hobaiter 
et al., 2014; see Lonsdorf, 2006, for further support), humpback whales (Allen et al., 
2013; Garland et al., 2011; Noad et al., 2000), at least two species of birds (Slagsvold 
& Wiebe, 2007; see also Aplin et al., 2015), and fishes (Helfman & Schultz, 1984; 
Warner, 1988). It is likely that a growing list of taxa that can be said to exhibit 
‘cultural’ behaviour will soon emerge, as a suite of new and innovative methodologies 
designed to detect social learning in naturalistic contexts, are increasingly applied (see 
Hoppitt & Laland, 2013).  
 What is not debated among interested scholars, is the gulf in complexity and 
magnitude that exists between the cultural worlds of other species and of our own 
(Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). Cultural capacities unique to humans have driven 
unprecedented population expansions into diverse environments, and the 
establishment of highly cooperative societies scaffolded by complex social 
institutions, such as religions and central governments. We alone appear to have 
stepped up from the technologically stagnant and often fleeting behavioural traditions 
typically characterised in other species (Laland et al., 1993; Thornton & Malapert, 
2009), accumulating cultural improvements, generation on generation, that have 
allowed us to write books, operate machinery and drive cars. There have been claims 
of cumulative culture in a handful of animal species, most notably chimpanzees and 
New Caledonian crows (Boesch, 2003; Hunt & Gray, 2003; Yamamoto et al., 2013). 
The evidence for these claims is circumstantial and equivocal, however, and the 
purported culturally accumulated behaviours still rudimentary next to our own (Dean 
et al., 2014; Tomasello & Herrmann, 2010).  
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     We have to acknowledge that the cultural evolutionary process has reached 
unprecedented levels in our own relative to other species. The fundamental question 
we are now left with is: How do we account for the gap between them and ourselves? 
This might be best viewed as a question with two parts (Rendell et al., 2011a). Firstly, 
we must ask: What specific properties of human social learning and interaction give 
rise to the complexities found in our own but not other animal cultures?  Then later: 
How did the processes that set human culture apart evolve out of the types of more 
rudimentary abilities possessed by other animals?  
 The body of work presented in this thesis aims to contribute to the first of 
these questions.  Traditional approaches have sought to elucidate human cultural 
uniqueness in specific cognitive capacities owing to our exceptionally large brains. In 
particular, research efforts have focused on identifying the behavioural and 
psychological learning processes responsible for high-fidelity cultural transmission 
between individuals (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Tomasello, 1999). Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 attempt to further our knowledge of the learning mechanisms and 
decision-making processes involved in high-fidelity social transmission. Increasingly, 
however, theoretical and empirical approaches are highlighting the importance of 
macro-level processes in cultural transmission – such as demography and large-scale 
interaction – and the interplay between macro-level processes and cultural cognition 
in fashioning cultural complexity (e.g., Cantor & Whitehead, 2013; Hill et al., 2011; 
Powell et al., 2009; Pradhan et al., 2012). Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 attempt to 
examine the interplay between the mechanisms underpinning group level cooperation 
and the mechanisms involved in cultural transmission.  
Before turning to these projects in more detail, it is first necessary to provide 
the reader with an overview of some key topics and definitions pertaining to the work 
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presented.  These include social learning mechanisms; high-fidelity social learning; 
social learning strategies; and the evolution of large-scale human interaction, 
cooperation and culture.  
 
 
1.2. Social learning mechanisms 
  
A number of social learning taxonomies have emerged in recent years, which have 
attempted to describe the different psychological processes through which one animal 
might learn from another (Galef, 1988; Heyes, 1994; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Whiten et 
al., 2004; Zentall, 2001). These taxonomies have only offered partial agreement on 
terminology and definitions, however, and have been criticised for assigning the 
proposed learning mechanisms to different levels of cognitive complexity based on 
subjective assessments (Roitblat, 1998). Hoppitt and Laland (2013) describe 12 social 
learning mechanisms that can each be distinguished empirically, yet concede that 
limitations present in much of the currently available data on animal social learning 
largely obscure accurate categorisations. The operation of more than one mechanism 
at any given time is also a possibility (Hoppitt et al., 2012).  
Human beings are regarded as capable of utilising all identified learning 
mechanisms, yet it has been hotly debated whether non-human animals (particularly 
non-human primates) are capable of learning via mechanisms considered to be more 
cognitively enhanced (Heyes, 2012b; Tennie et al., 2009; Whiten et al., 2009). Here I 
will outline four categories of learning mechanisms – imitation, emulation, stimulus 
and local enhancement – that are of most relevance to the body of work presented in 
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 Imitation is the most contentious and widely discussed mechanism within social 
learning research, regarded by many as the most cognitively complex form of social 
transmission (Hoppitt & Laland, 2008), and by some researchers as a capability 
unique to humans (e.g., Tomasello, 1999). During the last few decades, the definition 
of imitation within the field of social learning has been subject to much debate 
(Whiten et al., 2004). For example, Whiten and Ham (1992) described imitation 
broadly, as a process by which “B learns some aspect(s) of the intrinsic form of an act 
from A” (p.250). Other authors have proposed narrower criteria, insisting on a 
distinction between imitation, which they define as copying the action topography of 
an agent’s body movements, and emulation (see below), which refers to copying the 
environmental effects of the agent’s actions (Tomasello & Call, 1997; Tomasello, 
1998). Other debates have concerned whether imitation of another’s actions must 
incorporate an understanding of their intentional states and goals (Heyes, 1998; 
Horowitz, 2003; Tomasello, 1999), and whether the particular action copied must be 
novel to the learner (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Byrne, 2002).  
Throughout this thesis, I use the term imitation to refer to evidence that an 
observer has copied some part of the body action topography, or action sequence, of 
another individual. A distinction is acknowledged between simple or ‘mindless’ forms 
of imitation and complex imitation, which is believed to be more controlled, cognitive, 
and involved in the acquisition of novel behaviour (Heyes, 2011; Tomasello, 1996). 
The latter, more complex form, regarded by some as exclusive to human beings (e.g., 
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Tennie et al., 2009), is frequently the focus in experimental studies of instrumental 
social learning (although see Byrne, 2002, for a contrary view), and is most relevant 
to discussion in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The former, simpler form, also referred to 
as automatic imitation (Heyes, 2011), nonconscious mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999), contagion (Thorpe, 1963), response facilitation (Byrne, 2002), or social 
facilitation (Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000), and regarded as taxonomically more 
general, involves the unintentional imitation of a motor pattern that was already part 
of the imitator’s behavioural repertoire. Simple imitation is widely implicated in 
processes such as behavioural contagion, behavioural synchrony and group cohesion 
(Chartrand & Van Baaren, 2009), and forms the basis of discussion in Chapter 4. 
However, while simple or complex forms of imitation are often inferred, empirically it 
might often be difficult to tease apart one form from another (Byrne, 2002; Heyes & 
Ray, 2000), and a recent experimental investigation suggests that both processes 
might often be operating simultaneously (Belot et al., 2013).  
 
Emulation  
Emulation has also been subject to different definitions within the field of social 
learning (Byrne, 2002; Whiten et al., 2004), but can broadly be considered as 
describing the process by which an animal copies the environmental results of 
another’s actions, rather than the bodily actions themselves (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013, 
p77). Thus, an example of emulation might be an observer tying to recreate the object 
movements made by another individual (e.g., making a door move in the same 
manner/direction as another moved it). Alternatively, emulation could also constitute 
an observer trying to recreate the end product of another’s behaviour (e.g., an artefact 
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that another has created), without use of knowledge of the action or object movements 
that were involved in the product’s initial creation.   
 
Stimulus and local enhancement 
Stimulus and local enhancement are commonly regarded as abundant throughout the 
animal kingdom and are considered two of the simplest forms of social learning 
(Spence, 1937; Thorpe, 1963). Stimulus enhancement is said to occur when an 
individual’s behaviour results in a second observer individual becoming more 
responsive, and more likely to interact with, a single stimulus (Hoppitt & Laland, 
2013). For example, an individual performing the target behaviour on a stimulus, 
through increasing a second observer individual’s interaction with the same stimulus, 
might subsequently lead to an increase in the rate at which the observer learns and 
acquires the behaviour performed by the first individual. Similarly, local enhancement 
occurs when exposure to an individual’s presence, or interaction with objects, at a 
particular location, results in an increase in the rate at which an observing individual 
visits, or interacts with objects, at that same location (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013).  
  
Identifying social learning mechanisms  
Despite on-going definitional debates in imitation research, the majority of scholars 
have generally agreed upon the adoption of the two-action task for assessing imitative 
learning abilities in instrumental contexts (Dawson & Foss, 1965; Galef, 1988; 
Whiten & Ham, 1992; Heyes, 1993; Heyes & Ray, 2000; Zentall, 2001; for a contrary 
view see Byrne, 2002). Developed by Dawson and Foss (1965), the two-action task 
requires all test subjects to solve a task with two alternate solutions, but each subject 
is randomly assigned to witness only one solution. If the group of subjects show a 
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disproportionate tendency to match the solution they observed, imitation is assumed; 
otherwise they are assumed to have been reliant on alternative learning mechanisms, 
such as local or stimulus enhancement. However, evidence of imitative learning can 
only be confirmed if all other possible learning mechanisms can be ruled out. Heyes 
and Ray (2000) duly noted that most applications of the two-action task do not 
discriminate between imitation (copying the action topography of the demonstrator’s 
body movements), and emulation (reproducing the task-related object movements that 
resulted from the demonstrator’s actions).  
Some researchers, in attempts to disentangle the relative importance of 
imitative versus emulative learning, have assigned test groups to conditions where the 
apparatus was moved surreptitiously by the experimenter (dubbed “ghost” conditions 
by Fawcett et al., 2002), denying subjects information about the motor actions 
required to operate it (see Hopper, 2010). The reverse of the ghost condition, where 
subjects are shown the body actions necessary to operate the apparatus, but not the 
accompanying object movements, has also been implemented (Call et al., 2005).  
Results generated through the use of ghost conditions should be interpreted with 
caution, however, as the non-social context in which the demonstration occurs might 
be intrinsically less appealing to animals than contexts where another individual is 
present (Byrne, 2002).  
While categorisations of social learning mechanisms are explicit in their 
descriptions of the behavioural processes through which an animal might socially 
learn, the neural underpinnings of each mechanism are still poorly understood. This 
has obvious implications for existing assumptions concerning the complexity of one 
learning mechanism relative to another, which might prove to be incorrect, and also 
for claims regarding the evolved specificity of mechanisms for use in social learning 
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(Heyes, 2012b). A number of neural mechanisms that might underpin social learning, 
especially imitative learning, have been proposed, but will not be discussed further 
here (see Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2009; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013).  
 
 
1.3. High-fidelity social transmission 
 
The fidelity of social transmission – that is the accuracy and efficiency with which 
learned behaviours can spread between individuals – is considered pivotal to the 
remarkable cultural achievements of our species (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1996; 
Galef, 1992; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Morgan et al., 2015a; Tomasello, 1999).  It has 
been argued compellingly that the faithful and efficient transfer of culturally learned 
information is what allows each new generation of learners to build upon the 
achievements of its predecessors: a process that has been termed ‘cultural ratcheting’ 
(Tomasello et al., 1993). By this view, human beings have evolved the high-fidelity 
learning mechanisms necessary to initiate and fuel the cultural ratcheting process, 
while other animals, reliant on more erroneous, lower-fidelity forms of social 
transmission, must reinvent the wheel each time (Tennie et al., 2009).  
Support for this argument is offered by a recent comparative study in which a 
battery of cognitive tests was conducted across groups of chimpanzees, orang-utans 
and 2.5-year-old children (Herrmann et al., 2007). The results of this study suggested 
that cultural rather than general intelligence appears to be accounting for the human–
nonhuman cultural gap: while each of the species exhibited rather similar abilities 
across cognitive domains associated with the physical world (i.e., assessing quantities, 
understanding space and causality), the human children far exceeded the other ape 
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species on skills relating to the social world (i.e., social learning, communication, and 
shared intentionality; but see de Waal et al., 2008, for a critique of these findings).  
Of course, social learning must still work in tandem with novel invention and 
causal reasoning in order to accumulate cultural improvements: high-fidelity 
transmission and innovation are thought to be the dual engines driving cultural 
complexity. To this end, recent experimental evidence suggests that human cultural 
prowess may result from an ability to apply high-fidelity copying selectively and 
strategically in combination with skills such as individual learning (innovation) and 
trait recombination (Derex & Boyd, 2016; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Wood et al., 
2015; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015; for further discussion on selective social learning 
see 'Social learning strategies' below and Chapter 3). This suggestion chimes with 
other empirical evidence implying that, across primate species at least, social and 
individual learning abilities have coevolved (Reader & Laland, 2002; Reader et al., 
2011).  
 
Models and mechanisms of high-fidelity learning 
The case for fidelity as a key player in the evolution of human cultural complexity has 
received support from a number of theoretical models. For example, using a series of 
analytical models to investigate the factors underpinning cultural stability and 
transmission, Enquist et al. (2010) found that, above a given population threshold, 
relatively small increases in transmission fidelity could lead to disproportionately 
large increases in both the amount and longevity of cultural traits. These findings 
suggest that, through ensuring the perseverance of cultural traits for long enough to 
undergo cumulative modification, just small shifts in transmission fidelity might have 
been enough to initiate and fuel the cultural ratcheting that now typifies our species. 
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Likewise, Lewis and Laland (2012), employing simple mathematical models of 
cultural trait accumulation, discovered that fidelity (here represented by the inverse of 
a parameter that determined the relative rate at which useful traits could be lost from 
the population) was far more deterministic of the level of cultural complexity 
achieved than other contributory factors, such as new innovations, modifications, or 
the recombination of existing traits. When fidelity was below a certain threshold, 
cumulative culture did not get off the ground.   
Transmission fidelity in theoretical investigations of cultural evolution has 
been modelled explicitly as a function of learning outcomes (i.e., the frequency, 
complexity, perseverance or the payoffs associated with cultural traits), adopting the 
‘phenotypic gambit’ and bypassing consideration of the particular psychological and 
behavioural mechanisms that give rise to faithful transmission (e.g., Enquist et al., 
2010; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Rendell et al., 2010a). The particular psychological and 
behavioural mechanisms that might afford cultural fidelity have instead been the 
domain of psychologists and biologists interested in comparative cultural cognition. 
The relative importance of the different social learning mechanisms has been much 
debated. Imitation has received a special status (e.g., Galef, 1992; Tennie et al., 2009; 
Tomasello, 1999), yet the evidence for an especial role of imitative learning in 
instrumental cultural transmission is equivocal (see below).  
 
Is imitation required for instrumental learning and cultural ratcheting? 
The elevated status awarded to imitation in explanations of human cultural complexity 
is questionable in light of evidence that nonhuman animals also engage in complex 
imitation. Marmosets are capable of imitating the actions used by a demonstrator to 
remove a lid from a canister with remarkable fidelity, for instance (Voelkl & Huber, 
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2007). Likewise birds, such as pigeons (Saggerson et al., 2005) and quail (Akins & 
Zentall, 1998; Dorrance & Zentall, 2001), will imitate a conspecific’s actions if those 
actions have previously led to a desirable food reward. While this does not preclude 
the possibility that human imitation is quantitatively different from imitation in other 
species – humans may be capable of imitating more detailed or more complex 
sequences of actions – it does suggest that human imitation need not result from 
qualitatively dissimilar neural underpinnings (Heyes, 2012b). However, that imitation 
is found in animals taxonomically distant from humans suggests that imitation per se 
does not account for the human-nonhuman cultural gap. Indeed, even those 
researchers who emphasise imitation in explanations of human cultural uniqueness, 
regard it as necessary, but not sufficient, for cumulative culture (Tennie et al., 2009; 
Tomasello, 1999).  
Yet testing for evidence of imitation in other species is itself a qualitatively 
different question than asking: Does imitation lead to increases in the fidelity (i.e., 
success/accuracy) of cultural trait transmission? Or, Is imitation necessary for cultural 
ratcheting? Direct attempts to answer the first of these two questions have been 
neglected in studies of instrumental social learning, and hindered by two issues: the 
conflation of imitation with high-fidelity cultural transmission, and the conflation of 
imitation with emulative learning.  
Imitation is oft assumed synonymous with the successful or high-fidelity 
transmission of instrumental culture, whilst other mechanisms, such as local 
enhancement or end-product emulation, are assumed to result in lower-fidelity, less 
successful learning outcomes (e.g., Caldwell et al., 2012; Tennie et al., 2009). 
However, there is little empirical evidence that supports the relationship inferred, 
which may have resulted in part from an oversight of imitation’s dual cultural role. 
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Specifically, in one of its roles, imitation might act to facilitate the transmission of 
instrumental culture (e.g., creating technological artefacts, or food extraction). 
Alternatively, imitation might comprise the cultural behaviour (as in the case of 
imitating many ritual and conventional behaviours; see below). In its latter role, 
successful or high-fidelity cultural transmission is synonymous with the occurrence of 
imitation. Yet in its former role, high-fidelity cultural transmission does not 
automatically infer imitation, or vice versa; though this is frequently assumed.  
Experiments utilising the two-action task exemplify the conflation between 
imitation and high-fidelity learning. To my knowledge, only one study utilising the 
two-action paradigm has specifically attempted to address whether behaviour 
indicative of imitation is associated with higher levels of successful learning, relative 
to lower-level learning mechanisms. Interestingly, Fredman and Whiten (2008) report 
that, during a tool learning task, groups of capuchin monkeys displaying a high level 
of matching to the demonstrated actions were not significantly more successful at 
obtaining a food reward than monkeys limited to learning through stimulus 
enhancement. This finding chimes with examples of behavioural transmission in more 
naturalistic settings. Both the spread of potato washing behaviour in Japanese 
macaques, and of milk-bottle-top opening through populations of British blue tits, 
were initially reported as ‘cultural’ behaviours transmitted by processes akin to human 
imitation (Kawai, 1965; Bonner, 1980; Manning, 1979; Wittenberger, 1981), yet later 
re-described to more plausibly arise from simpler learning mechanisms, such as 
stimulus or local enhancement (e.g. Galef, 1990, 1992; Heyes, 1994; Laland & 
Hoppitt, 2003; Tomasello, 1999). Whether or not, and in what contexts, imitative 
learning leads to an increase in the successful transmission of instrumental culture 
remains an open empirical question.  
  15 
89 
The two-action task, regarded as the ‘litmus test’ of imitative learning 
(Caldwell & Whiten, 2002), also demonstrates a further conflation in debates about 
human cultural learning: that of imitative versus emulative learning. Evidence of 
matching the demonstrated solution (i.e., of moving the apparatus, or of using a 
particular body part) does not discriminate between whether an observer was 
matching the demonstrator’s body actions (imitation), object movements (emulation), 
or both (Heyes & Ray, 2000). The difficulty inherent in teasing these two processes 
apart has led some to call into question the utility of conceiving an imitation-
emulation dualism in instrumental learning, which could represent an oversimplified 
dichotomy of the action- and object-oriented processes required (e.g., Heyes, 2012a; 
Whiten et al., 2004). Proponents of the imitation-emulation dichotomy, who 
emphasise a special role for ‘imitative’ learning in humans (e.g., Tennie et al., 2009), 
have also fallen into this trap, pitching the human-nonhuman cultural divide in terms 
of ‘process copying’ (humans) versus ‘product copying’ (nonhumans). Specifically, it 
is unclear whether copying the process of action movements (imitation), or the 
process of object movements (emulation), is of greater importance in this context.   
Interestingly, in this vein, experiments employing ‘ghost conditions’ 
specifically to isolate and test emulative learning abilities suggest that human children 
are more competent than chimpanzees at emulating object movements, despite the 
latter’s characterisation as ‘emulators’ (Hopper et al., 2007, 2010). In contrast, when 
provided with information about the full process (action and object movements), 
matching to a demonstrator’s method of task manipulation has been evidenced across 
a range of primate species, from chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 2005), to capuchins 
(Dindo et al., 2010), colobus monkeys (Price & Caldwell, 2007), marmosets (Voelkl 
& Huber, 2007), and lemurs (Stoinski et al., 2011), suggesting that faithfully 
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matching the demonstrated process is not an exclusive human proclivity (see also 
Whiten et al., 2009).  Yet as noted above, whether or not this ability results in higher 
fidelity transmission of learning outcomes (i.e., instrumental success) has been largely 
overlooked, but is considered in more detail, using data from published two-action 
tests of primate social learning, in Chapter 2.  
 Recent empirical attempts to examine whether imitation is required for 
cultural ratcheting have relied on laboratory simulations of cumulative learning, 
within transmission chains of human participants tasked with instrumental goals (e.g., 
building a paper airplane). These studies have also conflated imitative versus 
emulative learning processes, comparing the efficacy of opportunities to copy 
artefacts (end product emulation) with opportunities to copy the construction process 
(process imitation/emulation). The results of these experiments are equivocal, 
however, with some studies claiming that learning from the end products of others is 
sufficient to generate cumulative improvements (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner & 
Thornton, 2015); another study claiming that process information is required 
(Wasielewski, 2014); and yet another study suggesting that opportunities to witness 
the construction process might not be sufficient to sustain cumulative improvements, 
unless complemented by verbal instruction (Morgan et al., 2015a). The inconsistency 
of findings across studies likely results from a combination of procedural differences 
(e.g., whether or not participants received explicit information about the efficacy of 
previous task solutions) and differences in the novelty and difficulty (opacity) of the 
tasks presented (Caldwell & Millen, 2010; Derex et al., 2012), implying that the 
utility of opportunities to copy action and/or object movements in cumulative learning 
is likely context specific.   
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Only one transmission chain study has attempted to examine the effect of 
learning mechanisms on the fidelity with which artefact designs were transmitted 
between successive chain generations. Zwirner and Thornton (2015), employing a 
task that required participants to make a basket, found that learning from end products 
resulted in lower transmission fidelity (of basket design) relative to opportunities to 
witness others building or to transmit information through verbal instruction, but did 
not prevent cumulative improvements in basket success (i.e, ability to carry rice). It is 
unclear why learning from end products resulted in lower fidelity transmission of 
basket design in this study, but the findings do highlight the interesting possibility that 
some cultural artefacts, through innovative redesign, might not depend upon the 
highest level of transmission between learners in order to gain gradual improvements 
in efficiency or function. However, Zwirner and Thornton’s findings also supported 
an especial role for high-fidelity teaching through verbal instruction – chains that 
permitted teaching trumped all other learning mechanisms with regards basket 
efficiency – echoing results from another transmission chain study that investigated 
the real-world and difficult-to-acquire skill of stone tool knapping (Morgan et al., 
2015a). 
Teaching, through verbal instruction, is one of a suite of socio-cognitive traits, 
including shared intentionality and extreme pro-sociality, that are considered unique 
or much enhanced in humans, and which, over and above our propensity to engage in 
imitative learning  (and/or emulative learning), are believed to play a key role in 
cultural ratcheting (Tomasello, 1999).  While it has been suggested that intention 
attribution might also be involved in guiding nonhuman social learning (Burkart et al., 
2012), the absence of evidence for intentional teaching in other animals (Tomasello & 
Herrmann, 2010), coupled with evidence suggestive of their reduced proclivity to 
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engage in cooperative endeavours relative to our own (e.g., Warneken et al., 2006), 
lends some support to this view.  So too does the observation that human children 
appear particularly receptive to pedagogical cues (Gergely & Csibra, 2006), readily 
incorporating the intentional teachings of adults, and actively perpetuating the trans-
generational fidelity of their culture (Tomasello & Herrmann, 2010). Perhaps 
cementing the evidence that a suite of cultural cognition, rather than any one single 
cognitive trait, is what equips humans for cumulative learning (Tomasello, 1999), is a 
study directly comparing the learning abilities of children, chimpanzees and 
capuchins. Using a sequential puzzle box, exhibiting three stages of increasing 
difficulty, Dean et al. (2012) showed that only the children were able to build upon 
their achievements at lower levels. Critically, the key to their success appeared to be 
enhanced tendencies towards pro-sociality, verbal teaching, and imitative/emulative 
learning, relative to the chimpanzees and capuchins.    
 
Imitation in ritual and conventional behaviour 
Complex and cumulative culture also often depends upon conventional and ritual 
behaviours, and it is in these that imitation occupies an indisputable role. As in the 
case of transmitting gestures, dance and many other arbitrary cultural expressions, 
imitation itself becomes the end goal of cultural learning, and the fidelity with which 
action topographies are transmitted is paramount. This observation has led many 
authors to argue that high-fidelity motor pattern imitation might have evolved to 
function more predominantly as a ‘social glue’ rather than in instrumental cultural 
propagation (Clegg & Legare, 2015; Heyes, 2012a). This suggestion finds support in 
evidence from nonhuman animals, who appear to imitate action topographies more 
accurately when tasked with recreating arbitrary body movements than when 
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attempting to manipulate objects to recreate instrumental outcomes, but also 
experience increased difficultly when tasked with the former compared to the latter 
goal (reviewed in Huber et al., 2009).  
Additional support for this view is offered by a series of recent studies with 
human children, examining the fidelity with which they imitate a sequence of object 
manipulations. These studies have demonstrated that children’s imitative fidelity 
increases when the demonstration is provided using a ritual rather than instrumental 
stance (i.e., synchronous vs. non-synchronous behaviour; Herrmann et al., 2013), or 
using conventional rather than instrumental language cues (Clegg & Legare, 2015; 
Legare et al., 2015; Herrmann et al., 2013), and also when they have been ostracized 
rather than included by members of their in-group (Watson-Jones et al., 2015). Legare 
and Nielsen (2015) argue that this reduction in imitative fidelity that occurs when 
learning is instrumentally rather than conventionally driven is necessary for the 
discovery and cultural accumulation of novel technological inventions.           
 
Over-imitation  
‘Over-imitation’ describes the fascinating phenomenon whereby both children and 
adults, in experimental settings, have been observed to blanket copy even those parts 
of an action sequence that are manifestly causally irrelevant to achieving an 
instrumental goal (e.g., tapping a tool on a puzzle box, or operating a task 
manipulandum that is visibly disconnected from the instrumental goal; Lyons et al., 
2007; McGuigan et al., 2011). This tendency, which on the surface appears to 
demonstrate an ‘irrational’ and potentially ‘costly’ copying mechanism (Price et al., 
2010; McGuigan et al., 2007), has been observed across diverse cultures (e.g. Nielsen 
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& Tomaselli, 2010; Nielsen et al., 2015), but has not been replicated in our closest 
extant relative, the chimpanzee (Horner & Whiten, 2005).  
Debates concerning this puzzling phenomenon exemplify imitation’s dual role. 
Some authors have offered explanations grounded in causal cognition, arguing that 
over-imitation may reflect an adaptive high-fidelity copying mechanism, which 
facilitates our species unique capacity for cultural ratcheting through ensuring the 
transmission of causally opaque artefact functions; but which also occasionally 
misfires resulting in non-efficacious behaviours being copied (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 
2005; Lyons et al., 2007). Others have argued that, while the experimental paradigms 
used to study over-imitation reflect an historical emphasis within comparative 
psychology on the instrumental functions of imitation, such high-fidelity copying is 
more plausibly explained by socially driven motivations, such as affiliative or 
conventional goals (e.g., Legare et al., 2015; Nielsen, 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2013; 
for a detailed overview of the competing hypotheses see Kenward, 2012). The use of 
instrumental puzzle boxes in over-imitation research has again resulted in the 
conflation of imitative learning with other mechanisms such as emulation, leading 
some authors to propose ‘over-copying’ as a more appropriate term (Whiten et al., 
2009).  
There has been little consensus reached in the ongoing debate. At one extreme, 
authors have argued that irrelevant actions are automatically encoded as causally 
relevant, and that their performance is not responsive to behavioural cost (Lyons et 
al., 2007, 2011). At the other extreme, it has been claimed that irrelevant action 
copying is intentional, and that it is moderated by social cues such as normativity 
(e.g., Keupp et al., 2013, 2015) and by the perceived behavioural costs of performing 
the action (Keupp et al., 2016). Experiments are required to clarify a number of 
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important questions. These include: How do selective and adaptive learning biases 
(see below) impact the transmission of causally irrelevant actions? Is ‘over-imitation’ 
prevalent in social learning in the ‘real world’, or is it predominantly an artefact of 
experimental design? And, To what extent does the term ‘over-imitation’ – which 
might suggest a natural predilection to ‘too much copying’ – accurately convey the 
copying propensities of our species? I attempt to address and discuss some of these 
questions in Chapter 3. 
 
 
1.4. Strategic and biased social learning 
 
The puzzling phenomenon of ‘over-imitation’ draws our attention to the possibility 
that social transmission might not always be beneficial: information might be out-
dated, misleading or ineffective (Giraldeau et al., 2002; Rogers, 1988). When 
individual trial-and-error learning is costly or risky, high-fidelity social transmission 
offers an alternate, potentially cheap mode of valuable information acquisition: but 
only if learning is directed towards reliable social models (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Rendell et al., 2010b; Kendal et al., 2009a). In order to solve this conundrum, 
researchers interested in cultural evolutionary processes have focussed on how 
animals filter social information adaptively, such that they might take advantage of 
the information available from others. The solution proposes that natural selection has 
fashioned social learning that is strategic, and guided by adaptive heuristics regarding 
‘when’ and ‘whom’ and ‘what’ to copy (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003; Laland, 2004). 
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  ‘When’ strategies refer to the conditions under which an individual might 
choose to learn socially instead of individually, and include heuristics such as, ‘copy 
when uncertain,’ or, ‘copy when individual learning has proven too costly, or 
dissatisfying, or failed’ (e,g., Laland, 2004). Evidence supporting the existence of 
‘when’ strategies has been provided by theoretical models of cultural evolution, which 
suggest that social learning may only be preferred when individual learning has 
proven unviable (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1995; Enquist et al., 2007; though see 
Rendell et al., 2010a), and by empirical investigations of social learning, conducted 
with both human (e.g., Morgan et al., 2012; Toelch et al., 2014) and nonhuman 
animals (van Bergen et al., 2004; Webster & Laland, 2008).  
 ‘Who’ and ‘what’ strategies, also referred to as learning biases (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985), describe whom one should choose to copy or learn from and what 
one should copy. These have also received support from a number of theoretical 
models (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Powell et al., 2009), and from empirical studies 
conducted with humans and non-human animals (e.g., Kendal et al., 2015; Morgan et 
al., 2012).  ‘What’ strategies can be based on the content of the information conveyed, 
such as content that evokes a strong emotional response (e.g, Bell & Sternberg, 2001) 
or conveys useful social or survival information (e.g, Mesoudi et al., 2006). ‘Whom’ 
strategies depend on the learning context, such as properties of the model’s age (e.g., 
Wood et al., 2012), success (e.g., Mesoudi, 2008), and familiarity (e.g., Corriveau & 
Harris, 2009), or on the relative frequency of models (e.g., Morgan et al., 2015b), or 
frequency of the behaviour (e.g., Toelch et al., 2010), in the population.  
The existence of guided or biased social learning not only serves to steer 
individual social learning away from out-dated or inappropriate information, but also 
profoundly influences the process of cultural evolution at the population level, across 
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spatial and temporal dimensions. For example, learning biases such as ‘copy the most 
successful’ or ‘copy the majority’ serve to increase group-level behavioural 
coordination, through directing cultural evolution towards homogenisation (Chudek & 
Henrich, 2011; Kendal et al., 2009a), and are also believed to occupy a key role in 
human cultural ratcheting, through guiding population-level learning towards the 
currently established local optima (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; 
Powell et al., 2009; for a discussion of how these biases might also act to reduce the 
tempo of cultural ratcheting see Eriksson et al., 2007; Mason et al., 2008)  
Particular attention, from theoreticians and empiricists alike, has been awarded 
to majority-biased transmission (van Leeuwen et al., 2015), which is examined in 
relation to ‘over-imitation’ in Chapter 3. Because the majority behaviour represents 
the behaviour that the greatest proportion of group members have converged upon, it 
is expected to signal a relatively safe, reliable, and adaptive behavioural response 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Wolf et 
al., 2013). For a majority trait to remain stable, the probability with which a naïve 
individual adopts the trait must at least match the proportional size of the majority 
group within the population. When the probability that the majority trait is adopted is 
disproportionate, or exceeds the proportional size of the majority, it is referred to as 
conformist transmission, and the trait is expected to increase in the population to 
fixation (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). 
 Theoretical investigations suggest that even when transmission fidelity is very 
high, the error introduced by just a very small number of copying imperfections can 
result in a substantial decay in the longevity of cultural traits, unless augmented by 
stabilising biases, such as majority or conformist transmission (Claidière & Sperber, 
2010). The absence of majority-biased copying tendencies has been proposed to 
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explain the often fleeting and temporary establishment of arbitrary behavioural 
traditions in nonhuman animal societies, and is illustrated by a field experiment with 
wild meerkats (Thornton & Malapert, 2009). However, two recent field experiments, 
investigating artificially induced feeding preferences in wild vervet monkeys (van de 
Waal et al., 2013) and birds (Aplin et al., 2015b), and an agent-based simulation of 
natural communication patterns in sperm whale clans (Cantor et al., 2015), have 
challenged the view that nonhuman animal cultures lack the conformist-like 
tendencies necessary to establish and maintain behavioural traditions; echoing earlier 
experimental findings from captive groups of chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 2005), and 
fish (Pike & Laland, 2010). (For a discussion of whether the behavioural patterns 
observed are strictly attributable to majority-biased or conformist learning strategies, 
see Aplin et al., 2015a; van Leeuwen et al., 2015.)  
Although social learning strategies are typically deployed in a mechanism 
neutral manner (Laland, 2004), a recent series of articles (e.g., Heyes & Pearce, 2015; 
Heyes, 2016) has nonetheless taken issue with the depiction of social learning 
strategies as cognitively fixed or hardwired algorithms. The work presented in 
Chapter 3 suggests that, on the contrary, many social learning strategies are likely 
highly flexible, and that their operation could be influenced by a range of 
developmental and context specific interactions, including cultural processes in 
humans (reviewed in Mesoudi et al., 2016). Future work on social learning strategies 
must look to identify how heuristics governing the use of social information differ 
between human and nonhuman animals in ways that help explain the cultural gap. 
Simulations already undertaken on this issue have suggested that increases in highly 
selective and refined copying strategies, along with a greater reliance on social 
information more generally, are two such candidate factors (Rendell et al., 2010a).  
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1.5. Large-scale human interaction, cooperation and culture 
 
The study of biased or strategic social learning illustrates the importance of 
contextualising the operation of cultural cognition at the level of cultural groups. 
Exemplifying this point further is the perplexing disconnect between the emergence of 
modern human culture and modern human brains. While there is much debate 
concerning the exact spatial and temporal emergence of cultural modernity (Klein, 
2000; Mcbrearty & Brooks, 2000; Mellars, 2005; Stringer, 2007) – which includes the 
first evidence of consistent symbolic behaviour, sophisticated hunting technology, and 
artefacts constructed from materials such as ivory, bone and antler – its heterogeneous 
spatial and temporal structuring, frequently reported as occurring many tens of 
thousands of years after human brain size reached anatomical modernity ~160-200 
kya (Stringer, 2007), raises an unavoidable question: How do we account for the 
misfit between the chronological emergence of modern human culture and modern 
human brains?  
Building on earlier work by Henrich (2004a), Powell et al. (2009), combining 
information from the archaeological record, population genetics and agent-based 
simulations of cumulative cultural transmission, have demonstrated that demographic 
processes, such as increased population density and increased migration between sub 
populations, were likely a major determinant in the onset of cultural modernity, and 
can also account for the heterogeneity of its emergence across space and time: Only 
after having reached a critical population density threshold are cultural groups able to 
maintain sufficient cultural fidelity to initiate the ratcheting process. Powell and 
colleagues’ findings are intuitive: larger numbers of highly skilled demonstrators are 
likely to exist in larger populations, buffering groups against stochastic population 
events and information loss through erroneous transmission, if individuals 
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preferentially attempt to learn from highly skilled demonstrators. Empirical support 
for these findings has been offered both from ‘real world’ analyses of cultural 
complexity among island populations in Oceania (Kline & Boyd, 2010), and from 
computer-based laboratory experiments of cumulative learning (Derex et al., 2013; 
Derex & Boyd, 2016; for a contrary view see Vaesen et al., 2016).   
That humans are able to exist in such large-scale societies and engage in the 
frequent exchange of cultural information between non-relatives hinges upon yet 
another unique tendency: our ultra-cooperativeness. Indeed, observations of human 
cooperativeness have long presented an enigma for evolutionary biologists. The 
accompanying literature is vast, and driven by debate and disagreement surrounding 
whether standard gene-based evolutionary theories – such as direct reciprocity, 
indirect reciprocity and kin selection – can account for the seemingly extreme levels 
of cooperativeness found within large and primarily unrelated groups of humans (Fehr 
et al., 2002; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Gintis et al., 2003; West et al., 2011). Semantic 
inconsistencies surrounding the use of terms such as altruism, mutualism and strong 
reciprocity in the study of cooperation have further compounded the debate over its 
evolution (West et al., 2007).  This debate is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
therefore will not be debated here (for recent reviews see: Richerson et al., 2016; 
West et al., 2011). However, in discussing cooperative behaviour, I adopt a simple, 
inclusive working definition, which is popular in the empirical literature (West et al., 
2007), that includes: ‘any behaviour that provides a benefit to the recipient, which 
could be beneficial or costly to the actor,’ Sachs et al., 2004).  
A related topic that is of much relevance to this thesis is the growing evidence 
of a mutual dependence between cooperation and culture. For instance, a network-
based simulation of cultural accumulation across extant ape and early human 
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populations, parameterised by estimates of each species’ life history and socio-
ecology, suggests that increases in cooperative interactions, which were possibly 
initiated by increases in cooperative breeding, were a driving force in the initiation of 
cultural ratcheting, through enhanced opportunities for social learning and exchange 
(Pradhan et al., 2012). This echoes findings from comparative analyses across extant 
primate species, showing that cooperative breeding is positively associated with 
proactive prosociality, social transmission and more complex communication; traits 
that are considered particularly enhanced in the suite of human cultural cognition 
(Burkart & van Schaik, 2010; Burkart et al., 2014).  
Even more compelling support for the coevolution of cultural complexity and 
cooperation is provided by investigations of human interaction in the ‘real world’. Hill 
et al. (2011), in an examination of human social networks across 32 contemporary 
foraging societies, discovered the signature of a uniquely human pattern of social 
interaction. Contrary to previous beliefs, the hunter-gatherer bands that constitute 
these 32 diverse societies exhibit high levels of co-residence between non-kin – a 
pattern not found in other primates – which facilitates enhanced cooperation and 
cultural exchange within and between neighbouring bands. Hill and colleagues argue 
that the large interaction networks between non-kin that ensue, drive increased 
information sharing between bands, amplifying the evolutionary processes 
underpinning human cultural ratcheting, and engaging culture and cooperation in a 
coevolutionary cycle.  
A subsequent analysis of Ache and Hadza hunter gatherer tribes reinforces 
these findings, showing a high probability of cultural and cooperative interactions 
between any two randomly chosen members of a tribe, and estimating that men are 
likely to observe over 300 other men making tools throughout their lifetime, in 
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comparison to male chimpanzees who are only likely to interact with 20 other males 
(Hill et al., 2014).  Moreover, a social network analysis of Tanzanian hunter-gatherers 
has revealed striking structural regularities between the network structures of hunter-
gatherers and modernised populations, raising the possibility that natural selection has 
fashioned some structural properties of human social networks (Apicella et al., 2012). 
The consistent network properties this analysis identified – transitivity and reciprocity 
between individuals – are believed to foster connections between non-kin and ensure 
that co-operators tend to cluster together; features believed to favour the evolution of 
large-scale cooperation (Nowak et al., 2010) and amplify the process of cultural 
transmission (Hill et al., 2011).  
While large-scale cooperation acts to scaffold the evolution of increasing 
cultural complexity, cultural transmission functions to stabilise and maintain 
cooperative interactions.  Culture’s role in maintaining societal cooperation can be 
seen most conspicuously in the operation of socially transmitted norms of cooperative 
behaviour, and in the cultural evolution of formal institutions, such as central 
governments and religious laws (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). Indeed, young children 
readily learn and incorporate, and are also strikingly inflexible about, the normative 
behaviours and values of their culture (Levy et al., 1995; Tomasello & Herrmann, 
2010).  Moreover, a series of experiments conducted using economic games suggest 
that norms of cooperation vary cross-culturally (Henrich et al., 2005; Herrmann et al., 
2008). These experiments, that have included ultimatum, third-party punishment, and 
public goods games, indicate that individuals across all societies cooperate at higher 
levels than if they were trying to maximise their own economic gain, but also vary in 
cooperativeness in a manner consistent with the institutional and civic properties of 
their cultures. This variation has fuelled wide debate regarding whether cultural group 
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selection – which occurs if groups that evolve highly cooperative norms are able to 
outcompete those that didn’t – has played a key role in the evolution of human hyper-
cooperation (reviewed in Richerson et al., 2016).  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the mechanisms of simple and automatic 
imitation (see ‘Imitation’ above) are also believed to be hard at work in cementing 
cooperation within cultural groups. Humans have long been observed to 
subconsciously imitate each other’s body movements and mannerisms; a tendency 
that has been replicated in semi-natural experimental settings, where it has also been 
shown that its occurrence serves to promote cooperative interactions (reviewed in 
Chartrand & Van Baaren, 2009). Automatic imitation can even occur when it 
interferes with our ability to perform a task (e.g., our ability to grasp an object when 
watching another simultaneously releasing their grasp; Heyes, 2011); a phenomenon 
that so far has only been replicated in budgerigars and domestic dogs (Range et al., 
2011). It is proposed that, just as our predilection towards subconscious imitation 
fosters increased liking and cooperation, cooperative interaction in turn serves to 
increase imitation; thus engaging these two processes in a virtuous circle of 
reciprocity (Heyes, 2012a). Although the mechanisms that have given rise to this 
virtuous circle in human interactions are still poorly understood, it is plausible that the 
processes responsible for engaging simple imitation and cooperation in this process of 
mutual reinforcement, have not only acted as a ‘social glue’, but also as a springboard 
for more complex forms of cultural learning and cooperation (Heyes, 2012a). The 
virtuous circle is discussed further and forms the basis of the work presented in 
Chapter 4.  
Between the formal dictations of our cultural norms and institutions, and the 
silent operation of the virtuous circle, there is one other obvious, yet overlooked, way 
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that our cultural dependence might solidify cooperation: reputation. A fundamental 
property of human interaction involves repetition: and where repetition is possible, 
reputation is often at stake. The public goods game (PGG), which exemplifies the 
interplay between cooperative behaviour and reputation, is the classic laboratory 
paradigm for studying the collective action dilemmas that routinely characterise 
human interactions. In a typical PGG experiment, individuals choose how much to 
contribute to a public pool, which benefits all group members equally. The maximum 
benefit for the group is then achieved if all group members contribute the full amount; 
yet individual free riders benefit more by withholding their own contribution while 
still benefiting from the pool.   
Despite the economic incentive to free ride, behaviour in the PGG has been 
used to argue that humans have evolved strong prosocial tendencies (Fehr et al., 2002; 
Rand et al., 2012; although see Burton-Chellew & West, 2013). For instance, cross-
culturally human subjects contribute at much higher levels to the PGG than if they 
were maximising their individual gain (Henrich et al. 2005). They are also willing to 
punish defectors (Henrich et al., 2006), and reward co-operators (Rand et al., 2009), at 
an additional cost to themselves, which serves to discourage the emergence of free 
rider strategies in repeated interactions. Cultural norms appear to play a role, and 
reputation is key. Yet cultural exchange might often constitute a cooperative dilemma 
in its own right (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Rendell et al., 2011b) – of sharing 
individually-gleaned information for the collective benefit, or withholding that same 
information to maintain a competitive edge – further helping to consolidate the 
reputation-based matrix that upholds large-scale interaction. Moreover, if access to 
cultural information is itself dependent on the establishment of cooperative reputation, 
then it is plausible that our species’ extreme dependence on cultural learning may 
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serve to encourage cooperative reputation building across multiple behavioural 
domains; potentially offering a cheaper system of sanction or reward against free 
riders than other costly alternatives. This suggestion will be examined further in 




The glaring and unparalleled complexity that sets human culture apart from the 
‘cultures’ of other animals – our artefacts, rituals, social institutions and technologies 
– is underpinned by a complex of interacting processes, that we are only just 
beginning to understand. At the micro level, the specific psychological and 
behavioural mechanisms that afford social learning, especially the faithful 
transmission of instrumental culture, are still a moot point. Yet faithful copying is 
ineffective unless directed towards the right opportunities and individuals. A growing 
body of evidence is beginning to unravel the learning heuristics that guide faithful 
copying; that permit us to filter and take advantage of social information, and preserve 
fundamental facets of our cultural repertoire. The operation of learning heuristics 
reminds us that faithful and guided transmission plays out in populations, both within 
and between cultural groups. Cultural evolution on the macro level is dependent on 
our remarkable ability to cooperate in large groups with non-kin. The evolution of our 
ultra-cooperativeness, in turn, has likely been scaffolded by its interaction with the 
mechanisms and processes underpinning cultural transmission, yet this relationship is 
currently under-researched. In sum, a deeper understanding of culture’s constituent 
mechanisms, how they interact, support, amplify, and constrain the cultural process, 
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from the micro through to the macro level, is key to understanding the unparalleled 
feats of human culture. 
In the following chapters, I first attempt to contribute to outstanding questions 
concerning the role of social learning mechanisms, and of social learning heuristics, in 
the evolution of high-fidelity cultural transmission. The focus of the thesis then shifts 
towards an examination of the interaction between social transmission and 
cooperation, and of the role this interaction might play in supporting cultural 
complexity in humans. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I present the results of a meta-
analysis undertaken on studies of primate social learning abilities that were conducted 
using the two-action paradigm. In doing so, I attempt to shed light on the [hitherto 
neglected] question of if and when fidelity to the demonstrator’s behaviour (i.e., 
imitation or emulation) is required for the faithful transmission of instrumental 
outcomes. Chapter 3 focuses on ‘over-imitation’ in young children. Taking a cultural 
evolutionary approach, I examine the operation of adaptive learning biases (here of 
majority-biased copying) in response to behaviour containing causally irrelevant 
actions. I explore whether children’s copying of the majority extends to majorities that 
perform irrelevant actions, and discuss whether the depiction of humans as ‘over-
imitators’ is appropriate, in light of my findings.  
In Chapter 4, I present a series of experiments that explore the hypothesised 
operation of a ‘virtuous circle’ between simple imitation and cooperative behaviour. 
In this chapter, I focus on whether the establishment of cooperative rapport between 
interaction partners subsequently serves to increase imitative behaviour – a 
relationship that has previously received little empirical investigation. Chapter 5 
explores the interaction between human cultural learning and the mechanisms 
sustaining large-scale cooperation, using an experimental micro-society approach, and 
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the adoption of two linked computer games. Specifically, in this chapter I ask whether 
individuals’ dependence on access to cultural information can act to stabilize 
cooperative reputations and behaviour during repeated interactions in a public goods 
dilemma. Finally, in Chapter 6, I end with a general discussion of the findings, and 

































High-Fidelity Social Transmission: A Meta-Analysis 


































Although it is commonly assumed that learning mechanisms associated with increased 
fidelity to a demonstrator’s actions and/or object manipulations (i.e., imitation and/or 
emulation) are required for the successful transmission of instrumental cultural goals, 
there is currently little evidence to support this claim.  In this chapter I present the 
findings of a meta-analysis that was undertaken on published studies of primate social 
learning abilities that were conducted using the two-action paradigm. The results of 
this analysis suggest that, relative to learning through other mechanisms (e.g., 
local/stimulus enhancement, individual learning), social learning that exhibits high 
fidelity to the demonstrator’s behaviour offers learning advantages that increase 
incrementally with the complexity of the learning goal.  This finding supports claims 
that learning mechanisms generating high demonstrator fidelity play a key role in the 





























The fidelity of social transmission – the accuracy with which learned information and 
behaviours spread between individuals – is considered pivotal to the extraordinary and 
cumulative cultural success of our species (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Galef, 
1992; Tomasello et al., 1993; Lewis & Laland, 2012). It has been argued 
compellingly that the faithful and efficient transfer of culturally learned information is 
what allows each new generation of human cultural learners to build upon the 
achievements of its predecessors – a process termed ‘cultural ratcheting’ – and that 
this ability is lacking or much reduced in other species (Tomasello, 1999). This 
proposal has received support from theoretical models of cultural evolution (Enquist 
et al., 2010; Lewis & Laland, 2012), and has fuelled debate among interested scholars 
over whether other animals, particularly nonhuman primates, share the imitative 
learning capabilities frequently attributed to humans (Whiten et al., 2004).  
While theoreticians have focussed on modelling fidelity explicitly as a 
function of learning outcomes (i.e., the frequency, complexity, perseverance or 
payoffs associated with cultural traits; e.g., Enquist et al., 2010; Rendell et al., 2010a; 
Lewis and Laland, 2012), experimental psychologists have focussed on defining and 
detecting the psychological mechanisms and behavioural processes believed to 
underpin the fidelity of cultural transmission. A suite of socio- or cultural-cognitive 
abilities have been proposed – including verbal teaching, extreme prosociality, and 
imitation – that are considered unique or much enhanced in humans (Tomasello, 
1999), and which have received some empirical support for their concerted role in 
human cultural ratcheting from a recent comparative study of sequential learning in 
chimpanzees, capuchins and children (Dean et al., 2012).   
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However, the majority of investigations of social learning abilities, and of 
attempts to elucidate the uniqueness of human social learning, have focussed on 
experimentally testing for imitation. In contrast to teaching, which has proven 
especially difficult to verify in other species, despite occupying a seemingly diverse 
taxonomic distribution (Hoppitt et al., 2008), and human language, which is regarded 
as qualitatively different from the communication systems of other species (e.g., 
Hurford, 2007; Scott-Phillips, 2014), the ability to engage in imitative learning has to 
a lesser degree been considered the fait accompli of human beings (e.g., Voelkl & 
Huber, 2000; Whiten et al., 2004, 2009). Indeed, following an upturn in discussions 
and debates concerning whether human social learning might be uniquely imitative 
among the great apes (Galef, 1990; Tomasello, 1990; Heyes, 1993; Whiten et al., 
2004, 2009), there has been a flurry of systematic investigations of imitative learning 
abilities in human and non-human primates during the last two- to three-decades. 
As detailed in the General Introduction (Section 1.2.), most researchers have 
adopted the two-action task to test for imitative or ‘high-fidelity’ learning abilities 
(Dawson & Foss, 1965). Subjects are offered two alternative solutions for solving a 
puzzle (i.e., retrieving a reward), but half witness the demonstration of one solution 
(e.g., push the lever to the left), while the other half witness the alternate solution 
(e.g., push the lever to the right). Imitation or ‘high-fidelity’ learning is then inferred 
if the test group demonstrate a disproportionate tendency to perform (i.e., match) the 
solution they observed with a probability greater than expected at chance.   
Despite being hailed as the litmus test of imitative learning, the two-action 
paradigm does not discriminate between the relative importance of copying the action 
topography of the demonstrator’s body movements (imitation), and reproducing the 
object movements that resulted from the demonstrator’s actions (emulation) (Heyes & 
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Ray, 2000). Yet while this discrimination has been deemed important by authors who 
emphasise an especial role for action imitation in human cultural affairs  (e.g. 
Tomasello and Call, 1997), other authors have questioned the utility of awarding 
action coping an elevated status in instrumental cultural learning, which plausibly 
benefits from both action- and object-oriented copying processes (Whiten et al., 2004, 
2009). Still other authors have suggested that copying object movements (i.e., 
emulation) might be more important in transmitting instrumental culture than copying 
actions (Heyes, 2012a), and that detailed action imitation may instead be the preserve 
of social rather than instrumental goals (Legare & Nielsen, 2015).  
 While the two-action task does not speak directly to the ongoing debate over 
learning mechanisms, if positive results generated using this paradigm (i.e., evidence 
of matching the demonstrated solution) do provide an indication of high-fidelity 
learning abilities, then it becomes apparent that this ability is not exclusive to humans: 
a range of taxonomically diverse species are also implicated, including many species 
of primate (e.g., Dindo et al., 2008; Stoinski et al., 2011), dogs (Range et al., 2007), 
and birds (Akins & Zentall, 1996).  Yet while researchers have been busy applying 
the two-action paradigm across a range of taxa, they have largely neglected to confirm 
that evidence of matching the demonstrated behaviour is also concurrent with 
measurable increases in the faithful transmission and acquisition of the learning goal 
or outcome (e.g., reward retrieval or the construction of material culture).  
Only one study has directly examined this relationship, but found no evidence 
that fidelity to the demonstrator’s behaviour increased transmission of the learning 
outcome (reward retrieval), relative to lower-level learning mechanisms, such as 
stimulus enhancement (Fredman & Whiten, 2008). This finding chimes with 
observations of the successful spread of potato washing behaviour in Japanese 
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macaques, and of milk-bottle-top opening through populations of British blue tits, 
which despite being initially attributed to processes akin to imitation, later emerged to 
more plausibly arise from simpler learning mechanisms, such as enhancement effects 
(e.g. Galef, 1990, 1992; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). Transmission chain studies 
conducted with human participants, which have attempted to assess the role of 
learning mechanisms in the cumulative improvement of laboratory artefacts, have also 
returned inconsistent conclusions. For instance, opportunities to observe the 
construction behaviour of more experienced individuals (i.e., engage in imitative 
and/or emulative learning), relative to opportunities to learn from other’s end 
products, were not required to produce cumulative improvements in two studies 
(Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015), but were deemed necessary in 
a third (Wasielewski, 2014).   
There is a clear need to assess further if and when fidelity to a demonstrator’s 
behavioural process (i.e., demonstrator fidelity) is required for the successful and 
faithful cultural transmission of instrumental and material outcomes (i.e., outcome 
fidelity). In the current study, I attempted to address this question by conducting a 
meta-analysis on the growing body of primate social learning experiments that have 
utilised the two-action task paradigm. Despite researchers having largely overlooked 
the relationship between learning mechanisms and learning outcomes, it is convention 
to report both measures in published manuscripts, which presented the opportunity for 
my analysis. 
Some authors have extended the two-action task to incorporate multiple 
manipulandi in task designs of increasing complexity (e.g. Whiten, 1998; Stoinski & 
Whiten, 2003), and a number of task designs have also incorporated tool use as a 
necessary component (e.g. Call & Tomasello, 1994; Hopper et al., 2010). Tool use 
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among the animal kingdom appears to be exceedingly rare, reliant on simple 
manipulations of natural objects, and rudimentary in complexity and diversification 
outside the human lineage (Seed & Byrne, 2010; Shumaker et al., 2011; Biro et al., 
2013). Indeed, a study conducted with chimpanzees suggests that the addition of a 
tool profoundly reduces performance on a task designed to test causal understanding, 
relative to when tool use is not required (Seed et al., 2009). Evidence from humans 
and non-human primate species suggests that the process of acquiring tool-using 
abilities is likely highly dependent upon social transmission (Biro et al., 2003; Beck et 
al., 2011; Stout, 2011; Price et al., 2009; Hobaiter et al., 2014), making tool use a 
pertinent additional component in tests of instrumental social learning.  
In a preliminary analysis, using only a subset of the data (i.e. published 
experiments that had also included asocial learning controls), I tested whether groups 
that received a demonstration outperformed matched groups of asocial (individual) 
learners. I predicted that, across studies, social information would be advantageous, 
and lead to an increase in learning success relative to individual learning (Laland, 
2004; Kendal et al., 2005; Rendell et al., 2010a). During the preliminary analysis, I 
also obtained an initial gauge of how important demonstrator fidelity (identified as 
high or low by a positive or negative result on the two-action test, respectively) was in 
the successful transmission of reward retrieval (outcome fidelity), and anticipated that 
while both high and low demonstrator fidelity would afford improvements in outcome 
fidelity over asocial learning, high-fidelity matching to the demonstrator would 
facilitate the greatest improvement overall (Galef, 1992; Tomasello, 1999; Dean et al., 
2012).  
For the main analysis, which included data from all social learning 
experiments meeting the inclusion criteria, I undertook a more detailed examination 
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of the effects of demonstrator fidelity (again identified by a positive or negative result 
on the two-action test) on outcome fidelity, controlling for procedural differences 
between experiments. I hypothesised that high-fidelity matching to the demonstrator’s 
solution would prove more important to outcome fidelity at higher- relative to lower-
levels of task complexity: a prediction that follows from the thesis that mechanisms 
generating demonstrator fidelity (e.g., imitation) are an essential component of the 
cultural ratchet (Galef, 1992; Tomasello, 1999; Dean et al., 2012; Lewis & Laland, 
2012). Finally, owing to the additional learning difficulties and demands associated 
with tool use (Beck et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2015b; Seed et al., 2009; Stout, 2011), 
I also predicted that tool-using tasks would reduce learning performance, and would 
benefit disproportionately from high demonstrator fidelity.  
 
 
2.2. Materials and Methods 
 
2.2.1. Search protocol 
 
I used three search protocols to conduct literature searches in April 2014. First, 
keyword searches of two online databases were performed.  The first 30 pages of 
results were obtained from Google Scholar (Google) for the search terms “social 
learning and imitation in primates,” and “social learning and imitation in children.” 
Web of Science (Thomson Reuters) was also searched (in the TOPIC field) using the 
following keyword searches: “imitation” AND “social learning”; “social learning” 
AND “primate*”; “social learning” AND “children*”; “imitation” AND 
“primate*”; “imitation” AND “children*”; “social learning” AND “tool us*”; 
“social learning” AND “artificial fruit”; “imitation” AND “emulation.” 
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 Second, Web of Science was used to search for all articles citing 9 literature 
reviews that specifically assess and discuss the experimental evidence for imitation 
and other social learning mechanisms in non-human animals including primates 
(Galef, 1988; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Heyes, 1993; Byrne, 1995; Byrne & Tomasello, 
1995; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Shettleworth, 1998; Heyes & Ray, 2000; Zentall, 
2001; Whiten et al., 2004).  
The titles and abstracts of all returned search results were examined. Those 
considered relevant were then read in detail to ascertain if they were suitable for 
inclusion (for study inclusion criteria, see below). Lastly, I also examined articles that 
were cited in the text of other articles if they had not already been identified through 
the online database searches.  
 
2.2.2. Inclusion criteria  
 
There were several criteria for study inclusion.  Studies were only included if the test 
subjects were human children or non-human primates, restricting analyses to species 
within a taxonomically homogenous group. It was also essential that the study 
presented subjects with an instrumental learning goal (i.e., a foraging puzzle) and that 
success versus failure in obtaining the goal could be determined for each individual 
member of a test group (i.e., obtaining a food reward in the case of non-human 
primates or a non-food reward in the case of child participants. For two published 
studies (Whiten et al., 1996; Custance et al., 2006), data on the success/failure of 
subjects was clarified by contacting the study authors. Inclusion was further limited to 
articles that utilised a design compliant with the dominant two-action paradigm 
(outlined above), to ensure consistency in the measurement and assignment of social 
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learning mechanisms throughout the meta-dataset. Two studies that utilised a 
modified version of the two-action paradigm, to test for sequence imitation (i.e., 
copying of the precise order in which a series of task-directed actions has been 
performed; Whiten, 1998), or copying of hierarchical action structure (i.e., copying of 
the precise hierarchically organised series of steps of task-directed actions; Whiten et 
al., 2006), were also included, but were flagged due to their deviation from the 
predominant protocol.  
Other inclusion criteria were that the test subjects should have no prior 
experience of the task, and that each experimental subject should be tested 
individually with a competent demonstrator. Two studies that did not meet the criteria 
of testing subjects individually were included (Horner et al., 2006; Fredman & 
Whiten, 2008), as their departure from this stipulation did not interfere with test 
subjects’ opportunities to view consistent demonstrator behaviour or to access and 
manipulate the task.  
 
2.2.3. Data extraction  
 
Data were extracted from the text or tables of articles, or indirectly from figures in a 
small number of cases.  For five articles, data were extracted from a subset of the total 
experimental procedures reported due to (1) procedural changes occurring in later 
(i.e., follow-up or second stage) test trials (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Voelkl & Huber, 
2000; Whiten et al., 2006), (2) a substantial number of test subjects being unavailable 
to participate in later trials (Stoinski et al., 2001), and (3) the data presented being 
from an earlier published article (Hopper et al., 2012). 
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Outcome Success/Outcome Fidelity 
For asocial learning control groups, outcome success corresponded to the proportion 
of individuals in the test group who successfully retrieved the reward during the 
experimental procedure (i.e., in any of the test trials). Likewise, for groups that 
received a demonstration of reward retrieval, the proportion of individuals in the 
group who successfully retrieved the reward during the experimental procedure 
represented a measure of outcome fidelity.  For a subset of experiments, a measure of 
outcome success and outcome fidelity in relation to the first test trial was also 
obtained.  
 
Demonstrator Fidelity  
Demonstrator fidelity was categorised as ‘high’ or ‘low’ for each test group. Thus, test 
groups for which there was a positive result on the two-action task were categorised 
as ‘high’ demonstrator fidelity, and test groups that showed no evidence of matching 
the demonstrated solution were categorised as ‘low’. All studies included in the meta-
dataset followed the convention in inferential statistics of rejecting the null hypothesis 
at the 0.05 probability level (i.e., p<0.05), therefore this was the threshold adopted in 
assigning test groups to ‘high’ or ‘low’ demonstrator fidelity.  
Statistical tests using the two-action paradigm are more powerful when 
assessing a discrimination ratio of performance of the two actions (e.g., Heyes & 
Dawson, 1990; Whiten et al., 1996). Accordingly, this was the statistical standard 
adopted when categorising test groups’ demonstrator fidelity as ‘high’ or ‘low’. 
However, a small subset of included experiments utilised statistical tests based on 
absolute rather than relative measures of action performance (Custance et al., 1999, 
2001; Fredman & Whiten, 2008), or scores relating to a behavioural index of the two 
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actions (Price et al., 2009). For this subset, statistical evidence of intra-test-group 
differences in performance of both actions was required for a test group to be 
categorised as showing ‘high’ demonstrator fidelity (i.e., higher levels of action ‘a’ 
must be observed in test group subjects witnessing ‘a’ AND higher levels of action ‘b’ 
must be observed in test group subjects witnessing ‘b’).  
Procedural variations across social learning experiments resulted in varying 
numbers of test trials being experienced by test groups. Hence, statistical evidence 
that matching the demonstrator’s solution had occurred at any point during a test 
group’s total trials was accepted, but a moderator variable relating to the number of 
trials test groups received was included in analyses to control for the potential 
influence of this factor on whether subjects learned to successfully retrieve the reward 
(see below). Where an apparatus contained multiple two-action manipulandi (e.g., 
Whiten et al., 1996; Stoinski et al., 2001), demonstrator fidelity was categorised as 
‘high’ if the test group showed evidence of matching the demonstrated solution on at 
least one manipulandum.  
For eight test-group-level learning assessments (six presented in Call et al. 
2005; two presented in Hopper et al. 2010), I recalculated the test statistics from 
descriptive data reported by the authors, because statistical tests matching the criteria 
outlined above had not been performed. One test group (Bugnyar & Huber, 1997), in 
a deviation from other two-action test protocols, was compared with an asocial 
learning control group that demonstrated a bias towards performing the alternate 
solution than was witnessed by the test group. Another test group (Caldwell & 
Whiten, 2004) included some subjects that did not witness a competent demonstrator; 
thus, these subjects were excluded from the data and demonstrator fidelity in the 
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remaining subjects (that showed no evidence of matching the demonstrated task 
manipulation) was categorised as ‘low’.  
Apparatus designs were examined to ensure that alternate mechanisms such as 
stimulus or local enhancement had been ruled out when categorising demonstrator 
fidelity as ‘high’. The fourth experiment in a battery of two-action tests conducted by 
Rigamonti et al. (2005) utilised a design that did not permit differentiation between 
‘high’ and ‘low’ categories of demonstrator fidelity; hence all test groups included in 
the fourth experiment were categorised as ‘low’, and those that had potentially 
matched the demonstrator’s task manipulations were flagged.  
 
Task complexity  
A measure of task complexity was devised, applicable for each apparatus, and given 
by the total number of causal manipulations necessary before the reward could be 
retrieved. For example, if test subjects were required to push or pull open a door 
before gaining access to a reward, this was given a task complexity rating of 1 (e.g., 
Tennie et al., 2006; Hopper et al., 2008). Likewise, if test subjects were required to 
disable two task defences in addition to removing a lid before gaining access to a 
reward, this was given a task complexity rating of 3 (e.g., Custance et al., 1999). Tool 
use during reward retrieval was coded as a separate binary variable. However, 
apparatus manipulations performed using a tool – e.g., using a tool to push or lift a 
lever (e.g., Hopper et al., 2010), or using a tool to reposition the reward inside the 
apparatus (e.g., Call & Tomasello, 1994) – were included in the measure of task 
complexity. In one experiment (Price et al., 2009), the measure of task complexity 
included an apparatus manipulation that was required on the tool itself (i.e., extending 
or sliding components of the tool together).  
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  A separate variable detailing whether the apparatus was transparent (i.e., 
allowing the reward to be visible) or opaque (i.e., concealing the reward) was also 
extracted. Call et al., (2005) used a combination of transparent and opaque 
apparatuses within test groups, but found no behavioural differences relating to 
whether the reward was visible or not. Thus, as analyses in the current study were 
undertaken at the level of the experimental test group, all apparatuses in Call and 
colleagues’ study were regarded and coded as ‘transparent’.   
 
Moderator variables  
A number of additional variables relating to between-study procedural variations were 
extracted. The total number of learning demonstrations that subjects in each test group 
received, along with the total number of test trials they were awarded, were recorded. 
In one learning experiment (Price et al., 2009) the number of demonstrations provided 
to experimental subjects varied between an upper and lower limit, therefore the mid-
point of this range was recorded.  
A measure of each test group’s mean age was also obtained. To standardise 
the measure of age across species, the mean age of each group was adjusted by the 
maximum longevity of the species, which was obtained from the PanTheria online 
dataset (Jones et al., 2009). In four social learning experiments (Bugnyar & Huber, 
1997; Voelkl & Huber, 2000; Caldwell & Whiten, 2004; Dindo et al., 2011), test 
subjects were described as “adult” but information pertaining to the mean age of the 
test group was not given. For these four experiments, the mean age of the group was 
approximated, by taking the mid-point of the lifespan between sexual maturity and 
maximum longevity for those species, as reported in the PanTheria dataset. 
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2.2.4. Dataset summary 
 
Two-action tests of learning fidelity 
A total of 28 published papers detailing the results of 36 separate social learning 
experiments, conducted between 1993 and 2012, were included in the final dataset. 
Experimental subjects that did not interact with the apparatus during testing were 
excluded from the data, as they did not contribute behaviourally to group-level 
learning assessments. This resulted in 777 individual experimental subjects distributed 
across 67 test groups. The final dataset comprised 84 test-group-level assessments of 
demonstrator fidelity (nine test groups participated in more than one social learning 
experiment), and 926 individual-level measures of outcome fidelity (i.e., success vs. 
failure in achieving the instrumental goal). 
Fourteen test groups were assigned to ‘ghost’ conditions, receiving reduced 
information about the actions necessary to obtain the reward (see Hopper, 2010). Four 
additional test groups also received incomplete information regarding the 
manipulations necessary to successfully operate the apparatus (Call et al., 2005), 
resulting in a total of 18 out of 84 test-group-level assessments of learning that 
followed reduced or incomplete task demonstrations.  
 
Asocial learning controls 
Data on the baseline performance (i.e., success verses failure in achieving the goal) of 
additional asocial learning control groups were provided for only 17 of the 36 (<50%) 
learning experiments. A total of 249 individual control subjects distributed across 31 
asocial learning groups were included in the final dataset.  Control groups reported in 
Fredman and Whiten (2008) were excluded from the dataset, as they were provided 
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with some social information about the solve state of the task. Also excluded was a 
control group reported in Price et al. (2009) that received a partial demonstration.   
 
Distribution of social learning tests across primate species 
There were 10 different primate species listed in the dataset, including species of 
monkey and apes, along with Old World and New World primates.  However, the 
majority of the data comprised social learning experiments conducted on human 





































Figure 2.1. The number of demonstration groups and asocial learning control 
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Apparatuses 
A total of 17 different apparatuses were used across the 36 included experimental 
designs, indicative of some repeatability in task designs across social learning 
experiments but also variation. A measure of apparatus complexity was extracted (the 
details of which are provided above), ranging from 1 (least complex) to 7 (most 
complex). The majority of test-group-level learning assessments were conducted with 





Table 2.1. Number of group-level learning assessments by task complexity  
 
 Task Complexity 
 1 2 3 5 7 
Social learning test groups 61 5 12 5 1 
Asocial learning control groups 21 6 1 2 1 






Eight (22%) social learning experiments involved tool use in reward retrieval. 
Experiments that included the use of a tool were limited to human (Homo sapiens), 
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), capuchin (Cebus apella), and orangutan (Pongo 
pygmaeus) subjects (i.e., all habitual tool-using species; Ottoni & Izar, 2008; Seed & 
Byrne, 2010; Biro et al., 2013). Tool use was not recorded for the mother-reared test 
group detailed in Fredman and whiten (2008), as all subjects that successfully 
retrieved the reward in this test group did so without use of the demonstrated tool.  
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U (7,7)=5, p=.17 
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Price et al. 2009 
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U(5,6)=3.3, p=.017   













U(5,6)=13, p=.355  
U(5,6)=12, p=.283  



















































































































































U(5,6)=11.5, p>.05  
























































































F(2,22)=4.48, p<.05   






























(Z=-1.138, p=.128)  
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Hopper et al. 2012 
 Key to test statistic abbreviations: B=binomial test; F=anova; FET=Fisher’s exact test; H=Kruskal W
allace; KT=Kendall’s Tau; NS=non-significant result reported, but details not given; T=t-
test; U=M
ann-W
hitney U test; X
2 = Chi square test.   
!





All analyses were carried out in R version 3.1.3. Analyses were conducted using 
binomial generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) in package lme4 (Bates et al. 
2014). The response variable used in analyses was the proportion of a test group that 
successfully retrieved the reward from the apparatus (i.e., the number of successful 
versus unsuccessful subjects in a group-level learning assessment), which equated to 
the measure of outcome fidelity when the test group had witnessed a demonstration. 
Adopting a model with a binomial error structure ensured that each test group was 
weighted by its relative size (i.e. the number of individual test subjects) during model 
fitting.  
 
2.3.1. Preliminary analysis 
 
In an initial analysis, a subset of the data, including only those test groups with a 
matched asocial learning control group, was used to assess the effect of receiving 
social information on successful reward retrieval. Firstly, I ran the model (Model 1) 
with a binary fixed effect that detailed whether a test group had received a 
demonstration or was an asocial learning control. This was followed by a second 
analysis (Model 2) where the original fixed effect was further deconstructed to 
categorise groups that had received a demonstration according to whether 
demonstrator fidelity was high or low. In both models, random effects for species and 
experimental study were included to control for systematic variance occurring 
between test groups of the same species or from within the same experimental 
protocol. An additional observation-level random effect was included to counter over-
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dispersion in model fit. Main effects were tested using likelihood-ratio tests (LRTs) 
and posthoc comparisons were performed using the package multcomp (Horthorn et 
al. 2008; 2013). LRTs compare the change in residual deviance (which follows a X2 
distribution) that occurs between nested models following the removal/addition of a 
variable. 
 
2.3.2. Main analysis   
 
All test-group-level assessments of social learning were included in the main analysis. 
Asocial learning control groups were excluded. Eight group-level variables and two 
interaction terms were included in the global model as fixed effects: (1) the inferred 
demonstrator fidelity (high or low; binary variable); (2) the measure of task 
complexity (numerical variable); (3) an interaction term between demonstrator 
fidelity and task complexity; (4) whether a tool was used (binary variable); (5) an 
interaction term between tool use and demonstrator fidelity; (6) whether the task was 
opaque or transparent (binary variable); (7) the total number of demonstrations 
(numerical variable); (8) the total number of trials (numerical variable); (9) the mean 
adjusted age of the test group (numerical variable); and, (10) whether the test group 
received full or reduced social information during the demonstration (binary variable). 
Species and experiment were included as random effects to control for systematic 
variation in the data at these levels. An additional random effect for test group was 
included, to control for autocorrelation in the response resulting from repeated 
measures on some test groups.  
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Model selection (main analysis):  
Model selection was undertaken only for the fixed effects. Marginality constraints on 
interaction effects were respected during model selection (i.e., candidate models 
containing interaction effects always retained the respective lower-order main effects 
represented in the interaction). Starting with the full global model, backward stepwise 
elimination of variables was undertaken, using the likelihood-ratio test statistic and 
AICc as model comparison criteria (variables that generated non-significant test 
statistics and resulted in a reduction in AICc following removal from the model were 
eliminated). As stepwise model selection has been criticised for not guaranteeing 
selection of the best combination of predictor variables (Burnham & Anderson, 2002), 
the dredge function in the MuMIn package (Barton, 2015) was also used to undertake 
an exhaustive search of all predictor variable combinations, in order to identify the 
best possible model using AICc model comparison. In addition, the relative variable 
importance (computed as the sum of model AICc weights across all models in a set 
where the variable occurs) was obtained for the top ten models using the function 
model.avg.  
 
2.3.3. Model fit and diagnostics   
 
Models from the main analysis and preliminary analysis were checked for 
overdispersion and to ensure that the magnitude of the standardized residuals were 
independent of the fitted values (Bolker et al., 2009). The full set of predictor 
variables included in the global model were examined with the vif function in the car 
package (Fox & Weisberg, 2011) for evidence of multicolinearity, using the 
convention that a variable with a variance inflation factor (VIF) of >10 is cause for 
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concern (Quinn & Keough, 2007). All predictor variables included in analyses had a 
VIF of <3.  Model fit was investigated visually via plots of the fitted verses actual 
values of the dependent variable (i.e., the proportion of successful test-group 
subjects), and by obtaining the R2 of the linear relationship between these two values: 
R2(FvA).  
 
2.3.4. Representation and robustness of results  
 
Odds ratios were calculated to provide a measure of effect sizes for the fixed effects. 
For the graphical representation of variable effects, population mean estimates, which 
are estimates computed at the average values of the other predictor variables in the 
model, and are therefore adjusted for variation that is attributable to these other 
predictor variables, were obtained using package lsmeans (Lenth, 2015). 
All reported models were refitted following the removal of group-level 
learning assessments that had been flagged during data compilation (N removed 
learning assessments: demonstration=5; asocial=0). Due to the relatively high 
representation of human children in the dataset, models were also refitted following 
the removal of all human test groups (N removed human learning assessments: 
demonstration= 37; asocial=12). A subset of experiments in the meta-dataset (N= 12) 
included only subjects that had successfully retrieved the reward in test-group-level 
assessments of learning fidelity (i.e., test subjects that had interacted with the 
apparatus but not retrieved the reward were not considered). This risks introducing 
error if the behaviour of unsuccessful group members would alter the assignment of 
any such test groups to high- or low-fidelity learning categories. Thus, all reported 
models were again refitted following the exclusion of all experiments that included 
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only successful subjects in fidelity assignment (N removed learning assessments: 
demonstration= 20; asocial=15).  
Finally, for a subset of experiments, information was available regarding the 
success of subjects on their first test trial (T1) (N available T1 learning assessments: 
demonstration=53; asocial=27). Hence, models were refitted to this subset, with the 
number of subjects that were successful versus unsuccessful on their first trial as the 
dependent variable (n.b. in all other analyses, the dependent variable detailed the 
success/failure of subjects across the entire experimental procedure).  
Where robustness checks failed to replicate the results obtained with the full 
dataset, this is reported.   
 
2.3.5. Phylogenetic signal 
 
Data collected across multiple species might exhibit phylogenetic signal (i.e., the 
tendency of closely-related species to be more phenotypically similar than species 
selected at random from a phylogenetic tree: Bloomberg & Garland, 2002, p905).  
When undertaking analyses using multi-species datasets, phylogenetic statistical 
methods are preferred when phylogenetic signal is high, to account for the non-
independence of data resulting from phylogenetic relatedness (Felsenstein, 1985; 
Carvalho et al., 2006).  However, phylogenetic signal in behavioural data is often low 
and/or inaccurate; possibly due to measurement error and noise resulting from 
variation in measurement protocols (Blomberg et al., 2003; Ives et al., 2007).  
Additionally, previous analytical investigations have indicated that phylogenetic 
signal cannot be estimated accurately using datasets with <30 species (Freckleton et 
al., 2002; see also Postma & Charmantier, 2007; de Villemereuil et al., 2013; and 
  61 
89 
Quinn et al., 2006, for problems relating to small species samples), and that an 
unequal distribution of data measures across species might be problematic 
(Struthsaker, 2000). As such, a phylogenetic analysis was not preferred over 
conventional statistical techniques for the purpose of this study. However, in order to 
safeguard that a phylogenetic model would not have generated results inconsistent 
with those resulting from conventional modelling approaches, I also conducted the 
main analysis within a Bayesian phylogenetic modelling framework, using the 
package MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010).       
A consensus phylogenetic tree, based on a sample of 10,000 primate 
phylogenies in proportion to their posterior probabilities, was downloaded from the 
website 10KTrees (Version 3, Arnold et al. 2010), with branch lengths scaled 
according to evolutionary time. The global phylogenetic GLMM followed the same 
specification of fixed and random effects as detailed for the main analysis in section 
3.2, but with an additional random effect included to account for phylogenetic signal.  
In MCMCglmm, priors for the fixed effects, which are normally distributed, 
are obtained automatically during the model fitting process, while the random effect 
priors are given an inverse-Wishart distribution (Hadfield, 2010).  The model’s 
sensitivity to the priors was investigated using three different prior distribution 
scenarios for the random effects, which varied the expected (co)variance V and the 
degree of belief parameter nu for the inverse-Wishart distribution: V=1 and nu=0.002 
(prior 1); V=1 and nu=0.1 (prior 2); V=5 and nu=1 (prior 3). Although the spread of 
the posterior distribution for the random effects changed across the three different 
priors, the proportional contribution of each random effect to the overall variance 
remained relatively constant. The effect sizes of the fixed effects also varied slightly 
across the three different priors, but not in direction or significance. The prior that 
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was least informative and represented the lowest degree of belief (i.e., V=1, 
nu=0.002) was subsequently used during variable selection.  
The model was run for 3,000,000 iterations, with a burn-in of 1,000,000 
iterations, and thinned every 500 updates, resulting in an effective sample size of 
4000 values. In order to check convergence, the model was run with three different 
starting values that were chosen specifically to be heuristically unfavourable.  
Autocorrelation between successive samples of the posterior distribution was low for 
all parameters (<.06) indicating good chain mixing. Chain convergence was checked 
visually and using Gelman and Rubin’s convergence diagnostic (Gelman & Rubin, 
1992). Variable selection was undertaken by backward stepwise elimination using the 
MCMC p-values returned by MCMCglmm.   
Phylogenetic signal was estimated from the phylogenetic variance in the 
model using the heritability statistic (h2) (Hadfield 2010).  The value of h2 ranges 
from 0 to 1 (values close to 0 indicate negligible phylogenetic signal while values 
close to 1 indicate a strong effect of phylogenetic relatedness), and is conceptually 





2.4.1. Preliminary analysis: asocial versus social learning 
 
The results of the preliminary analysis are detailed in Table 2.3. As predicted, 
irrespective of the social learning mechanism used, receiving a demonstration had a 
highly significant effect on successful learning outcomes relative to asocial learning 
(see Table 2.3, Model 1). Contrasts between asocial learning groups and groups 
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demonstrating high or low demonstrator fidelity confirmed expectations that, after 
controlling for differences between species and experimental procedures, high relative 
to low demonstrator fidelity afforded the highest levels of outcome fidelity (see Model 
2 & Figure 2.2). In addition, groups exhibiting low demonstrator fidelity were still 
able to outperform groups that were reliant on asocial or individual learning 
processes.  
 Robustness checks (see above section 2.3.4) revealed no changes in the 




Table 2.3. Results of preliminary analysis: The effect of receiving a demonstration on 
the proportion of a test group that learned to retrieve the demonstrated reward  
Model 
parameters 






   
Intercept   -0.31(0.36)  
Learning Typea   1.54(0.30)*** 4.65 
 
R2(FvA) =0.90; N groups: Asocial = 31; Demonstration = 49; N subjects=833 
 
Model 2 
   




Demo (Low) – Asocial   1.01(0.32)** 2.74 
Demo (High) – Asocial   2.29(0.39)*** 9.84 
Demo (High) – Demo (Low)  1.28(0.41)** 3.58 
 
R2(FvA) =0.90; N groups:  Asocial= 31; Demo(high)= 31; Demo(low)= 18; N subjects=833 
Binomial GLMM with random effects for species, experiment and observation-level. Main effects were 
tested using likelihood-ratio tests. Pairwise comparisons were undertaken using Wald tests with Tukey 
correction for familywise error.  
a Dichotomous variable  (Asocial learning = 0; demonstration = 1)  
b Categorical variable (Asocial =  asocial learning; Demo (Low) =  groups evidence low fidelity to 
demonstration; Demo (High) = groups evidence high fidelity to demonstration 
**p<.01; ***p<.00































































































Figure 2.2.  The effect of receiving a demonstration on the proportion of a test group 
that learned to retrieve the demonstrated reward, at different levels of fidelity (high 
vs. low) to the demonstrated method (Model 2, Table 2.3). Plots represent: (a) 
boxplot of the raw data values; (b) boxplot of the model-fitted data values; (c) 
crossbar plot of the model-estimated population means adjusted for sampling 
variation between learning categories (±95% CI). **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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2.4.2. Main analysis: Demonstrator fidelity and task complexity  
 
The main analysis examined the relationship between demonstrator fidelity and 
outcome fidelity in more detail, including consideration of a number of additional 
predictor variables on the dependent variable. Model selection undertaken by 
backward stepwise elimination, using the likelihood-ratio test in combination with 
AICc, identified the same top model as the exhaustive search of all possible variable 
combinations based solely on AICc (see Table 2.4 & Table 2.5). The measure of 
relative variable importance was also concordant with model selection, showing that, 
with only one exception, all variables retained in the final model were present in all of 
the top ten AICc ranked models (n.b. lower order terms for the inferred demonstrator 
fidelity and task complexity were always retained where present in the higher-order 
interaction term). All predictor variables eliminated during model selection had low 
relative variable importance (≤0.4).  Five predictor variables were included in the 
final model, the results of which are detailed in Table 2.6. 
 As predicted, there was a significant interaction between the inferred 
demonstrator fidelity (high or low) and task complexity, indicating that high 
demonstrator fidelity (i.e., imitation/emulation) became increasingly important at 
higher task complexities. A detailed breakdown of the effects of demonstrator fidelity 
at each level of task complexity is given in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.3. At the lowest 
level of task complexity – the level adopted in the majority of social learning 
experiments – there is no significant advantage of learning with high demonstrator 
fidelity on outcome fidelity (i.e., successful learning). However, at all subsequent 
levels of task difficulty, high demonstrator fidelity is associated with significant 
increases in outcome fidelity, showing increases in the odds ratio at each increment in 
task complexity between test groups with high verses low demonstration fidelity.  
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 Tool use, in line with predictions, had a significant and negative effect on 
learning success; the odds of reward retrieval being approximately ten times lower 
when using a tool (see Table 2.6 & Figure 2.4: left-panel plots). The expectation that 
high demonstrator fidelity would afford a greater relative advantage in tool-use tasks 
was not confirmed, with the interaction between demonstrator fidelity and tool use 
eliminated during model selection, and exhibiting a relative variable importance of 0 
(see Table 2.4 & Table 2.5; Figure 2.4: right-panel plots). Figure 2.4(f), which 
displays the model-estimated effects of tool use at each level of demonstrator fidelity, 
adjusted for the effects of other predictor variables, suggests a trend in the predicted 
direction, but also indicates large margins of error due to the relatively small number 
of tool-use studies (N groups =10) in the sample.  
 Receiving a complete rather than reduced demonstration of the action- and 
object-oriented processes required to successfully operate the apparatus appeared to 
have a marginal positive effect on learning success (p<.1; odds ratio=2.07; relative 
variable importance of 0.61; see Tables 2.4-6). The majority of test groups that 
received reduced social information during demonstration of the apparatus (e.g., were 
assigned to ‘ghost’ conditions), subsequently exhibited evidence of low rather than 
high demonstrator fidelity (14/18 test groups = 78%).  
 Robustness checks using subsets of the data (see above section 2.3.4) revealed 
no changes in the direction of reported results. Refitting the model with the proportion 
of individuals who solved on the first trial as the dependent variable, revealed that 
tool use was no longer a statistically significant predictor of outcome fidelity 
(X2(1)=0.61, p=.44 , N groups=53).  However, there were only 5 test groups that used 
a tool in the data subset that detailed success on the first learning trial, substantially 
reducing the power to detect a significant effect of this variable.  
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Table 2. 4. Main analysis: Variable selection undertaken by backward stepwise 
elimination using the likelihood-ratio test ( ) and AICc 
Model parameters  Variable 
removed/tested*   (p-value)† 
AICc 
Global model: DemoFidelity+Complexity+ 
FullDemo+Tool+TaskOpaque+Age+Nde
mos+Ntrials+ DemoFidelity *Complexity 
+ DemoFidelity*Tool 
 
  255.02 
DemoFidelity +Complexity+FullDemo+ 
Tool+Age+Ndemos+Ntrials+ 































Final model: DemoFidelity+Complexity+ 




























*Likelihood ratio test ( ) used to evaluate the effect of removing the specified variable 
from the most recent model.  
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Table 2.5. Main analysis: The 10 best supported models and the relative importance 
of predictor variables included in this candidate set, following an exhaustive search 
based on AICc 
 
 
*Computed as the sum of AICc weights across all the models in the set where the variable 






Table 2.6. Main analysis: The effects of predictor variables included in the final 
model on outcome fidelity (proportion of group-level reward retrieval)   
Model parameters  Estimate (S.E.)                                 Odds ratio
Intercept    3.32(0.80)***  
DemoFidelitya    0.76(0.72) - 
Complexityb   -0.02(0.24) - 
Toolc   -2.42(0.81)** 0.09 
FullDemod    0.73(0.42) † 2.07 
DemoFidelity*Complexity   -1.43(0.44)** - 
 
R2(Fitted vs. Data) =0.88; N groups= 84; N subjects=926 
Binomial GLMM with random effects for species, experiment and test group. All interaction terms 
were retained with their respective main effects and lower order terms. Variables were tested using 
likelihood-ratio tests ( ) that are detailed in Table 4. (Odds ratio effect sizes are given only for model 
parameters not included in a second order interaction; interaction effects are detailed separately in 
Table 2.7.) 
a  Dichotomous variable (0 = high, 1 = low)  
b Numeric variable (number of task manipulations required for reward retrieval)   
c  Dichotomous variable (0 = no tool use required, 1 = tool use required) 
d Dichotomous variable (0 =  received reduced demonstration, 1 = received full demonstration) 
† p<.1; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 2.7. Main analysis:  The effects of fidelity to the demonstrated method on 
outcome fidelity (proportion of group-level reward retrieval) at each level of task 
complexity (obtained from final model estimates detailed in Table 2.6).  
 Covariate-adjusted  






    
1 Demo%Fidelity:%(High)%–%(Low)    0.67(0.44)NS 1.96 
2 Demo%Fidelity:%(High)%–%(Low) 2.11(0.52)*** 8.21 
3 Demo%Fidelity:%(High)%–%(Low) 3.54(0.85)*** 34.42 
4 Demo%Fidelity:%(High)%–%(Low) 4.97(1.26)*** 144.18 
5 Demo%Fidelity:%(High)%–%(Low) 6.40(1.68)*** 603.95 
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Figure 2.3. Plots showing the proportion of a test group that learned to retrieve the 
demonstrated reward (outcome fidelity), at different levels of task complexity and 
fidelity (high vs. low) to the demonstrated method. Plots represent: (a) raw data 
values (binomial lines of best fit); (b) model-fitted data values (binomial lines of best 
fit); (c) model-estimated population mean values (adjusted for the other variables in 
the final model) 
NSp>.05; ***p<.001  
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.4. The effect of tool use (left-panel plots) and fidelity to the demonstrated 
method (right-panel plots) on the proportion of a test group that learned to retrieve 
the demonstrated reward (outcome fidelity). Plots represent: (a-b) boxplots of the raw 
data values; (c-d) boxplots of the model-fitted data values; (e-f) crossbar plots of the 
model-estimated population mean values ±95% CI (adjusted for the other predictor 
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2.4.3. Phylogenetic signal 
 
The main analysis was also conducted within a Bayesian phylogenetic framework (see 
section 2.3.5 for details).   A comparison of the final model estimates from the 
phylogenetic analysis and the conventional non-phylogenetic model detailed in Table 
2.6, is summarised in Table 2.8. Both final models contained the same set of predictor 
variables, and very similar estimates of the magnitude and direction of their effects, 
with the conventional model providing slightly more conservative estimates. Lambda 
(λ =0.16, 95% CI=[0.08-0.40]), which was estimated from the total variance in the 
phylogenetic model, was low, indicating weak phylogenetic signal in these data and 





Table 2.8.  Comparison of final model estimates generated by a Bayesian 
phylogenetic GLMM and the conventional non-phylogenetic GLMM in Table 2.6. 
 Phylogenetic model Conventional model 




Intercept          3.17[ 0.60 –  5.62]*       3.32(0.80) *** 
DemoFidelitya        0.77[-0.91 –  2.51]                 0.76(0.72) 
Complexityb       -0.02[-0.52 –  0.48]               -0.02(0.24) 
Toolc -2.85[-4.39 – -1.26]***    -2.42(0.81) ** 
FullDemod          1.02[-0.12  – 2.13] †   0.73(0.42) † 
DemoFidelity*Com
plexity 
  -1.51[-2.39 – -0.65]***   -1.43(0.44)** 
   
a  Dichotomous variable (0 = High, 1 = Low)  
b Numeric variable (number of task manipulations required for reward retrieval)   
c  Dichotomous variable (0 = no tool use required, 1 = tool use required) 
d Dichotomous variable (0 =  received reduced demonstration, 1 = received full demonstration) 
† p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (p-values relate to pMCMC values returned by the package 










The analyses presented in this chapter provide the first extensive review of the 
relationship between learning mechanisms (demonstrator fidelity) and learning 
outcomes (outcome fidelity) in primate species. They confirm previous suggestions 
that learning mechanisms associated with high-fidelity to the demonstrated solution 
(represented here as a positive result in the two-action task; i.e., imitation/emulation) 
offer advantages over lower-fidelity mechanisms (e.g., stimulus/local enhancement), 
in the transmission of instrumental culture, and suggest that the advantages conferred 
increase incrementally with the complexity of the learning goal. These results support 
claims that mechanisms affording increased demonstrator fidelity (e.g., 
imitation/emulation) play a crucial role in the emergence, maintenance and 
cumulative improvement of culture (e.g., Galef, 1992; Tomasello, 1999; Dean et al., 
2012). 
 Tool use, as expected, increased learning difficulty and exerted a strong 
negative effect on learning success. The apparent difficulty that was associated with 
learning to use a tool effectively echoes previous findings (Seed et al., 2009), and 
might offer some explanation regarding the rarity of tool use in the animal world. 
Certainly, tool use has been linked with enhanced cognitive abilities (Reader & 
Laland, 2002; Stout et al., 2008; Reader et al., 2011), and with complex forms of 
social learning, such as active teaching through language in humans (Stout, 2011; 
Morgan et al., 2015a). However, the expectation that mechanisms conferring high 
demonstrator fidelity would prove disproportionately advantageous in tool-using tasks 
was not supported. The relationship between demonstrator fidelity and tool use on 
learning success, when represented graphically, does suggest a trend in the expected 
direction. Failure to detect this effect might reflect the relatively low sample of tool-
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using studies in the meta-dataset. Alternatively, it is possible that the skills required 
for effective tool-use in social learning experiments are benefitted by other, more 
enhanced mechanisms of high-fidelity transmission, such as active instruction and 
teaching by the demonstrator, or by other skills not connected to social learning, 
which were not incorporated into these experimental designs.  
 Test groups that received reduced information about the apparatus 
manipulations necessary to obtain the goal (e.g., groups assigned to ‘ghost’ 
conditions) were less successful than groups that received a full demonstration, but 
this result was only marginally significant, likely due to the small sample of studies in 
this category. The majority of test groups receiving reduced information were 
categorised as exhibiting low demonstrator fidelity (or more accurately low 
demonstration fidelity when a demonstrator was not present), suggesting that the 
negative impact on learning might have resulted from the absence of a social model at 
the task, which was characteristic of most reduced-information conditions. A study by 
Hopper et al. (2008), finding that demonstration fidelity and outcomes are enhanced 
by conspecific presence at the task during ‘ghost’ demonstrations, supports this 
suggestion. That most test groups receiving reduced information did not demonstrate 
high demonstration fidelity is also suggestive that information pertaining to both a 
model’s bodily actions, and the associated object movements, is useful in learning 
instrumental skills, and that a reduction of one or the other leads to a loss of fidelity. 
Further examination of the relative importance of each type of learning process in 
instrumental skill learning is an important question for future research (see also 
Heyes, 2012).  
A number of variables relating to variation in inter-experimental designs were 
eliminated during model selection. It is interesting that variables relating to the 
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quantity of social information (e.g. number of demonstrations) and the opportunity to 
be successful (e.g. number of trials) were not influential predictors of learning 
outcomes. A plausible explanation is that researchers have already calibrated their 
experimental designs to reflect the optimal local levels of these variables for their test 
subjects, when the primary goal of their research is to identify the mechanisms that 
underpin learning outcomes.  
The finding that high demonstrator fidelity did not afford a significant increase 
in learning success at the lowest level of task complexity, offers an explanation for 
previous instances of successful behavioural spread in the absence of mechanisms 
such as imitation/emulation. It is likely that behaviours such as potato washing in 
macaques, and milk-bottle-top opening in birds, are simple enough to be transmitted 
successfully without recourse to copying the detailed actions and object movements. 
This raises the question of why the majority of social learning experiments have been 
conducted at the lowest level of task difficulty, when incentives for test subjects to 
copy using higher-fidelity processes might be reduced. Other authors have also 
alluded to the possibility that learning processes leading to high demonstrator fidelity 
are superfluous when the task demands are easy (e.g., Byrne & Russon, 1988; Whiten 
et al. 2009).  An interesting avenue of future research will be to investigate whether 
animals exercise learning mechanisms flexibly in response to the perceived difficulty 
or uncertainty of success on the task; a heuristic that might complement other 
proposed learning strategies regarding when and how to use social information 
(Laland, 2004, Kendal et al., 2005).   
However, the possibility also remains that, while imitative or emulative 
learning did not enhance successful outcomes when tasks were easy, other measures 
of learning, such as the latency to success, were still favourably impacted. This 
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suggestion echoes Galef (1992), who argued that imitative learning processes offer a 
more efficient way of acquiring new behaviours.  Yet few studies have provided 
detailed breakdowns of learning outcomes, which might usefully include measures of 
latency and the results of subjects’ first interaction with the task (though see e.g., 
Rigamonti et al., 2005 for an exception); possibly reflecting the emphasis on 
identifying learning mechanisms, while leaving learning outcomes implicitly 
assumed, which has prevailed in experimental investigations of social learning.   
Of course, complex culture also depends on conventional and ritual 
behaviours, in addition to instrumental skills and the transmission of material culture.  
A number of authors have suggested that the highest fidelity of human imitation 
occurs not during the transmission of instrumental culture and artefacts, but rather in 
learning the ritual and conventional behaviours that signal group identity and 
affiliation (Over & Carpenter, 2012; Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare & Nielsen, 2015). 
An expectation that derives from this is that high demonstrator fidelity is likely to be 
advantageous at all levels of ritual and conventional behavioural complexity, where 
re-enacting the precise actions of other group members is key to preserving group 
solidarity and homogeneity.      
A potential criticism of the current study is the existence of noise in the 
measure of task complexity. It is possible that some task designs afford manipulations 
that are easier to execute than others, and are also more amenable to particular species 
(Caldwell & Whiten, 2002). While this suggestion is plausible, it seems unlikely that 
adjustments to the task difficulty measure would substantially alter the clear 
interaction between task difficulty and fidelity found in these data. Another issue that 
can affect analyses resulting from metadata is the underreporting of null results 
(known as the ‘file drawer problem’), resulting in a biased data sample. However, 
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given the pattern of reporting demonstrated in the current data, along with the 
emphasis on identifying learning mechanisms rather than learning outcomes, it seems 
plausible that unpublished results are likely biased towards studies demonstrating low 
demonstrator fidelity coupled with low outcome fidelity, at higher rather than lower 
levels of task complexity – i.e. data that would enhance the strength of the 
relationships reported here.  
More refined measures than the high- or low-fidelity learning dichotomy 
offered by the two-action task would also enhance the current findings. Additionally, 
assessments of demonstrator fidelity and outcome fidelity at the individual level, 
rather than on the aggregate behaviour of the test group, would enable a more detailed 
and powerful analysis of the relationships reported here. Systematic, coordinated and 
controlled comparisons across species, using a range of varying task complexities, and 
documenting measures of learning fidelity that include and go beyond the typical two-
action paradigm (e.g., to include sequential copying (e.g., Whiten, 1998), attribution 
of intentions (Burkart et al., 2012), latency/efficiency measures and more detailed 
assessments of action and object copying), would broaden our understanding of high-
fidelity social transmission and its evolutionary trajectory across primate species. 
The low number of species and over-representation of a few species in these 
metadata, coupled with inter-study procedural variation, prevented an accurate 
examination of cross-species variation in learning ability. Previous research by Reader 
and Laland (2002) and Reader et al. (2011) has indicated that social learning 
frequencies covary positively with brain size in primates, and has been offered in 
support of hypotheses claiming that increased reliance on cultural learning has been a 
key factor driving increases in brain size in this lineage (e.g., Wilson, 1985; Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007).  
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However, Reader and colleagues’ measure of inter-species social learning is 
comprised of systematic counts of social learning occurrence, as reported in the 
published primate literature, without recourse to the complexity of social learning 
presented or the fidelity of its transmission. The results of the current analysis, 
coupled with observations that simple forms of social learning are common in a 
variety of small-brained taxa, including invertebrates (Leadbeater & Chittka, 2007), 
urge caution when inferring relationships between unrefined rates of social learning 
and brain size.  
Moreover, the unequal distribution of cross-species data in the current study 
implies that published reports of social learning occurrence, both in naturalistic and 
experimental contexts, are possibly biased towards species a priori believed to exhibit 
enhanced social learning capabilities (i.e. hominids, Cebus and Macaca). Reader and 
colleagues’ attempts to control for research effort have not incorporated this bias, 
risking circularity in their argument: larger brained species, which are associated with 
higher levels of intelligent behaviour (including social learning), generate increased 
reports of social learning because research in social learning is concentrated on these 
species. A systematic, unbiased and controlled experimental program to assess social 
learning abilities across a range of primate species, though logistically challenging, 
would provide invaluable validation to Reader and colleagues’ thesis. 
 
In summary, the data and analyses presented here support previous arguments that 
learning mechanisms such as imitation and emulation play an essential role in the 
emergence and maintenance of complex cultural behaviour. Given that the 
extraordinary cultural achievements of human beings have driven our species’ global 
dominance and success, it is highly likely that mechanisms affording high 
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demonstrator fidelity have undergone increased selection and refinement during the 
evolution of our lineage. Future studies that generate more refined measures of 
demonstrator fidelity and outcome fidelity, across different learning complexities and 
contexts, are required for a more comprehensive understanding of how learning 
mechanisms influence learning outcomes, and the selective processes that may have 
favoured their evolution. An exciting and plausible possibility, given the enormous 
cultural success of the human lineage, is that social learning, and the behavioural 
advantages that its enhanced forms can attain, has played an important role in driving 
increases in brain size and intelligence across the primate lineage (Wilson, 1985; 
Whiten & van Schaik, 2007; Reader et al., 2011). While causality in brain-behaviour 
correlations is always very difficult to infer (Healy & Rowe, 2007), more refined and 
systematic measures of social learning abilities across species would clarify the 

























   
Selective Copying and ‘Over-Imitation’: An 



















The previous chapter examined the social learning mechanisms thought to be involved 
in the successful high-fidelity transmission of instrumental cultural goals (i.e., 
imitation/emulation). The current chapter examines children’s tendency, during 
experimental tests of social learning, to copy even those actions that are manifestly 
causally irrelevant to achieving an instrumental goal – a puzzling phenomenon 
described as ‘over-imitation’. Taking a cultural evolutionary approach, I investigated 
whether majority-biased copying in children extends to majorities that perform 
irrelevant actions. I found that children always displayed majority-biased copying 
when the majority performed an efficient task solution, but that majority-biased 
copying did not extend to majorities who performed an irrelevant action. Additionally, 
results indicated that children’s copying of the irrelevant action was influenced not by 
causal inferences but rather by demonstrator behaviour (i.e., socially driven 
motivations). I discuss whether the term ‘over-imitation’ is appropriate in instances 
where causally irrelevant actions encompass socially functional properties. I further 
argue that, in more real-world contexts, where actions are not always demonstrated 
unanimously, causally irrelevant actions might substantially alter the operation of 
adaptive learning biases, and are likely to be quickly eliminated in purely causal or 










Humans show an exceptional ability to learn through copying others.  The tendency of 
young children to engage in high-fidelity copying of others’ actions appears to set 
them apart from other animals (e.g., Dean et al., 2012).  This propensity to engage in 
faithful copying is thought to play a crucial role in facilitating cumulative cultural 
improvement: a hallmark of human culture (Dean et al., 2014; Tomasello, 1999).  
However, children’s high-fidelity copying in laboratory studies has also been 
described as ‘surprisingly unselective’ or ‘mindless’ (Whiten et al., 2009), and 
susceptible to behavioural ‘inefficiency’ or  ‘cost’ (Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et 
al., 2007), following numerous reports that children blanket copy even those parts of 
an action sequence that are manifestly causally irrelevant to obtaining the instrumental 
goal (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward et al., 2011; Lyons et al., 2007; 
McGuigan et al., 2007, 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010).  This phenomenon, which 
has been dubbed ‘over-imitation’ (Lyons et al., 2007) and which has received much 
attention in recent years, has been replicated in several cultures (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 
2010; Nielsen et al., 2015), and, surprisingly, is reported to increase with age into 
adulthood (McGuigan et al., 2011, 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Whiten et al., 
2009).   
 The seemingly counterintuitive nature of  ‘over-imitation’ has led some 
authors to propose explanations that are grounded in causal cognition, suggesting that 
the demonstration leads children to imitate the action automatically (Lyons et al., 
2007; 2011; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Whiten et al., 2009), despite being able to 
understand the causal mechanisms necessary to operate the apparatus.  Such blanket 
copying, it is argued, might serve to promote facets of cultural learning that are 
causally opaque (Lyons et al., 2007; 2011), and should lead mostly to gains in cultural 
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knowledge, assuming that the demonstrator is a more experienced adult (Whiten, 
Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2005; Whiten et al., 2009). 
Critics of causal explanations have argued that the phenomenon results from 
more purely social processes, rather than mechanisms grounded in causal 
understanding (Legare et al., 2015; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2012). 
On this view, the term ‘over-imitation’ is misleading when applied to contexts in 
which the causally irrelevant actions encompass socially relevant pressures and 
benefits: rather, ‘optimal-imitation’ might be a better term there.  For example, 
children might be motivated to copy the causally irrelevant actions in order to be like, 
and share experiences with, the demonstrator, or to affiliate with and encourage the 
demonstrator to like them (Meltzoff, 2007; Nielsen, 2008; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; 
Over & Carpenter, 2012). Likewise, unanimity in the demonstration of irrelevant 
actions, which are often provided in a pedagogical context, might additionally lead 
children to believe that they are expected by the experimenter to perform the 
irrelevant action (Lyons et al., 2011), or that the demonstration is normative, and that 
they ought to conform to its performance, despite its function being unclear (Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011; Kenward et al., 2011; Kenward, 2012; Keupp et al., 2013; Keupp et 
al., 2015).  
 The critiques levelled at causal hypotheses resonate with other findings that 
children’s imitation can be selective and strategic. There is compelling evidence that 
children are able to imitate rationally, adjusting their imitative fidelity flexibly in 
response to a number of contextual cues, including the demonstrator’s competency 
(e.g., Birch et al., 2008; Williamson et al., 2008) and intentionality (Carpenter et al., 
1998), whether the demonstrator was constrained (Gergely et al., 2002), signs of 
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pedagogical engagement  (Csibra & Gergely, 2006), and the perceived goal of the task 
(Carpenter et al., 2005; Williamson et al., 2008).  
 Here I take a cultural evolutionary approach to investigating the question of 
whether children are better characterized as ‘over-‘ or ‘optimal-’ imitators. Cultural 
evolutionary theory predicts that social learning decisions should be strategic and 
selective regarding whom and when we copy (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), and guided 
by a set of adaptive learning heuristics that influence the emergence of socially 
transmitted behaviours within cultural groups (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Laland, 
2004; Rendell et al., 2011b). Evidence that learning biases are involved in guiding our 
use of social information has been provided using both theoretical (e.g., Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007; 
Kandler & Laland, 2013) and empirical approaches (e.g., Wood et al., 2012; Morgan 
et al., 2011; Toelch et al., 2014; Mesoudi, 2008), yet have been little considered in 
investigations of ‘over-imitation’. Initial evidence that learning biases are operational 
in the adoption of causally irrelevant actions suggests that these actions are more 
likely to be copied when there are adult rather than child models (Flynn, 2008; Wood 
et al., 2012), or high rather than low status individuals (McGuigan, 2013).  
Decisions regarding the adoption of causally irrelevant actions should be 
especially tuned to adaptive decision-making processes. Most previous ‘over-
imitation’ research has been conducted using one-to-one or otherwise unanimous 
interactions between demonstrator and observer (although see McGuigan & 
Robertson, 2015; Nielsen & Blank, 2011 for exceptions), yet ‘real world’ learning 
might involve observations of multiple individuals who behave in different ways. 
Comparing the operation of learning biases across situations that include, exclude, or 
otherwise vary the degree of irrelevant action performance in the demonstrations will 
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be particularly informative regarding the robustness of children’s propensity to ‘over-
imitate’ outside of these standard unanimous conditions. This chapter addresses this, 
considering one type of learning bias that has fascinated cultural evolutionists and 
psychologists alike: majority-biased copying.  
There is empirical evidence that majority or consensus behaviour informs 
copying in both children (Corriveau et al., 2009; Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Fusaro & 
Harris, 2008; Haun & Tomasello, 2011; Haun et al., 2012; Herrmann et al., 2013; 
Morgan et al., 2015a) and adults (Coultas, 2004; Morgan et al., 2011). For example, 
Haun et al. (2012) found that 2-year-old children were more likely to drop balls into a 
reward-releasing container that was previously chosen by three different individuals 
once each (majority group) than an alternative container that was chosen by one 
individual three times (minority person).  Because the majority behaviour represents 
the behaviour that the greatest proportion of group members have converged upon, it 
is expected to signal a relatively safe, reliable, and adaptive behavioural response 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Wolf et 
al., 2013).  It therefore presents a particularly suitable learning bias for testing 
hypotheses about the adoption of causally irrelevant information.  
 In the current study, I showed 4- to 6-year-old children a video demonstration 
in which the number of demonstrators who performed a causally irrelevant action 
(along with a causally relevant one) while getting a reward out of a puzzle box was 
systematically varied. That is, either all four of the demonstrators, or the majority (3 
out of 4), or the minority (1 out of 4), or none of the demonstrators, performed the 
causally irrelevant action. Outcome-oriented language emphasizing the instrumental 
end-goal of the task was used, as previous research indicates that language cues can 
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influence children’s perceptions of the task goal  (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare et al., 
2015; Clegg & Legare, 2015).  
The first experimental condition examined whether children were more likely 
to adopt the majority over the minority solution when faced with alternative, but 
equivalent, causally relevant task solutions. In line with previous findings (Haun et 
al., 2012), I anticipated that children would demonstrate a bias towards copying the 
majority’s solution. Importantly, I then asked whether majority-biased copying in 
children extends to majorities who perform a causally irrelevant action.  
If children copy actions blindly, without regard to their causal efficacy – if 
they [truly] ‘over-imitate’ – they should copy the majority regardless of whether the 
majority solution omits or includes causally irrelevant actions. However, I predicted 
that they would not do this, and instead that when presented with a majority 
performing the irrelevant action and a minority omitting it, the instrumental framing 
of our task, coupled with children’s tendency towards rational and selective imitation 
(e.g., Gergely et al., 2002; Want & Harris, 2001), would counter their tendency to 
copy the majority, and majority-biased copying would not be detected.  In contrast, in 
a condition in which the majority omitted the irrelevant action and the minority 
performed it, majority-biased copying was expected.   
I compared these results to those from a condition representing the paradigm 
typically used in ‘over-imitation’ research:  unanimous demonstrations of the 
irrelevant action. Here I predicted that the unanimity of the demonstration would 
result in irrelevant action copying at similarly high levels as previously reported (e.g., 
Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007).  A final condition, with no 
demonstration, provided the baseline level of irrelevant action production. Participants 
were provided with multiple (three) attempts at solving the puzzle box, as this 
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permitted an evaluation both of children’s initial tendency to copy as well as their 
tendency to ‘stick with’ performing the demonstrated actions after their own initial 
experience with the task.  
I tested 4- to 6-year-olds, as children within this age range have developed 
sensitivity to demonstrator frequency in copying decisions (Haun & Tomasello, 2011; 
Haun et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2015a; Wilks et al., 2015), as well as an ability to 
engage in rational and selective imitation (Gergely et al., 2002; Want & Harris, 2001). 
Children in this age range are also considered prolific ‘over-imitators’ (Kenward et 






Two hundred and fifty-two 4- to 6-year-old children (128 males; 4-year-olds: M = 
4;5, range = 4;0 - 4;11; 5-year-olds: M = 5;6, range = 5;0 - 5;11; 6-year-olds: M = 6;5, 
range = 6;0 - 6;11) were included in the final sample. Eight additional children were 
tested but were excluded from analyses due to experimenter error (2), apparatus 
failure (3), parental interference during testing (2), and refusal to interact with the 
apparatus (1). Participants were recruited at science centres in central Scotland and 
NE England. Testing took place on non-school days when children were visiting the 
science centre accompanied by a parent or guardian. Recruitment was via 
advertisements and visitor information displayed within each science centre, and 
participation was voluntary. Ethical approval for this study was given by UTREC of 
the University of St Andrews. 
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3.2.2. Apparatus  
 
The ‘Sweep-Drawer Box’ (Wood et al., 2013, see Figure 3.1a-c), a two-action 
transparent apparatus, was used with minor modifications. A capsule containing a 
sticker reward can be inserted into the apparatus through a cylindrical inlet located on 
the top of the box. Once inserted, the reward capsule rests on an opaque mid-level 
platform, and retrieval is dependent upon the capsule being first moved to the lower 
level by one of two spatially separated and functionally independent manipulandi: i) a 
silver sweeper with blue handle (Figure 3.1a), or ii) a blue drawer with red handle 
(Figure 3.1b). Capsule retrieval using the ‘sweep’ method involves moving the 
sweeper towards the front of the box, thereby pushing the capsule through a hole 
leading to the lower level. Capsule retrieval using the ‘drawer’ method involves 
pulling the drawer outwards, which creates a hole in the mid-level through which the 
capsule falls to the level below. Once at the lower level, the capsule can be retrieved 
by sliding open the black opaque door (unlike Wood et al., 2013, where the door 
could slide or lift open).   
In some demonstrations, capsule retrieval via the sweep or drawer 
manipulandum was preceded by an irrelevant (i.e., causally unnecessary) action (see 
Figure 3.1c). The irrelevant action involved the demonstrator twice sliding the black 












Figure 3.1a – c. The Sweep-Drawer Box. Demonstrator releasing the capsule using 
the sweep manipulandum (a), and the drawer manipulandum (b). Demonstrator 





In a between-groups design, participants were randomly allocated to one of five 
conditions (C1-C5). There were no significant differences in the distribution of age 
(F(4, 246)=0.26, p=.91) and approximately equal numbers of boys and girls in each 
condition. In four experimental conditions (C1-C4, N=201), children first watched a 
video showing four different demonstrators retrieving the sticker capsule from the 
apparatus in turn, before being given their own attempt at capsule retrieval. The fifth 
condition (C5, N=51) served as a non-social, baseline control in which participants 
received no video demonstration. The four demonstrators in the video were female, of 
similar age, and unknown to participants. Each wore a different-coloured long-sleeved 
t-shirt (red, blue, green, and purple) to help highlight that they were different 
individuals.  
The first experimental condition (relevant actions only: C1), in which no 
irrelevant actions were demonstrated, investigated whether children displayed 
majority-biased copying when choosing between two causally relevant actions: sweep 
versus drawer retrieval. Children in this condition saw the majority (three 
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demonstrators) perform the alternate relevant action to the minority person. In the 
remaining three experimental conditions, each child saw all four demonstrators 
perform the same causally relevant action (i.e., sweep or drawer), but the number of 
demonstrators who additionally performed the irrelevant action varied between one 
(i.e., minority irrelevant: C2), three (i.e., majority irrelevant: C3), and four (i.e., all 
irrelevant: C4) across conditions. The identity of the minority demonstrator, the order 
in which the minority and majority performed, and the use of the sweep and drawer 
methods of retrieval were all counterbalanced within and between experimental 
conditions (please see Table 3.1 for a detailed outline of the experimental conditions).   
 The majority demonstrators always appeared consecutively, as a block, with 
the minority individual demonstrating her method immediately before or immediately 
after the majority. To control for effects of demonstration frequency, the three 
majority demonstrators retrieved the capsule once each, while the minority individual 
demonstrated her method three times. In the baseline condition (C5), participants 
were presented with the apparatus without a prior video demonstration. Each 
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Table 3.1. Overview of the demonstration and baseline conditions 
!
Condition   Majority solution (3 demonstrators)   
Minority solution 
 (1 demonstrator) N 
(C1) 
Causal actions only 
 
  
All retrieve using the 
same relevant action 
(sweep OR drawer) 
  





Minority irrelevant  
All retrieve using the 
same relevant action 




action then retrieves 
using the same 




Majority irrelevant   
All perform the 
irrelevant action before 
retrieval. All use the 
same relevant action 
(sweep OR drawer) 
  
Retrieves using the 
same relevant action as 





All irrelevant   
 
All demonstrators perform the irrelevant action 
before retrieval. All use the same relevant action 




Baseline  No demonstration 51 





Children were tested individually in a screened–off area or in a learning classroom at 
the science centre. Parents were permitted to accompany children during testing, but 
were seated away from the main test area and asked to refrain from interaction with 
children until the test session ended.  Each child was asked to choose a sticker from a 
selection, which the experimenter then placed inside the reward capsule. The child 
was told, “I am going to put this [the capsule] inside a box. All you have to do is try to 
get it back out of the box. Once you get it out, you can keep the sticker.” For the 
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experimental conditions (C1-4), the child was then shown a picture of the four 
demonstrators and asked, “Can you see these four people who are all wearing 
different coloured t-shirts? Earlier I asked each of these four people to take a turn at 
getting the sticker out, and I made a video of what they did. This is the video of them 
taking a turn.”  The child then sat at a table in front of a laptop display screen, with 
the apparatus visible on a separate table perpendicular to the child. The experimenter 
dropped the capsule into the top of the box and then started the video.  
 All video demonstrations began with a still image of the four demonstrators 
together, accompanied by the video narration: “Earlier I showed the box to four 
people and asked them to take a turn at getting the sticker out. Watch closely to see 
what they did.” Each demonstrator was then introduced consecutively, and she 
performed her method of capsule retrieval before the next demonstrator was 
introduced. The introductions were identical across experimental conditions and 
consisted of footage of the demonstrator waving and smiling, accompanied by the 
narration: “Here’s the person wearing the (e.g., blue) top. This is her taking a turn.” 
The demonstrator then appeared standing next to the apparatus, ready to take her turn.  
Video clips of the actual capsule retrieval showed only the demonstrator’s arms and 
hands (Wood et al., 2012), eliminating possible differences in ostensive cues between 
demonstrators, while still displaying the demonstrators’ different coloured shirts.  
Each retrieval clip ended when the demonstrator had retrieved the capsule and held it 
in her hand. The footage of the minority demonstrator retrieving the capsule was 
repeated three times, but she was only introduced once.   
After all four demonstrators had retrieved the capsule, the video footage 
returned to the initial still image of all four demonstrators. The experimenter then 
verified that the child had watched the video. Pointing at the screen the experimenter 
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asked, “Did they all get the sticker out of the box?” Only two children answered 
incorrectly (i.e., “no” instead of “yes”), but subsequently answered correctly after 
watching the video a second time. The child was next asked to stand in front of the 
apparatus and told, “Now it’s your turn to try to get the sticker out.”  Children were 
then free to approach the apparatus and interact with it until either (i) the capsule had 
been retrieved, or (ii) 2 minutes had elapsed, or (iii) the child had refused to continue. 
When necessary, children were further encouraged, “You can try to get the sticker out 
if you like, you won’t break the box.” On successful retrieval of the capsule, the 
experimenter removed the sticker and said, “That’s one sticker for you,” before 
placing the sticker aside on a nearby table until the test session ended. Participants 
who successfully retrieved the sticker at T1 were offered two further attempts at 
sticker retrieval (T2 and T3); the experimenter reset the apparatus out of sight before 
each subsequent trial while the child was choosing a new sticker.   
  Children assigned to the baseline condition (C5) received the same initial 
instructions and prompts as children in the experimental groups but watched no video. 
Before their attempts the experimenter inserted the capsule into the box and reminded 
the child, “All you have to do is try to get the sticker back out.” All children who 
participated in the study received a sticker reward.     
 
3.2.5. Coding and inter-observer reliability 
 
Each participant was scored for three separate measures on each response trial: (i) 
successful removal of the capsule containing the sticker, (ii) the number of times they 
performed the irrelevant action (sliding the door open and closed prior to operating 
the manipulandi), and (iii) the manipulandum used during retrieval (sweep or drawer). 
The experimenter coded 100% of the sample from video records. An independent 
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observer, who was blind to experimental condition and hypotheses, coded a random 
sample of 25%. Inter-observer reliability was excellent: Chronbach’s alpha = 0.99 for 
the number of irrelevant actions performed, and Cohen’s kappa = 1.00 for the two 




All analyses were carried out in R version 3.1.3. GLMMs and post-hoc comparisons 
were performed using the packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) and multcomp (Hothorn 
et al., 2008), respectively. Significance testing on regression variables was undertaken 
by likelihood-ratio tests (LRTs) using the anova function. LRTs compare the change 
in residual deviance (which follows a X2 distribution) that occurs between nested 
models following the removal/addition of a variable. All models were checked for 
evidence of overdispersion, and to ensure that the magnitude of the standardized 
residuals were independent of the fitted values (Bolker et al., 2009). Two-tailed p 
values are reported throughout. 
To assess whether children demonstrated majority-biased copying across all 
response trials combined (T1-T3), I used the option-bias method (Kendal et al., 
2009b), to account for within-individual correlations in responses. This comprised 
performing a one-sample t-test on the difference in the number of times the majority 
versus the minority was copied within individuals, and then comparing the resulting 
test statistic (t) to the expected null distribution when no preference for the majority or 
minority solution was observed.  The null distribution was computed by randomizing 
the observed data, recalculating t, then repeating this 10,000 times. The null 
hypothesis could be rejected when the probability (p) that the randomization 
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procedure generated a t value at least as big as that calculated for the original data was 






Children who received a social demonstration (C1-4) were significantly more 
successful at retrieving the reward at T1 (success rate = 100%) than those who did not 
(six participants failed to retrieve the reward in the baseline condition: success rate = 
88.2%; Fisher’s Exact Test, p<0.001). All but three participants who retrieved the 
reward at T1 also retrieved the reward in T2 and T3.  
The remaining results are presented in three sections. First, I examine 
children’s copying of unanimous demonstrators. Next the influence of the majority on 
children’s tendency to copy is investigated. Finally, I examine the effect of 
demonstrator unanimity on children’s initial decisions to copy, and children’s 
persistence across trials with the method they first copied.  
 
3.4.1. Copying when the demonstrators were unanimous 
 
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of children’s age or sex on whether children 
copied actions that were unanimously demonstrated. 
 
Unanimous demonstrations of causally relevant actions  
In order to examine the effect of unanimous demonstrators on copying causally 
relevant information, data was pooled across the three conditions in which children 
saw all four demonstrators performing the same causally relevant action (i.e., sweep 
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or drawer retrieval, C2-C4 combined, N=150). Despite successful children in the 
baseline condition showing a bias towards retrieval using the sweep manipulandum 
(78% of all retrievals used sweep: Fisher’s Exact Test, p<.001), children who saw a 
unanimous demonstration showed a strong tendency to copy the relevant action they 
had witnessed (92% copying across all trials combined [91% sweep, 93% drawer]: 
Fisher’s Exact Test, p<.001).  
A logistic generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), with standard errors 
adjusted for repeated measures on participants across trials (see Table 3.2), revealed 
no significant effect of the method demonstrated (sweep vs. drawer), experimental 
condition (C2-C4), trial number, or whether the child copied the irrelevant action, on 





Table 3.2. The effects of experimental condition, the relevant action witnessed (sweep 
or drawer), whether the child copied the irrelevant action, and the trial number, on 
whether the relevant action was copied (C2 - C4) 
!




    
Intercept  10.34(2.26)***  
 
Conditiona 
     Minority (C2) – Majority (C3) -0.20(2.23)NS 0.82 
         All (C4) – Minority (C2) -0.06(2.39)NS 0.95 
         All (C4) – Majority (C3)  -0.26(2.52)NS 0.77 
Relevant actionb    0.51(1.90)NS 1.67 
Copied irrelevantc  0.98(1.34)NS 2.67 
Triald  -0.26(0.52)NS 0.77 
    
Logistic generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) with standard errors adjusted for repeated measures 
on participants. Pairwise comparisons were undertaken with Tukey correction for familywise error.  
R2GLMM = 0.83 (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). 
a Categorical variable: (Minority irrelevant (C2) = only one of four demonstrators performs irrelevant 
action; Majority irrelevant (C3)= three of four demonstrators perform irrelevant action; All irrelevant 
(C4) = all four demonstrators perform irrelevant action) 
b  Dichotomous variable (0 = drawer, 1 = sweep) 
c   Dichotomous variable (0 = did not copy irrelevant action, 1=copied irrelevant action)  
d Numeric variable (trial number) 
NS p>.05; ***p<.001 
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Unanimous demonstration of irrelevant action 
 Only 16% of children in the baseline condition performed the irrelevant action 
(sliding the door before using the sweep/drawer to move the capsule to the door-level) 
on their first retrieval attempt (T1). By contrast, a significantly larger percentage of 
children in the all irrelevant condition (C4) copied the irrelevant action at T1 (86%; 
(1) =51.60, p<.001), consistent with the high levels of irrelevant action copying 
reported in previous studies (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007; Horner & Whiten, 2005). Across 
all trials combined (T1-T3), the percentage of children’s responses in the all 
irrelevant condition that included production of the irrelevant action (81%) was 
significantly greater than in the baseline (9%; (1) =167.83, p<.001).  
 
3.4.2. Majority-biased copying 
 
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of children’s age, sex, or the method 
demonstrated (sweep/drawer), on whether they copied the majority behaviour.  The 
order in which the minority and majority performed did influence children’s copying, 
but only in the majority irrelevant condition (C3; see below).  
 
Majority-biased copying of causally relevant actions 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates that on their first trial (T1) children in the relevant actions 
only condition (C1) copied the majority significantly above chance when faced with 
demonstrations of two different, yet causally equivalent, relevant actions (binomial 
test: 76% copied majority, ±95% CI [62% – 87%], p<.001).  A randomization test 
(Kendal et al., 2009) revealed that children in this condition continued to demonstrate 
majority-biased copying when responses across all trials (T1-T3) were considered 
overall (test statistic = 4.39; p<.001; majority: 73%, minority: 27%; see Figure 3.2).  
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Majority-biased copying of the causally irrelevant action  
Participants were scored as demonstrating a majority bias if they copied the majority’s 
behaviour with regard to omitting (minority irrelevant; C2) or performing (majority 
irrelevant; C3) the irrelevant action. Figure 2 demonstrates that a strong preference 
for the efficient majority solution was observed in the minority irrelevant condition at 
T1 (binomial test: 84% copied the majority, 95% CI [71%, 93%], p<.001), and 
remained when responses across all trials (T1-T3) were considered (randomization 
test statistic = 7.70; p<.001; majority: 85%, minority: 15%; see Figure 2).  
In contrast, majority-biased copying was not observed in the majority 
irrelevant condition at T1, where the majority of children copied the more efficient 
minority (binomial test: 41% copied the majority, 95% CI [27% – 56%], p=.25). 
Majority-biased copying was also not observed when responses across all trials (T1-
T3) were considered; rather children in this condition showed a bias towards the 
minority person’s more efficient solution that approached significance (randomization 
test statistic = 1.82; p<.08; majority: 39.5%, minority: 60.5%).  Children in the 
majority irrelevant condition were influenced by the order in which the majority and 
minority performed:  They more often copied the demonstration they had witnessed 
first (64% of all responses matched the solution demonstrated first: Fisher’s Exact 
Test, p<0.001).  Thus, majority-biased copying was always detected when the 
majority performed an efficient solution, but did not apply to majorities who 
performed irrelevant actions. Interestingly, 12 children (8%) who had witnessed at 
least one demonstrator performing the irrelevant action subsequently performed the 
irrelevant action in a later trial (T2 or T3) after having omitted it at T1 (C2-C4, 
N=150).  











































































































Figure 3.2. Percentage of participants copying the majority behaviour at T1 and 
across all three trials (collapsed across age groups, C1- C3)  
 
 
3.4.3. Demonstrator unanimity and copying persistence across trials  
 
Previous research suggests that children persist with performing an irrelevant action at 
high levels when it has been demonstrated unanimously, despite hands-on experience 
of task mechanics (Lyons et al., 2007; Wood et al., 2012). Children also persist in 
performing a unanimously demonstrated relevant solution, even when there are other 
equally efficacious solutions discoverable (Wood et al., 2013).  Here I examined the 
effects of demonstrator unanimity on children’s persistence across T1-T3 with the 
demonstrated method.  
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 Preliminary investigations revealed age and sex effects in analyses pertaining 
to children’s copying of irrelevant actions (reported below), but all other age and sex 
effects were non-significant.   
 
Unanimous demonstrators   
Within the all irrelevant condition (C4), where both causally relevant and irrelevant 
actions were demonstrated unanimously, the level of irrelevant action copying at T1 
(86%) did not differ significantly from the high level of causally relevant action 
copying (96%; McNemar Test: (1) =1.78, p=.18). However, across trials (T1-T3) 
children were less likely to persist with the irrelevant action (70%) than the relevant 
action (92%; McNemar Test: (1) =5.88, p=.02), suggesting that fidelity erodes 
more quickly for irrelevant actions.   
 
Causally relevant actions 
 To examine the effect of demonstrator unanimity on whether children copied causally 
relevant actions, I compared the behaviour of children who witnessed a unanimous 
demonstration of the causally relevant action (i.e., sweep or drawer retrieval, C2-C4 
combined, N=150) with that of children who witnessed a less-than-unanimous 
majority (causal actions only condition, N=51).  Children were significantly more 
likely to adopt the relevant action at T1 when it was unanimously demonstrated than 
when it was demonstrated by a less-than-unanimous majority (Unanimous=96%, Not 
Unanimous= 76%: (1) =8.32, p<.004), and were also more likely to persist with 
copying the unanimous demonstration across T1-T3 (Unanimous=89%, Not 
Unanimous= 63%: (1) =16.91, p<.001).  Thus, children were more likely to both 
adopt and persist with the majority action when the demonstration was unanimous. In 
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other words, exposure to the alternate action, even when performed by a minority, 
leads to an increase in children incorporating both sweep and drawer solutions into 
their behavioural repertoire.   
 
Causally irrelevant actions 
Logistic regression models, including participants’ sex and age, were used to examine 
the effect of demonstrator unanimity on children’s initial copying of the irrelevant 
action in T1 (C2-C5, N=201), and their persistence in copying the irrelevant action 
across all trials (T1-T3) (C2-C4, N=150; see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3).  The baseline 
condition was included in analyses of T1 but was dropped from analyses of their 
persistence in copying, as it lacked the variation required to fit a logistic regression 
(i.e., no children in the baseline condition who performed the irrelevant action in T1 
persisted in performing it in T2 or T3).  
The frequency of demonstrators who performed the irrelevant action strongly 
influenced both children’s initial copying of the irrelevant action in T1 (likelihood-
ratio test: (3) =81.20, p<.001), and their persistence in copying it across T1-T3 
(likelihood-ratio test: (2) = 51.19, p<.001). Pairwise comparisons between 
conditions (see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3) revealed that the high levels of initial and 
persistent irrelevant action copying that occurred when demonstrators were 
unanimous in performing the irrelevant action (all irrelevant: T1: 86%, T1-T3: 70%) 
decreased sharply in all conditions in which the demonstrators were not unanimous, 
including when the demonstrators performing the irrelevant action constituted a less-
than-unanimous majority (majority irrelevant: T1: 41%, T1-T3: 21%). There was a 
further sharp reduction in children’s initial (T1) copying of the irrelevant action when 
the number of demonstrators performing the irrelevant action dropped from three 
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(majority irrelevant: 41%) to just one out of four (minority irrelevant: 14%). In the 
latter case, the percentage of children who performed this action at T1 was no 
different from that observed in the baseline children (16%). Children who had 
witnessed three of four demonstrators performing the irrelevant action (majority 
irrelevant) were not significantly more likely to persist in performing it than children 
who saw only one of four demonstrators performing it (minority irrelevant), however. 
Thus, when the demonstrators were not unanimous, children were influenced by the 
number of demonstrators who performed the irrelevant action at T1, but this did not 
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Table 3.3. The effects of experimental condition and age on whether the irrelevant 
action was performed at T1 (C2 - C5), and persistently across T1-T3 (C2-C4) !
Model 
parameters 






  Intercept 
      
 




   Conditiona 
 
           All (C4) – Majority (C3) 
          All (C4) – Minority (C2) 
         All (C4) – Baseline (C5) 
Baseline (C5) – Minority (C2) 
   Majority (C3) – Minority (C2) 
   Majority (C3) – Baseline (C5) 
  2.25(0.51)*** 
3.81(0.60)*** 
 3.81(0.60)*** 
-0.005(0.58)NS         
     1.56(0.51)*                 







  Participant’s ageb       -0.04(0.02)* 0.96 
  Participant’s sexc     -0.33(0.37) NS 0.72 
  Total model: R2 = 0.46 (Nagelkerke), !!(5) =84.41, p<.001 
    
Model T1-T3    
  Intercept    
  Conditiona            All (C4) – Minority (C2) 
         All (C4) – Majority (C3 







  Participant’s ageb  -0.02(0.02)NS 0.98 
  Participant’s sexc  -1.01(0.44)* 0.37 
  Total model: R2=!0.43!( Nagelkerke!),! !(4)!=!55.76,!p<.001!
  
Logistic regression models. Pairwise comparisons were undertaken with Tukey correction for 
familywise error.   
a  Categorical variable: (Minority irrelevant (C2) = only one of four demonstrators performs irrelevant 
action; Majority irrelevant (C3)= three of four demonstrators perform irrelevant action; All irrelevant 
(C4) = all four demonstrators perform irrelevant action; Baseline (C5) = non-social control)  
b Numeric variable (age in months)   
c  Dichotomous variable (0 = female, 1 = male) 
NS p>.05; * p<.05; ***p<.001 
 
 

















































































Figure 3.3. Percentage of participants performing the irrelevant action at T1 and 
persistently across T1-T3 (collapsed across age groups, C2-C5)  
***p<.001, *p<.05,  n.s p>.05. Comparisons with baseline were made at T1 only.  




Across conditions (C2-C5) children’s age was found to correlate negatively 
with performance of the irrelevant action at T1 (see Figure 3.4 and Table 3.3), such 
that older children produced fewer irrelevant actions.  An examination of Figure 3.4 
reveals that the negative effect of age on irrelevant action copying (in conditions C2-
C4) was confined to conditions in which the irrelevant action was not unanimously 
demonstrated (i.e., the majority irrelevant and minority irrelevant conditions), and 
was still significant following removal of the all irrelevant and baseline conditions 
from the analysis (C2-C3, Z = -2.04, Odds ratio = 0.95, p=.041, N=100). By contrast, 
children’s age had no significant effect on persistence in copying the irrelevant action 
across T1-T3, even following exclusion of the all irrelevant condition.  Thus the 
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initial (T1) tendency for increased copying of the efficient solution in older children 
was not maintained across repeated trials.   
Although there was no effect of sex on children’s initial performance of the 
irrelevant action in T1, boys were less likely to persist with the irrelevant action 
across T1-T3 than girls. Follow-up analysis revealed no interaction effect between sex 









































Figure 3.4. Percentage of participants performing the irrelevant action at T1 by age 
group (C2 - C5). Age represented in years for ease of graphical representation. 










The results presented here enhance previous research findings in relation to both 
‘over-imitation’ and majority-biased copying. They support previous results that 
children imitate flexibly and selectively, and provide the first direct evidence that 
behaviour containing causally irrelevant actions substantially alters the operation of 
adaptive learning biases. Within the instrumental framing of the task, majority-biased 
copying was always detected when the majority performed an efficient task solution, 
but did not extend to majorities who performed irrelevant actions.  That is, majority-
biased copying does not apply, at least in this context, to causally irrelevant actions. 
 
Irrelevant action copying 
In line with previous research (e.g., Lyons 2007; 2011; Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
McGuigan et al., 2007) children copied the irrelevant action at high levels when it was 
demonstrated unanimously, despite the instrumental framing of the task: “all you have 
to do is to try to get the sticker back out.” My experimental design does not directly 
test between competing hypotheses concerning why children copy irrelevant 
information at such high levels in this context, but it does offer some insights into 
this.  
For instance, it is unlikely that children in the all irrelevant condition saw the 
irrelevant action as causally necessary (i.e., Lyons et al. 2007; 2011), as despite 
copying the relevant and irrelevant actions at similar high levels initially, children 
were more likely to retain the causally relevant than the causally irrelevant action. 
Explanations based solely on assumptions about causality also imply that once the 
redundancy of the irrelevant action has been demonstrated, it should not show 
sensitivity to the relative frequency of demonstrators performing or omitting the 
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irrelevant actions. However, demonstrator frequency did influence children’s 
irrelevant action copying in our study: children were more likely to perform the 
irrelevant action in the majority irrelevant than minority irrelevant condition. The low 
level of irrelevant action production in the baseline condition further implies that 
causal understanding of what was and was not required to extract the reward was not 
problematic for participants in any of the age groups. Considered together, these 
findings suggest that children’s copying was influenced not by causal inferences but 
by demonstrator behaviour.  
Older children (age 6) were less likely to copy irrelevant actions at T1 than 
younger children (age 4), but only in experimental conditions where irrelevant actions 
were not demonstrated unanimously. Previous studies in which the irrelevant action 
was demonstrated unanimously have found that irrelevant action copying increases 
with age (McGuigan et al., 2011, 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). A plausible 
explanation for these combined findings is that unanimous demonstrations generate 
normative pressures and susceptibilities to copy the ‘way it’s being done’, despite the 
child’s knowledge that it is causally unnecessary, an understanding of which increases 
with age (Moraru et al., 2016). However, when demonstrators vary in performance of 
the irrelevant action, as in our study, the pressure to conform is substantially reduced 
and becomes increasingly undermined by age-related increases in discarding the 
majority behaviour for more accurate or reliable behaviour (Einav, 2014; Seston & 
Kelemen, 2014).  
 
Majority-biased copying 
These results provide strong evidence that while young children do use majority 
behaviour as a heuristic to guide instrumental learning, they are able to do so flexibly, 
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calibrating their decision-making according to additional cues, such as the majority’s 
perceived efficiency. Thus, children do not blindly follow the crowd. Majority-biased 
copying (regarded as a strategy for acquiring safe and effective behaviour; Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985, Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Henrich & Boyd, 1998) was strongest 
when the majority demonstrated the inefficiency of the minority’s irrelevant action, 
and did not extend to a majority that performed irrelevant actions.  
There were no significant age effects on the rate at which children copied the 
majority. This result contrasts with the findings of Morgan et al. (2015b), who 
demonstrated a positive relationship between age and majority-biased decision-
making in 3- to 7-year-old children presented with a forced-choice, numerical 
discrimination task.  However, Morgan and colleagues study did not include irrelevant 
actions, suggesting that age-related inferences about what is causally relevant could 
trump the tendency to conform in this study. These findings also contrast with 
McGuigan and Robertson’s (2015) conclusion that children of a similar age to this 
study do copy irrelevant actions at high levels when demonstrated by a majority. A 
number of procedural differences between the two experiments could easily explain 
this difference; notably, the serial reinforcement of irrelevant action performance 
across trials in McGuigan and Robertson’s design would have created increased social 
pressures to conform that were absent in this study.  
It is possible that had the irrelevant action in the current study been 
demonstrated using ritualistic or normative contextual cues (e.g., Fusaro & Harris, 
2008; Herrmann et al., 2013; Legg & Legare, 2015), or had the demonstrators been 
physically present (rather than on video), increasing children’s social motivations to 
imitate and providing the irrelevant actions with clear socially functional properties 
(Nielsen, 2008; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2012), a different pattern 
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of results, and possibly majority-biased causally irrelevant action copying, might have 
emerged. Future research is required to establish just where the boundaries lie in 
majority-biased copying.   
 
Implications for cultural evolution 
Cultural evolutionary theory states that a behavioural trait must be copied at levels 
proportional to the trait in the population if the trait is to be maintained at its current 
levels (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). These data therefore suggest that majority-biased 
copying could potentially stabilize functionally relevant behaviours within a 
population over time, but not behaviours that contain functionally redundant 
information. Across all three trials combined, participants who witnessed the majority 
perform an irrelevant action showed a bias for the minority’s more efficient behaviour 
that approached significance. There was also no difference in persisting with copying 
the irrelevant action between participants who saw it performed by a non-unanimous 
majority or performed by a minority. In combination with the strong bias for a 
majority who demonstrated greater behavioural efficiency over a minority, these data 
imply that without additional reinforcement of the irrelevant action (e.g., sanctions, 
punishments, explicit teaching or other normative or social pressures), majority 
behaviour containing functionally redundant information will rapidly switch to a more 
efficient solution (i.e., irrelevant action omission), which would likely continue to 
increase towards fixation. 
It is plausible that had the causally irrelevant action in this study encompassed 
more substantial efficiency costs, as might be true of many naturalistic behaviours, 
lower rates of irrelevant action copying and faster rates of erosion over time would 
have been observed; a suggestion consistent with the findings of Keupp et al. (2016). 
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Varying the ratio of majority versus minority demonstrators who performed the 
irrelevant action (for example 25:1 instead of 3:1), would also plausibly affect the rate 
of erosion, as would manipulating the relative age (Wood et al. 2012), status 
(McGuigan, 2013), or group membership (Oostenbroek & Over, 2015), of the 
demonstrators. Examining the interaction of different types of learning biases in 
irrelevant action copying is also an area ripe for future research.  
 
In sum, to my knowledge, this chapter presents the first evidence that young children 
flexibly and adaptively adopt a majority-biased learning strategy when faced with an 
instrumental learning goal and the opportunity to integrate social information from 
multiple individuals. Majority-biased copying did not extend to causally inefficient 
and irrelevant actions, despite these being copied at high levels when demonstrated 
unanimously. When just one individual dissented from the majority, ‘over-imitation’ 
plummeted. Thus, these data suggest that the presence of causally irrelevant actions 
might substantially alter the operation of adaptive learning biases. This finding has 
obvious implications for cultural evolutionary theory; namely that, in more real-world 
contexts in which actions are not always demonstrated unanimously, causally 
irrelevant, and potentially costly, actions are unlikely to be maintained in causal or 
instrumental contexts.    
 But instances of copying causally irrelevant actions, to serve social, ritualistic, 
or normative purposes, clearly do exist. These data also provide support for the 
operation of socially driven motivations in causally irrelevant action copying, despite 
the instrumental framing of the task. However, I suggest the term ‘over-imitation’ is 
inaccurate and misleading when causally irrelevant actions encompass social or 
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normative functional properties, as their performance in this instance no longer 
represents puzzling or irrational behaviour.   
To the contrary, these findings illustrate a flexible and highly functional 
integration of social learning strategies, through which individuals combine social and 
non-social sources of information to home in rapidly on the relevant actions in 
instrumental tasks, while remaining sensitive to the social functions of imitation. This 



































Cooperation and Imitation: A Series of Experimental 




































The previous chapters considered questions pertaining to the role of high-fidelity 
learning mechanisms (e.g., imitation) in the transmission and generation of cultural 
behaviour.  In this chapter, the focus shifts to the relationship between cooperation 
and imitation, and its role in generating group cohesion and cultural behaviour. In 
humans it is hypothesised that simple (automatic) imitation and cooperation are 
engaged in a mutually reinforcing virtuous circle, which might act as a springboard 
for the development of more complex forms of cultural learning and cooperation (e.g., 
Heyes 2012a). The pathway leading from imitation to increased cooperation is well 
documented, while the reciprocal relationship, from cooperation to increased 
imitation, is little studied.  Using a series of three experiments, I attempted to test the 
hypothesis that increases in cooperative rapport lead to increases in imitative 
behaviour between interaction partners. In the first experiment, imitative behaviour 
was positively associated with a measure of the quality of participants’ cooperative 
interaction (cooperative task performance), but was not higher overall in participants 
who cooperated relative to a control group (who performed the task alone). Moreover, 
participants in the control group imitated their interaction partner more if they had 
performed poorly; consistent with the hypothesis that poor individual performance 
leads to increasing desire to affiliate with others through imitation. However, these 
effects were not replicated in Experiments 2 and 3, and nor was imitative behaviour 
higher overall in participants who experienced cooperation, despite a series of 
incremental modifications designed to enhance participants’ cooperative experience. 
Future studies are required to examine and identify possible nuances in the 
relationships tested here.     





It is well established that people subconsciously imitate each other’s mannerisms, 
gestures and expressions. This phenomenon – known as the chameleon effect 
(Chartrand & Bargh 1999), non-conscious mimicry (van Baaren et al., 2009), 
response facilitation (Byrne, 2002), or automatic imitation (Heyes, 2011) – is believed 
to result in enhanced social interactions. For instance, when experimental participants 
are imitated by a confederate, the participants report that they like the confederate 
more than do participants who were not imitated (Chartrand & Bargh 1999). Imitated 
participants also report that they found the interaction more enjoyable (Tanner et al., 
2008), and rate their interaction partner as more persuasive (Van Swol, 2003), than 
participants who were not imitated. 
The benefits of being imitated appear to not just advantage the imitator. In a 
negotiation study by Maddux et al. (2008), dyads in which one subject was instructed 
to mimic their partner’s mannerisms secured better outcomes for both partners, 
compared with dyads that had no imitator. Participants who have been imitated are 
also more likely than non-imitated participants to help other group members with 
simple tasks (e.g., picking up objects another has dropped) – helping both the person 
who has imitated them or a third party – and make increased anonymous donations to 
a charitable cause (van Baaren et al. 2004). Even children as young as eighteen 
months old will help others more (e.g., pick up something dropped) when they have 
been imitated than children who have not been imitated (Carpenter et al., 2013).  
Thus, even when it is deliberately and experimentally orchestrated, the pro-
social effects of imitation appear pervasive. The relationship between imitation and 
cooperation is unlikely to be unidirectional, however: While imitating another leads to 
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increased cooperation, being cooperative is also thought to increase imitation, thus 
engaging automatic imitation and cooperation in a ‘virtuous circle’ of mutual 
reinforcement (Heyes, 2012a). This virtuous circle, in which persons are neither 
aware of being imitated nor of imitating (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), might function to 
help maintain large-scale collective action and information exchange, by acting as a 
social glue between members of a cultural group. Experimental evidence that 
individuals are less likely to imitate members of other ethnic (van Baaren et al., 2009) 
or religious (Yabar et al., 2006) groups than members of their ingroup, lends some 
support to this suggestion. 
Although the mechanisms that give rise to the virtuous circle are still poorly 
understood, it is plausible that the processes responsible for engaging simple imitation 
and cooperation in this reinforcing loop have acted as a springboard for the 
coevolution of more complex forms of cultural behaviour and cooperation (Heyes, 
2012a). Indeed, experimental studies suggest that simple, automatic imitation operates 
jointly with more complex forms of rational and intentional imitation in subjects 
engaged in an instrumental gesture making game (Belot et al., 2013). It is then 
possible that an escalating cycle of automatic imitation and cooperativeness between 
interaction partners could bootstrap the emergence of more complex forms of social 
learning (including rational and intentional imitation, and teaching through language; 
Byrne & Russon, 1998; Shea, 2009; Tomasello, 1999) along with ever-increasing 
forms of ultra-cooperativeness.  
However, despite the proposed mutual reinforcement between cooperation and 
imitation, the pathway leading from cooperation to imitation is less documented and 
established than its reciprocate.  Perhaps the most convincing evidence was shown by 
Leighton et al. (2010), who found that individuals primed with words such as 
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“cooperate” and “together” showed higher levels of automatic imitation than those 
primed with words such as “alone” and “selfish” (using a stimulus-response 
compatibility procedure that required them to produce matching or mismatching hand 
movements in response to a stimuli). People also imitate a person who they like more 
than a person they don’t like a priori (Likowski et al., 2008; McIntosh, 2006; Stel et 
al., 2010), and incur reputational costs when a third party observes them imitating an 
inhospitable other, relative to imitating a cordial other (Kavanagh et al., 2011). 
However, participants do not preferentially imitate an ‘agreeing’ person more than a 
‘disagreeing’ person, when faced with the two simultaneously (Van Swol, 2003), and 
also increase their imitative tendencies towards groups from whom they have been 
excluded, rather than included (Lakin et al., 2008; see also Watson-Jones et al., 2015). 
Thus, the social functions served by imitation in forging and repairing cooperative 
relationships (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Over & Carpenter, 2012) might sometimes 
offset the immediate positive relationship expected between these two traits.  
The purpose of the experiments in the current chapter was to examine the 
effect of cooperative interactions on automatic imitation in more detail. The work in 
this chapter is presented as a series of three experiments that reflect the chronological 
development and aims of the work undertaken. Specifically, in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2, I compared the imitative behaviour of participants who performed a 
coordination task cooperatively with a confederate, with participants in a control 
condition who performed the coordination task alone. In Experiment 3, pairs of naïve 
participants performed the coordination task with each other (or alone), rather than 
with a confederate. The first two experiments employed a naturalistic measure of 
imitation (i.e., face touching; e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), while a gesture-
matching measure was adopted from Belot et al. (2013) in Experiment 3. In 
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manipulating participants’ engagement in an actual collaborative activity, this study 
extends earlier work that examined the effect of experimentally priming a cooperative 
mind-set on participants’ propensity to imitate images of gestures presented via a 
computer display screen (Leighton et al., 2010).  
Across all experiments, I hypothesised that participants who undertook the 
coordination task cooperatively with an interaction partner would show a greater 
propensity to imitate the interaction partner’s behaviour, than participants who had 
not previously been given the opportunity to form a cooperative rapport (Chartrand & 
Van Baaren, 2009; Heyes, 2012a; van Baaren et al., 2009). However, as the 
coordination task presented the possibility for variable performance between 
participants (apparatus, see methods), I further anticipated that participants’ 
propensity to imitate their interaction partner might show sensitivity to their 
performance on the task. I expected that performance would vary positively with 
imitative behaviour when participants had performed the task cooperatively, reflecting 
the quality of their cooperative interaction. Conversely, I anticipated that participants 
who performed the task alone would not display the same positive relationship 
between task performance and imitative behaviour, and instead might show the 
reverse pattern (i.e., a negative relationship between performance and imitative 
behaviour) if poor individual performance led to an increase in desire to affiliate and 
build rapport with others (Chartrand & Van Baaren, 2009). 
  
4.2. Experiment 1 
 
In the first experiment, participants first undertook the coordination exercise (the buzz 
wire, see apparatus below), either with a confederate or individually, and then 
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engaged in a separate communications exercise with the confederate. During the 
communications exercise a naturalistic measure of subconscious imitation was 





Fifty-four participants were recruited from the St Andrews University population via 
the Psychology Department’s online sign-up system SONA. An additional 11 
participants took part, but were excluded due to: noticing the concealed camera (2); 
not paying attention during the communication exercise (1); suspecting that the other 
‘participant’ was a confederate (1); resting their face on their hands throughout the 
face touching phase (1); and noticing the confederate’s face touching mannerisms (6). 
Participants had a mean age of 22 years and 14 (26%) were male. There were no 
differences in participants’ sex (Fisher’s Exact Test: p=0.76), or age (Welch’s 
t(37.95)=1.54, p=0.13) between conditions. All subjects were awarded a participation fee 
of £5, which they could increase up to £10 for good performance in the first phase of 
the experiment. Ethical approval for this study was given by UTREC of the 
University of St Andrews.  
 
4.2.1.2. Apparatus (coordination task) 
The buzz wire task, a coordination exercise, was designed and custom-made for the 
purpose of this study (Figure 4.1).  The buzz wire could be performed jointly (Figure 
4.1a) or individually (Figure 4.1b), and the goal was to move a metal wand, which 
was attached to the wire by a small metal ring, backwards and forwards along the 
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buzz wire, from one end to the other, without touching it. Upon touching the wire, a 
buzzer sounded, at which point participants were required to return the wand to the 
starting end of the wire and begin again.  A successful run of the buzz wire was 
defined as moving the wand from one end of the wire to the other without sounding 
the buzzer. This novel task was thought particularly suitable for the purposes of this 
study as, when performed jointly, the motor requirements of the two roles are 










Figure 4.1. Participant undertakes the buzz wire task (a) jointly with another person, 






In a between-subject design, participants were randomly allocated to the cooperation 
or control condition. The experiment consisted of two stages: the first phase provided 
the experimental manipulation (i.e., cooperation or control), while the second stage, 
(b)$(a)$
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which was identical across conditions, provided the measure of behavioural imitation. 
Data collection was balanced in relation to two females who acted as confederates, 
who were unknown to participants, and who were blind to the hypotheses of the 
study.  
In the first stage, participants in the cooperation condition undertook the buzz 
wire task cooperatively with a confederate (see Figure 4.1a), while participants in the 
control condition undertook the buzz wire task alone (Figure 4.1b). Methods for the 
second stage of the experiment were adapted from previous experimental protocols 
that have been used to study non-conscious imitation of face touching behaviour 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Yabar et al., 2006). Participants 
were video recorded while they watched a “live feed” of the confederate 
communicating information from an adjoining room (actually recorded earlier), 
during which the confederate was touching her face. The same confederate video 
footage was used throughout the experiment to ensure consistency within and between 
experimental conditions, and confederates were also issued with scripts to ensure that 
they each communicated identical information.  
 
4.2.1.4. Procedure 
On arrival each participant was informed that they would be taking part in two 
unrelated experiments with another participant (the confederate). In the first stage, 
participants were informed that they would undertake a coordination exercise. Those 
assigned to the cooperation condition were required to work jointly with the 
confederate in completing the buzz wire task. During this phase, which lasted for 10 
minutes, participants were permitted to communicate verbally about the task, and 
encouraged to achieve as many successful runs of the buzz wire as possible in the 
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allotted time. Participants in the control condition completed the same buzz wire task 
alone, and in a separate room from the confederate.  All participants were informed 
that their final pay-off was directly related to their performance in this phase, and that 
they would receive an extra £0.25 for every successful run of the buzz wire, in 
addition to the £5 participation fee. 
Before moving on to the second stage of the experiment, the experimenter 
informed participants that she had forgotten to complete some paperwork (a short 
questionnaire regarding whether they had any previous experience on a coordination 
task such as the buzz wire) that required their (dated) signature. In an adaptation of a 
previous method used to study conformity (Coultas, 2004), the confederate first 
signed and dated the form using an analogical method of date signing (e.g., 14th 
March 2012), before passing it on to the participant to complete. Coultas (2004) 
previously found that experimental participants switched from the more common 
practice of writing the date numerically (14/03/2012), to signing analogically, when 
they believed others were signing analogically. The method was adapted here to serve 
as an additional measure of the participant’s willingness to imitate the confederate. 
The consent form that participants signed and dated at the start of the experiment 
served as a measure of their baseline method of date signing.       
In the second stage, participants were instructed that they were partaking in a 
communications exercise, during which they would watch a “live feed” of the other 
participant (actually the confederate videoed earlier), communicating information 
about four photographs from another room (the participant’s goal was to later identify 
the photographs described from a larger series of photographs). Each of the four 
photograph scripts communicated by the confederate described a landscape, and 
included details of persons, but no emotional expressivity (e.g., a group of people 
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hiking). The first 2 minutes of video playback footage were used to ascertain a 
baseline measure of each participant’s face touching behaviour. During the baseline 
phase, the confederate examined the pictures in preparation for the description task, 
but she did not touch her face. Immediately following the baseline period, the 
confederate began touching her face during and between verbal descriptions of the 
pictures: a period lasting approximately 4.5 minutes (imitation phase).  Participants 
were surreptitiously filmed throughout the video playback, which they watched from 
a chair placed 50 cm away from a 20” LED display screen. 
Next, participants completed a debrief questionnaire probing for (a) general 
suspicions about the confederate or procedure (b) what they thought the experiment 
was about, and (c) whether they noticed any particular mannerisms exhibited by the 
confederate. They were then thoroughly debriefed on the purpose of the experiment, 
and given the opportunity to ask questions. The experimental procedure lasted 
approximately 40 minutes. Participants were then free to collect their payment and 
leave. 
 
4.2.1.5. Coding and analysis 
The experimenter live-coded the participants’ performance on the buzz wire task (i.e., 
the number of successful wire runs), and coded 100% of participants’ face touching 
behaviour from video footage. Following previous protocols (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) the amount of time (in seconds) that each participant 
spent touching their face during the baseline and imitation phase of the video 
playback was coded. An independent coder blind to condition and hypotheses scored 
20% of videos, and inter-observer agreement was high: Chronbach’s alpha= 0.87.   
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All analyses were carried out in R version 3.1.3. Quasi-binomial models were 
used to examine the proportion of time that participants engaged in face touching 
during the experimental phase. A quasi-binomial model, which employs an additional 
parameter to adjust for deviations from the variance structure of the binomial 
distribution (Crawley, 2013), was preferred, as a conventional binomial model 
displayed evidence of overdispersion during model fitting. Quasi-AIC (QAIC) values 
were obtained using the package MuMIn (Barton, 2015), and a reduction in quasi-AIC 
of more than 2 was regarded as evidence that inclusion of an independent variable 
significantly improved model fit. Zero-inflated negative-binomial models were fitted 




Participants in the cooperation condition produced higher scores on the buzz wire task 
(mean=9.94) than those who were in the control condition (mean=5.21, Welch 
t(51.8)=5.27, p<0.001, N=54). Thus performing the buzz wire task jointly with another 
person was beneficial for performance. Participants who performed the buzz wire task 
jointly with the confederate did not afterwards copy the confederate’s analogical 
method of date signing more frequently than participants who undertook the buzz 
wire task alone (Fisher’s Exact Test: p=0.28, N=48; 8 participants who had signed the 
date analogically in the baseline were excluded from this analysis).  
 To examine the effects of experimental condition and buzz wire performance 
on face touching imitation, a quasi-binomial model was run on the proportion of time 
the participant engaged in face touching during the imitation phase. A covariate to 
adjust for each participant’s baseline measure of proportional time spent face touching 
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was also included. Other variables included in the model were condition 
(cooperation/control), buzz wire performance (the number of successful runs), and the 
interaction between condition and buzz wire performance.  Although the dependent 
variable exhibited a high proportion of zeros (26% of all participant responses), a 
zero-inflated negative-binomial model did not yield results that differed in direction or 
significance from those reported for the quasi-binomial model.  
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that, after controlling for the significant effect of 
participants’ baseline level of face touching (t=7.08, odds ratio= 2.10, p<.001, N=54), 
there was a significant interaction effect between buzz wire performance and 
condition, suggestive that face touching imitation increased with increasing 
performance when participants had undertaken the task cooperatively, but decreased 
with increasing performance when they had performed the buzz wire task alone 
(∆QAIC= -2.34,  t=-2.07, p<.04; see Figure 4.2b). There was no main effect of 
experimental condition following removal of the significant interaction term (t=1.16, 
odds ratio= 1.85, p=.25). 
 
 










































































Figure. 4.2. (a) Scatterplot showing the proportion of time spent engaging in face 
touching behaviour in the imitation phase by condition and performance on the buzz 
wire task (binomial lines of best fit ±95% CIs; data not adjusted for participants’ 
baseline level of face touching); and (b) predicted mean values ±95% CIs (adjusted 






Experiment 1 showed evidence of an interaction effect between buzz wire 
performance and automatic imitation in the direction predicted: When participants had 
undertaken the buzz wire task cooperatively, imitation of the interaction partner 
(confederate) was positively associated with performance, but negatively associated 
with performance when participants had undertaken the buzz wire task alone. This 
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relationship was expected if task performance in the cooperation condition was 
positively related to the quality of cooperative rapport established, while poor task 
performance in the control condition led to an increase in participants’ desire to 
affiliate with and imitate others. However, contrary to expectations, automatic 
imitation was not higher overall in participants who had been given a prior 
opportunity to establish cooperative rapport with the confederate.  
A possible explanation for this discrepancy between results and predictions 
might relate to participants’ experience of the task. While it was initially envisaged 
that the cooperation task used in this set-up would encourage participants to develop a 
feeling of collaboration and behavioural synchronization with the confederate, it 
became apparent during Experiment 1 that some participants in the cooperation 
condition found working with the confederate stressful (occasionally mentioning 
concerns that the confederate was hindering their performance on the buzz wire task 
or vice versa). Participants in the cooperation condition were also unaware of the 
performance advantages bestowed by cooperation versus performing the buzz wire 
task alone (cooperation approximately doubled average performance) – an additional 
factor that might have prevented the expected positive association between 
cooperation and imitation. In Experiment 2, I attempted to address these issues.    
 
4.3.  Experiment 2 
 
The aims and design of Experiment 2 closely followed Experiment 1, but offered a 
number of procedural modifications. In an attempt to enhance the relationship 
between cooperation and imitation, participants in Experiment 2 who performed the 
task cooperatively were provided with explicit information about the task-related 
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benefits of cooperative performance (i.e., information about the lower average scores 
of control participants), which had not been available in the first experiment. In 
Experiment 2, I also implemented a number of measures designed to reduce any 
anxiety that participants might have experienced when undertaking the buzz wire task 
cooperatively, and included additional questions in the end-of-study questionnaire to 
assess participants’ experience of this.  I expected the general pattern of results to be 
comparable with Experiment 1, but with the exception that overall levels of imitation 





Thirty-eight participants were recruited from the St Andrews University population 
via the Psychology Department’s online sign-up system SONA. An additional 12 
participants took part, but were excluded due to: noticing the concealed camera (3); 
not paying attention during the communications exercise (2); suspecting that the other 
‘participant’ was a confederate (2); resting their face on their hands during the face 
touching measure (2); and noticing the confederate’s face touching mannerisms (3). 
Participants had a mean age of 22 years and 10 (26%) were male. There were no 
differences in participants’ sex (Fisher’s Exact Test: p=0.46), or age (Welch’s 
t(19.5)=1.01, p=0.32) between conditions. Ethical approval for this study was given by 
UTREC of the University of St Andrews. 
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4.3.1.2. Design and procedure 
The design and procedure of Experiment 2 followed that of Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. Participants in the cooperation condition were informed of the 
average score of participants who had performed the task individually (based on data 
from the control condition in Experiment 1), in order to highlight the performance-
related advantages of performing the buzz wire task cooperatively. Participants in the 
control condition were given no information pertaining to performance.  
Additionally, in an attempt to reduce any stress or anxiety associated with 
performing the buzz wire task, a practice period of 4 minutes was introduced for all 
participants in Experiment 2, which did not contribute to their performance-related 
payoff. During the practice period, participants were free to try adjusting the height of 
the buzz wire, along with different techniques of moving the wand, while the 
experimenter busied herself with another task. Participants in the cooperation 
condition performed the practice period jointly with the confederate, who was 
instructed to explicitly consult and cooperate with the participant on their preference 
for the height of the buzz wire and wand movement.   
After the practice period had ended, participants then spent a further 6 minutes 
performing the buzz wire task, and were aware that they would receive an extra £0.50 
for every successful run of the buzz wire during this period. In the cooperation 
condition, on reaching the average score of a participant assigned to the control 
condition, the confederate announced, “at least we’re doing as well as somebody on 
their own.” This was followed by,  “now we’re doing better than an individual 
person,” when the average score was exceeded.  
 The procedure for the second stage (i.e., face touching imitation) was identical 
to Experiment 1. In addition to the previous questionnaire (i.e., questions probing for 
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general suspicions about the experimental procedure), participants were asked to 
answer the following three extra questions: (1) How much did you like the other 
person? (2) How well do you think you performed on the buzz wire task? And (3), 
How cooperative do you think the other person was during the buzz wire task? All 
answers to the additional questions were provided on a 7-point likert scale.  
 
4.3.1.3. Coding and analysis 
Coding and analysis followed the same procedure as Experiment 1. The experimenter 
coded 100% of the video footage detailing participant’s face touching behaviour. An 
independent coder blind to condition and hypotheses scored 20% of videos, and inter-
observer agreement was high: Chronbach’s alpha= 0.84.   
 
4.3.2. Results  
 
Participants in the cooperation condition produced higher scores on the buzz wire task 
(mean=5.47) than those who were in the control condition (mean=2.29, Welch 
t(30.1)=4.72, p<0.001, N=38). Thus performing the buzz wire task jointly with another 
person was beneficial for performance. Participants who performed the buzz wire task 
jointly with the confederate did not afterwards copy the confederate’s analogical 
method of date signing more frequently than participants who undertook the buzz 
wire task alone (Fisher’s Exact Test: p=1, N=30; 8 participants who had signed the 
data analogically in the baseline were excluded from this analysis). All participants in 
the cooperation condition rated the other participant’s (i.e., the confederate’s) 
cooperativeness as six or seven on the seven point likert scale (seven indicating very 
cooperative).  
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 As in the first experiment, a quasi-binomial model was run on the proportion 
of time the participant engaged in face touching during the imitation phase, with 
baseline level of face touching, along with experimental condition and buzz wire 
performance (including their interaction), as independent variables.  In contrast to the 
first experiment, and after controlling for the significant effect of participants’ 
baseline level of face touching (t=2.79, odds ratio= 1.79, p<.01, N=38), there was no 
interaction effect between buzz wire performance and condition (t=0.48, p=.64; see 
Figure 4.3). Moreover, Figure 4.3b indicates that the non-significant interaction effect 
in Experiment 2 showed an opposite pattern to that found in the first experiment. 
Following removal of the interaction term from the model, there was also no main 
effect of buzz wire performance (t=-0.53, odds ratio= 0.63, p=.60, N=38), nor of 
experimental condition (t=-0.20, odds ratio= 0.97, p=.85, N=38). A separate analysis 
of face touching behaviour, also employing quasi-binomial models but adopting the 
questionnaire-based measures as independent variables, revealed no significant effect 
of how much the participant liked the confederate (t=-0.74, odds ratio= 1.0, p=.99, 
N=38), nor how well the participant thought they had performed on the buzz wire task 
(t=-0.74, odds ratio= 0.80, p=.47, N=38), after controlling for baseline levels of face 
touching.    
    
 
 










































































Figure. 4.3. (a) Scatterplot showing the proportion of time spent engaging in face 
touching behaviour in the imitation phase by condition and performance on the buzz 
wire task (binomial lines of best fit ±95% CIs; data not adjusted for participants’ 
baseline level of face touching); and (b) predicted mean values ±95% CIs (adjusted 






Experiment 2 failed to replicate any of the patterns observed in Experiment 1. 
Additionally, imitative behaviour in the cooperation condition was not significantly 
above that observed in the non-cooperative control, despite additional interventions 
(relative to Experiment 1) to reduce any anxiety caused by performing the buzz wire 
task cooperatively, and interventions to raise awareness of the performance-related 
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benefits of performing the task cooperatively. This was observed despite all 
participants assigned to the cooperation condition rating the confederate highly for 
cooperativeness (i.e., 6 or 7 on a 7-point likert scale). Unlike previous studies 
(Likowski et al., 2008; McIntosh, 2006; Stel et al., 2010), there also appeared to be no 
effect of how much the participant reported liking the confederate on imitative 
behaviour, although this might reflect differences in the way that ‘liking’ was assessed 
between studies.        
 The non-repeatability of general patterns across the first two experiments 
raises doubts as to the robustness of the interaction effect detected in Experiment 1. 
Given that the non-significant findings in Experiment 2 displayed an opposite trend to 
that observed in Experiment 1, it is unlikely that the failure to replicate the initial 
findings is simply an artefact of the small sample size (i.e., N=38) in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 1 utilised a slightly larger sample (N=54), but the interaction effect 
detected only just passed the significance threshold (p<.04), raising the possibility that 
this result might reflect stochastic or systematic error. It is unlikely that the procedural 
differences between Experiment 1 and 2 would explain the opposite pattern of results, 
as the modifications implemented were simply designed to increase overall 
cooperative rapport in the cooperation condition, while the control condition 
remained largely unchanged. The sample sizes employed in the current study are on 
par with other published studies that utilise very similar experimental designs (e.g., 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999 (N=35); Lakin & Chartrand, 2003 (N=47); Yabar et al., 
2006 (N=26)), and illustrate the risk of non-repeatability with small samples, but also 
the difficulty of generating large samples when the procedure for obtaining each data 
item is detailed and long. 
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A further potential criticism of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is that a forced 
cooperation task in experimental settings might not easily lend itself to the expected 
relationship between cooperation and imitation, and that a voluntary cooperation 
exercise, where participants are free to choose to cooperate, is more representative of 
naturalistic situations.  Allowing participants to choose or decline cooperation is also 
more in line with studies that have tested the reverse relationship, from imitation to 
cooperation, and found that participants who have been imitated by a confederate are 
more likely to voluntarily help this person (e.g., van Baaren et al. 2004). The use of 
naturalistic measures in studies of automatic imitation (e.g., face touching, foot 
tapping, pen handling), which was adopted in Experiments 1 and 2, has also been 
criticised for failing to provide an accurate measure of imitation: the effect of 
increased face touching might more accurately reflect stimulus enhancement effects, 
for example, as the precise motor actions of the ‘imitator’ are not expressly assessed 
(Leighton et al., 2010).  
In Experiment 3, I attempted to address these remaining concerns.  
 
4.3. Experiment 3 
 
In Experiment 3, pairs of naïve participants interacted with each other rather than with 
a confederate. Procedural and design modifications permitted active decision-making 
between participants regarding cooperative or individual performance on the buzz 
wire task (i.e., cooperation was chosen rather than enforced by the experimenter). 
These design modifications also presented the opportunity to use a different imitation 
measure, based on hand gesture matching between participants (the Matching Pennies 
game, see Methods below), which afforded a more reliable assessment of imitative 
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behaviour than is offered by naturalistic measures such as face touching (Leighton et 
al., 2010).  
All pairs of participants in Experiment 3 were provided with the opportunity to 
practice performing on the buzz wire task both jointly (cooperatively) and 
individually, after being allocated to a condition that either encouraged or discouraged 
cooperation. Participants could then decide to complete the trial by performing the 
task cooperatively or individually. In line with the first two experiments, I expected 
that participants who performed the task cooperatively would show higher levels of 
imitation than those who chose not to cooperate. However, contrary to Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2, I did not predict or test for an interaction between experimental 
condition and performance, as each participant’s decision to cooperate or not in 
Experiment 3 was based on a comparison of their relative practice period experience 
of cooperative versus individual performance, and not restricted to an individual or 





Forty participants (20 pairs) were recruited as per the same procedure as the first two 
experiments. Participants had a mean age of 21.9 years and 35% were male. There 
were no differences in age (Welch’s t(20.0)=0.08, p=.94) or sex (Fisher’s Exact Test: 
p=1) between conditions. Participants were not permitted to take part in the same 
session with another participant whom they already knew. Ethical approval for this 
study was given by UTREC of the University of St Andrews.   
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4.3.1.2. Matching Pennies game (imitation measure)  
The Matching Pennies game (adapted from Belot et al. 2013) was used to provide a 
measure of automatic imitation in Experiment 3. Matching Pennies is a zero-sum hand 
gesture game (i.e., one player’s win automatically signals the other player’s loss) that 
closely resembles the widely known game rock-paper-scissors. The Matching Pennies 
game is played by pairs of players, and begins with both players in the neutral START 
position (Figure 4.4a). After a count of three, each player must choose to execute 
either the CLOSED-HAND gesture (Figure 4.4b) or the OPEN-HAND gesture 
(Figure 4c). Players are given different incentives during gameplay: if Player 1’s 
incentive is to produce matching gestures with Player 2, then Player 2’s incentive is to 
produce mismatching gestures, and vice versa. The Nash equilibrium for each player 
in Matching Pennies is therefore to produce the OPEN- or CLOSED-HAND gestures 
each with a probability of 0.5. During gameplay, one of the players is sighted, while 
the other is blindfolded (i.e., the blindfolded player’s role is simply to provide the 
gestures that the sighted player might imitate). Despite being instructed to produce 
their gestures at the same time, players sometimes display fractional discrepancies in 
their timing, providing an opportunity for automatic imitation to operate on the 
sighted player when the blindfolded player presents early (Cook et al., 2012). Belot et 
al. (2013) showed that players of Matching Pennies match the gesture of their 
opponent significantly greater than would be expected by chance, and have attributed 
this effect to the occurrence of automatic imitation in the sighted player. In Belot and 
colleagues’ study, automatic imitation was detectable even when the sighted player 
was incentivised to mismatch gestures, although players matched more frequently 
when the sighted player was incentivised to match, due to the additional operation of 
intentional gesture imitation.  









Figure 4.4.  Hand gestures used in the Matching Pennies game, detailing (a) the 
neural START position, (b) the CLOSED-HAND gesture, and (c) the OPEN-HAND 







In a between-subjects design, pairs of participants were randomly allocated to the 
cooperation encouraged condition or the cooperation discouraged condition. The 
experiment took part in two stages. The first stage provided the experimental 
manipulation, and involved a modified version of the previous buzz wire task. The 
second stage, which was identical across conditions, provided the measure of 
behavioural imitation, and employed the Matching Pennies game (see above). 
 
4.3.1.4. Procedure  
On arrival, each participant was introduced to the other participant and informed that 
they would be taking part in two unrelated experiments. In the first stage, participants 
engaged in a four-minute practice period on the buzz wire task, before together 
choosing whether to complete the exercise: (i) cooperatively (joint-action wand, 
Figure 4.1a), or (ii) individually (individual-action wand, Figure 4.1b). Crucially, in 
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the cooperation encouraged condition (number of pairs =10; 3 pairs were mixed sex) 
the circular attachments of the wands were manipulated to encourage a preference for 
cooperative working (diameter of joint-action wand attachment: 3 cm; diameter of 
individual-action wand: 1.5 cm). In the cooperation discouraged condition (pairs=10; 
4 pairs were mixed sex) participants followed the same procedure but the wands were 
manipulated to discourage a preference for cooperative working (diameter of joint-
action wand attachment: 1.5 cm; diameter of individual-action wand: 3 cm). 
Participants in both conditions spent 2 minutes practicing with the individual-action 
wands and 2 minutes practicing with the joint-action wand, before deciding whether 
to work together or alone. After participants had decided, they performed the exercise 
cooperatively or individually for 6 minutes. All participants were informed that their 
final pay-off was directly related to their performance in this phase, and that they 
would receive an extra £0.50 for every successful run of the buzz wire, in addition to 
the £5 participation fee. 
In the second phase of the experiment, participants played the Matching 
Pennies game (adapted from Belot et al., 2013, see above). The experimenter 
provided participants with detailed verbal instructions about the rules of the Matching 
Pennies game, checking that they understood and could create the required hand 
gestures before beginning. Within each participant pair, individuals were randomly 
labelled Player 1 or Player 2, and the experimenter acted as the game umpire. Each 
participant pair played four rounds of 20 games, and participants were sitting facing 
each other throughout each round. The game incentive of each player (matching vs. 
mismatching gestures), and the player who was blindfolded, was counterbalanced 
between rounds (see Table 4.3.1).   
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At the start of each new round, players played three practice games, during 
which both players were sighted. After this, only one player remained sighted (the 
other wore the blindfold) and game play began.  In each game, players were required 
to produce their hand gesture at the experimenter’s count of three, following which 
the experimenter announced the game winner (e.g., “Player 1”) and recorded the 
result on a score sheet, before players resumed the neutral START position, ready for 
the next game. Rounds in which there was an obvious violation of the game rules 
(e.g., delayed or premature gesture execution) were replayed (a total of 8% of games 
were replayed). All participants were informed that they would receive an additional 
5p for every Matching Pennies game that they won, thus a player who won all of their 
games would receive an additional 0.05 x 80 = £4.    
At the end of the experiment, participants were provided with a full debrief 
and an opportunity for further questions. The experimental procedure lasted 






1 Match Mismatch Player'1 20
2 Match Mismatch Player'2 20
3 Mismatch Match Player'1 20







Table 4.1.  Game-round structure played by pairs of participants during the 
Matching Pennies game 
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4.3.1.5. Data coding and analysis 
The experimenter live coded the data in both stages of the experiment. All analyses 
were conducted in R version 3.1.3. Generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) were 
fitted using package lme4 (Bates et al., 2014), and significance testing was undertaken 
by likelihood-ratio tests (X2) using the anova function. GLMMs were checked for 
overdispersion and to ensure that the magnitude of the standardized residuals were 




All pairs of participants allocated to the cooperation encouraged condition chose to 
work cooperatively on the buzz wire task, and all participants who were allocated to 
the cooperation discouraged condition chose to work individually.  There was no 
difference in buzz wire performance between participants who chose to undertake the 
task cooperatively (mean= 6.8 wire runs), and those who completed the task 
individually (mean=5.9: t(18.7) = -1.02, p = .32).  
The percentage of matching gestures produced by the sighted player according 
to whether they were incentivized to match or mismatch their opponent’s gestures, 
and by experimental condition, are shown in Table 4.2.  An inspection of the 
percentages described in Table 4.2 indicates that the values are comparable with those 
presented in Belot et al. (2013), but provides no evidence that choosing to perform the 
buzz wire task cooperatively led to an increase in imitation: by contrast, gesture 
matching was lower in participants who had performed the task together, for games 
with both matching and mismatching incentives. Following Belot et al. (2013), one-
tailed t-tests were performed on the percentage of matching gestures produced by 
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pairs of players, to determine if matching occurred at significantly greater levels than 
would be expected by chance (i.e., 50%). Across all responses combined, there was 
evidence that sighted players produced matching gestures significantly greater than 
expected by chance (t(39) = 2.04, p = .026). However, there was no significant evidence 
of matching greater than chance when responses were considered separately for 
games with matching (t(39) =1.61, p = .06) or mismatching (t(39) = 1.13, p = .13) 
incentives; a finding which appeared to result from a higher amount of variance 
existing within the measures when the data was split into separate response types.  
A logistic regression, with standard errors adjusted for repeated measures on 
pairs of participants, was run to assess the effect of buzz wire undertaking 
(cooperatively/individually) on whether the players produced matching gestures.  As 
expected from examination of the data in Table 1, there was no effect of condition 
(X2(1)=0.06, odds ratio= 0.97, p=.81) on matching behaviour. Thus, in this 
experiment, there was no evidence that choosing to cooperate with another person led 










Table 4.2. The percentage of game rounds in which the sighted player matched the 
gesture of the blindfolded player by game incentive (match/mismatch) and whether 
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4.4. General Discussion 
 
The three experiments presented in this chapter failed to find the expected positive 
relationship between cooperation and automatic imitation, despite participants 
reporting that they found their interaction partner cooperative (Experiment 2) and 
despite their choosing cooperation (Experiment 3). Experiment 1 produced results that 
hinted at an anticipated interaction effect – i.e. imitative behaviour was positively 
related to task performance when participants had interacted cooperatively, but was 
negatively related to performance when participants had performed alone – but this 
finding did not show any repeatability in Experiment 2, and is therefore seemingly not 
robust. This finding is reflective of growing concerns in psychology studies regarding 
the non-repeatability of results and effect sizes obtained with relatively small data 
samples (Open Science Collaboration., 2015), and should encourage caution when 
interpreting the results of similar studies that do not provide evidence of repeatability.     
 Experiment 3 attempted to address potential procedural weaknesses remaining 
from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, by allowing participants the experience of 
‘choosing’ to cooperate, and also employing a more accurate measure of imitation 
(gesture matching), yet this still failed to detect the expected increase in imitative 
behaviour within pairs who worked jointly relative to pairs who worked individually. 
On the contrary, pairs who worked jointly imitated each other at a lower rate than 
pairs who worked individually, though this effect did not reach statistical significance. 
This finding contrasts with that of Leighton et al. (2010), who did find an increase in 
automatic imitation of similar hand gestures (displayed via a computer monitor) in 
participants who had been primed with ‘cooperative’ versus ‘individualist’ words.  
One possibility for the discrepancy between the findings in Experiment 3 and 
those of Leighton and colleagues is that joint performance on the buzz wire task 
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relative to performing the task individually does not instil the same differences in 
cooperative mind set as cooperative relative to individualist priming, even when 
participants have themselves chosen cooperation. For instance, the act of choosing to 
work individually in Experiment 3 might in itself have been experienced as a 
collaborative and beneficial act of decision-making between participant pairs, 
reducing the contrast between individual and cooperative task performance; though 
we should still expect decisions and experiences leading to cooperation to enhance 
cooperative rapport further than decisions to perform alone. It is also possible that 
joint decisions to perform the task individually led to a subsequent desire to reconnect 
and re-affiliate with the interaction partner (through increased imitation) during the 
Matching Pennies game (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Future research should repeat the 
procedure undertaken in Experiment 3 while replacing the buzz wire task with 
Leighton et al’s cooperative priming procedure, to investigate these possibilities 
further.    
An additional procedural difference that might also explain the difference in 
my own and Leighton et al’s findings is that in the latter experiment participants were 
presented with a photographic image of the OPEN-HAND and CLOSED-HAND 
gestures via a computer display screen (a less naturalistic measure of automatic 
imitation that utilises a stimulus-response-compatibility/reaction-time paradigm; e.g., 
Brass et al., 2000; Bird et al., 2007), while participants in Experiment 3 were 
presented with the opportunity to imitate their own interaction partner’s live hand 
gestures. However, this observation might lead us to expect a stronger relationship 
between cooperation and imitation in Experiment 3 relative to Leighton et al’s 
measure, rather than the opposite pattern observed, as live measures of automatic 
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imitation (Belot et al., 2013; Cook et al., 2012) allow the imitator to respond directly 
to their cooperative or non-cooperative interaction partner’s hand gestures.  
As in the first two experiments, the discrepancy in findings between these two 
studies could also reflect the use of small data samples leading to random or 
systematic errors – 40 participants were used across two conditions in my study, while 
only 36 participants were used across three experimental conditions in the study by 
Leighton and colleagues. This possibility again highlights the need for replication in 
published research. Moreover, in my own experiment, given the very small 
percentage (%) differences in matching behaviour observed between experimental 
subcategories, and relative to chance matching, it is possible that even if the 
experimental manipulation were to produce an effect in the predicted direction, an 
unrealistically large sample would be required to detect what might accurately be a 
small effect size. Leighton et al’s use of reaction time (i.e., the time taken by 
participants to produce a matching or mismatching gesture), rather than matching per 
say, to measure the effect of automatic imitation, may also represent a higher 
resolution and more amenable response variable in this regard.         
It is also of course possible that the directional relationship leading from 
cooperative behaviour to imitation, which was the focus of study in this chapter, is not 
as strong as its reverse, or is mediated by other factors such as mood (van Baaren et 
al., 2006) or the degree of similarity between interaction partners (Van Swol & Drury-
Grogan, submitted). This would explain the relative abundance of literature 
demonstrating the link between imitative behaviour and cooperativeness (e.g., 
Carpenter et al., 2013; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren et al., 2004), but the 
scarcity of empirical evidence showing the hypothesised relationship in the opposite 
direction. It is also plausible that anticipation of a cooperative interaction in the future 
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supports the relationship between cooperation and imitation (Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003), while a previous cooperative interaction with no possibility of continued future 
cooperation (as in this experiment) does not. This possibility could also explain why 
cooperative priming produces the expected effect but previous cooperative behaviour 
did not. Future studies that vary the type of cooperation exercise and the context in 
which cooperation is required are necessary to investigate these possibilities further.   
 
In sum, the experimental procedures detailed in this chapter did not find support for 
the relationship hypothesised between cooperative behaviour and imitation. They also 
highlight potential concerns relating to the repeatability and robustness of results 
obtained in investigations of automatic imitation, and provide support for the adoption 
of experimental procedures that demonstrate repeatability of results across more than 
one measure of imitation (e.g., face touching and foot tapping; Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999).    
 Given the series of updated experimental manipulations adopted here, it is 
plausible that the relationship between cooperation and imitation is more nuanced 
than initially predicted, and likely mediated by other factors that were not represented 
in the experimental design. However, these results do not dispel the possibility that 
cooperation and imitation are interlocked in a mutually reinforcing system that 
bolsters cohesion and cultural transmission in social groups. Future studies are 
required to elucidate the conditions and contexts under which this relationship may 
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In the previous chapter, I investigated the relationship between cooperative behaviour 
and imitative behaviour, specifically attempting to assess the hypothesis that 
cooperation enhances the operation of mechanisms and behaviours leading to 
imitation. In this chapter, I attempted to examine the interaction between collective 
behaviour and instrumental cultural learning, using an experimental micro-society 
approach with groups of participants playing networked computer games.  Despite an 
abundance of studies and theories purporting a link between large-scale cooperation 
and the evolution of complex culture (e.g., Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Hill et al., 2011; 
Pagel, 2012; Tomasello et al., 1993), there have been no attempts to manipulate this 
interaction experimentally. Specifically I tested whether individuals’ access to cultural 
information in a learning game (as determined by other group members) was 
mediated by their reputation in a linked public goods game, and predicted that 
reputation-based access to information could serve to increase cooperative behaviour 
if free riders were targeted and discouraged by exclusion from cultural information. 
As predicted, I found evidence that participants preferentially shared information with 
co-operators and withheld information from free riders.  However, the operation of 
reputation-based access to cultural information did not increase cooperative 
behaviour, relative to a control condition. It is likely that the cost of exclusion from 
cultural information was not large enough to offset the benefits of free riding in this 
experiment, but it is argued that this mechanism could serve to increase both 
cooperation and cultural exchange in the plausible scenario where being denied access 








Laboratory-based economic games have been instrumental in generating empirical 
support for the paradigm that humans have evolved strong prosocial tendencies that 
bolster large-scale cooperation. The results of these experiments suggest that humans 
cooperate at much higher levels than is economically rational, even when there is no 
possibility of direct or indirect fitness benefits, immediately or in future (e.g., Fehr et 
al., 2002; Gintis et al., 2003; Rand et al., 2012; although for an alternative view see 
Burton-Chellew & West, 2013). The public goods game (PGG) is one such economic 
game that is frequently used to study cooperative behaviour in groups of humans 
faced with collective action decisions.  
 In the PGG, individuals choose how much to contribute to a public pool to 
produce benefits that are shared equally by all members of their group, including 
themselves. The maximum payoff for the group occurs when all individuals 
contribute the full amount. However, individual players can increase their own 
personal payoff by free riding – i.e. taking the benefits from the public pool while 
withholding their own contribution. Players are thus faced with a dilemma: the 
dilemma of contributing to the increased welfare and cooperativeness of the group, or 
of maximising their own immediate individual gain while risking retaliation from 
other group members in future. The PGG encapsulates the many public-goods 
scenarios that day-to-day engage us all: from reducing global carbon emissions, to 
adhering to hosepipe bans, to contributing fairly to community projects and household 
chores.  
 In a one-shot PGG, an individual wishing to maximise their personal income 
or gain should contribute zero. On the contrary, across a wide range of cultures, most 
players make initial contributions that are substantially greater than zero (~40-50% of 
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their resources; Gintis et al. 2003; Henrich et al., 2005; Burton-Chellew & West 
2013). However, when play is repeated, the initial and unexpectedly high levels of 
investment by players in the PGG tend towards zero, as free-rider strategies emerge 
and players gradually switch to behaving in the expected self-interested manner (Fehr 
& Gächter 2000).  This holds true whether the players (who interact anonymously via 
computer screens) are randomly assigned to groups in each round, or whether group 
composition, and therefore interaction partners, remain constant over multiple rounds 
(Fehr & Gächter 2000).   
 The mechanisms that sustain and bolster cooperative interaction in human 
groups, preventing the influx and establishment of free-rider strategies, have thus been 
the focus of much attention. The opportunity for game players to use costly 
punishment or reward has received particular focus. For example, in PGGs that permit 
individuals to pay a cost to punish non-contributors, cooperation does not deteriorate, 
but rather increases, over time (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gintis et al. 2003; Rand et 
al. 2009).  Moreover, when interaction partners remain constant from round to round, 
costly reward (i.e., paying a cost to bestow a reward upon another group member) is 
found to be just as effective as punishment in maintaining high levels of cooperation, 
and can even lead to higher net payoffs (Rand et al. 2009).  
 In addition to costly punishment and reward, player behaviour in cooperative 
dilemmas is responsive to an increasing array of experimental manipulations. 
Symbolic sanctions (i.e., anticipating unrestricted verbal feedback from other players), 
that confer no cost on the sanctioner, can lead to increased cooperation, for instance 
(Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008).  Expectations of others’ cooperativeness, which are 
higher when playing with members of one’s ‘cultural ingroup’, might also influence 
game outcomes (Koopmans & Rebers, 2009).  Likewise, conducting gameplay within 
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dynamic network settings, permitting players to change their interaction partners 
through making or breaking game connections, has also been shown to stabilise 
cooperation: co-operators frequently break their links with defectors whilst making 
new ties with other co-operators; discouraging freeriding and incentivising 
cooperation in the process (Rand et al., 2011). Moreover, the visibility of other 
players’ wealth (game points) can lead to lower aggregate levels of cooperation within 
groups, and exacerbate initial levels of wealth inequality, relative to when wealth is 
hidden (Nishi et al., 2015).  
 However, despite the growing evidence of an intrinsic connection between 
human ultra-cooperativeness and cultural complexity (reviewed in Chapter 1: General 
Introduction), there has been very little experimental work that attempts to directly 
assess this interaction. Indirect evidence suggestive of a reciprocal and coevolutionary 
relationship between cultural exchange and the establishment of large, cooperative 
interaction networks, has been provided both by theoretical models (e.g., Henrich, 
2004a; Powell et al., 2009; Pradhan et al., 2012), and empirical studies (e.g., 
Discamps & Henshilwood, 2015; Henrich et al., 2005; Hill et al., 2011, 2014). One 
experimental study, comparing the learning capabilities of children, chimpanzees and 
capuchins, supports the suggestion that human cultural feats, such as cumulative 
technological advancements, are directly scaffolded by our extreme cooperativeness 
(Dean et al., 2012). Yet, to my knowledge, there have been no attempts to 
experimentally examine whether our extreme dependency on cultural information in 
turn promotes and scaffolds cooperation. Because cooperative interactions and 
cultural exchange have likely coevolved (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Hill et al., 2011; 
Tomasello, 1999), it is plausible that our requirement for up-to-date and reliable 
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cultural information acts to encourage and stabilize cooperative behaviour, in addition 
to depending on it.     
 In this chapter, I attempted to study the relationship between cultural 
transmission and cooperative behaviour experimentally, using an experimental micro-
society approach (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). Specifically, I investigated whether 
individuals’ reputations (i.e, contributions) in a public goods game influenced their 
access (as determined by fellow group members) to beneficial ‘cultural’ information, 
in a separate but linked learning game. In turn, this also permitted me to examine 
whether reputation-based access to cultural information could encourage increased 
cooperative reputation building, thereby serving to promote and increase group-level 
cooperation.   In this experiment, following each round of an iterated PGG, all group 
members learnt of each other’s contribution to the PGG then each played one round of 
a separate computer-based learning game. During each play of the learning game, 
individuals were permitted to choose which other group members they were willing to 
share game-related (‘cultural’) information with. In a second experimental condition, 
that prevented and therefore controlled for reputation-based effects across the two 
games, players were assigned separate and unlinked identities in the PGG and learning 
game.  
 For the learning game, I created an adapted version of a custom-made 
cumulative learning game, ‘the monster league game’, previously implemented by 
Wisdom et al. (2013) to study social learning in networked groups. This game, which 
is outlined in detail below (see Methods), requires players to select a team of monster 
icons from a league of available icons, and players aim to maximise the score of their 
selected team in each round. The hidden score distribution in the monster league game 
prevents individual participants from monopolising increments in performance, and 
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thus encourages continued motivation to engage in information exchange among 
players. Moreover, a previous study (Wisdom et al. 2013) showed that groups with 
access to each other’s game play were able to explore the problem space more 
effectively than groups with reduced social information, and that the advantage of 
sharing information was also positively correlated with the number of group members 
contributing information.  
 When participants’ identities were linked across the PGG and learning game, 
they were expected to preferentially direct information sharing towards co-operators, 
and withhold information from free riders. However, when participant game identities 
were unlinked, this reputation-based specificity in information sharing was prevented. 
Thus, I predicted that higher levels of cooperation (i.e., PGG contributions) would be 
maintained when game identities were linked, as reputation-based targeted exclusion 
from social information would act to discourage individuals from free riding in this 
condition, but would be prevented from operating when game identities were 
unlinked.  
In turn, I predicted that, when game identities were linked, group-level PGG 
contributions would be positively related to information transfers, and individual-level 
PGG contributions would be positively related to the amount of information transfers 
individuals received. No prediction was made regarding the overall relationship 
between PGG contributions and information transfers in the unlinked identity 
condition, nor regarding overall differences in information transfers between 
conditions, as there was no clear hypothesis regarding the absolute level of 
information transfer that would occur when participants’ between-game identities 
were unlinked. However, relatedly, I also anticipated that, within experimental 
conditions, participants might be relatively less willing to share high-quality 
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information (i.e., high-scoring monster teams) when they were unsure of other 
individuals’ reputations (i.e., when game identities were unlinked), than when the 
reputations of their information recipients were visible (i.e., game identities were 
linked).  
In line with previous findings (Wisdom et al. 2013), I predicted that learning 
game performance would be positively associated with the amount of social 
information transfer between group members, at the group and individual level. I did 
not make a firm prediction regarding differences in learning game performance 
between conditions, due to the unpredictability of between-condition differences in 
information transfer. However, I did not expect that learning game performance in the 
unlinked identity condition would exceed that in the linked identity condition 
(although it could be equal or less), due to the expectation that positive feedback 
between cooperation and sharing when identities were linked would drive high levels 
of performance. I also predicted that PGG contributions would be positively 
associated with learning game performance when game identities were linked, due to 
the positive relationship expected between PGG contributions and information 
transfer in this condition, but that this relationship would not be observed when game 
identities were unlinked, due to the inability of participants to link PGG reputations to 
information-transfer decisions in this condition. Finally, I anticipated that participants’ 
game-round payoff (i.e., total points earned across the PGG and learning game in each 
round) would be higher when game identities were linked than when they were 









5.2.1. Participants and materials 
 
Participants were 80 students and staff at the University of St Andrews, recruited via 
the University’s online sign-up system for human experiments (SONA). Participation 
was voluntary, and participants were remunerated with a £5 participation fee, plus the 
opportunity to earn an additional bonus of up to £15 dependent on their performance. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 52 years old (mean=21.5, sd=4.8), and 32 
were male. There was no difference in the distribution of age (Mann-Whitney: 
W=762.5, p=0.72) or sex (X2(1)=0.47, p=0.49) between experimental conditions. 
Ethical approval for this study was given by UTREC of the University of St Andrews. 
 All participants took part in groups of four, and each experimental session was 
conducted inside a university computer lab with one or two groups of four participants 
(i.e., 4 or 8 participants per session). Each participant had access to a computer, and 
was visually separated from the other participants by large screens. The experiment 
was implemented via custom-made software written in Java, and run over a local 
computer network. Participants used a mouse and keyboard to interact with the 
experiment, and participants’ computers were coordinated and updated by a server 
computer, which also recorded the data, throughout the experiment.     
  
 
5.2.2. Computer games 
 
Public goods game (PGG) 
Following Rand et al. (2009), I employed a standard PGG design (designated the 
project game), in which groups of four participants interacted repeatedly. In every 
game round, each participant received 20 monetary points and was asked to decide 
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how many points (between 0 and 20) they were willing to contribute to the public 
good (i.e., the group project), on the proviso that they would keep any points they did 
not contribute for themselves. Participants were given 20 seconds to make their 
contribution, and were informed that failure to decide in this timeframe would result 
in a random number of points between 0 and 20 being contributed. Contributions to 
the public good were then doubled before being split evenly back among the four 
group members.  
Thus, the maximum payoff for the group occurred when all participants 
contributed 20 points, and each participant received back 40 points (i.e., for each point 
contributed, all participants received back 0.5 points), but individual participants 
could increase their own game-round earnings relative to other group members by 
contributing less while still benefiting from the group pool (the maximum individual 
payoff was 50 points for an individual who contributed zero when all other group 
members contributed 20 points).   
 
Learning game 
The learning game (designated the monster league game) was adapted from, and 
closely resembled, a custom-made learning game designed by Wisdom et al. (2013). 
The aim of the game for each participant was to maximise the number of points 
earned by a subset of six monster icons (“monster team”) chosen from a larger subset 
of 48 monster icons (“the monster league”). The game screen included the league of 
48 monster icons, an area for the participant’s current team selection, and another area 
displaying the participant’s best-scoring team alongside their team from the previous 
round (see Figure 5.1 for a screen shot of the learning game). The scores of the 
participant’s best-scoring and previous round teams were also visible, and a timer 
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located in the top right corner of the screen reminded participants of how many 
seconds remained in the round. In each round of the game, participants were given 20 
seconds to choose six icons for their current monster team, after which random 
monster icons were selected from the available icons in the league to fill any 
remaining spaces. Participants could click on a button to “clear” their current team 
entirely, or alternatively could clear individual monster icons they wished to change 
by clicking on the icon. Monster icons could be selected from any part of the screen 
by clicking on the icon, except those icons that already appeared in the participant’s 
current team which were highlighted with a green border. In addition, the current team 
could be replaced entirely by a previous team through clicking on the “copy” button 








Figure 5.1.  Screen shot of the learning game during the practice rounds. During 
interactive gameplay participants could also view the monster teams of other 
participants who had agreed to share with them (see Figure 5.3)    
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In each new experimental session, the league and monster icon positions were 
generated randomly from a larger set of 149 monster icons, but then remained fixed 
for the duration of the session. Following Wisdom et al. (2013), each monster icon 
was associated with a specified positive points score, and some ‘interaction’ pairs of 
monster icons were associated with additional points bonuses or penalties when they 
appeared in the same team together. Thus, the score for each monster team 
represented the sum of points associated with each monster icon plus or minus the 
value of any interaction pairs that were present. There was no overlap between 
interaction pairs, and their distribution, which concentrated bonuses among low-
scoring pairs and penalties among high-scoring pairs, was previously found to be 
challenging for experimental participants (Wisdom et al. 2013; see Figure 5.2a for an 
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Figure 5.2a. The score distribution applied to individual monster icons and the 
interaction bonuses and penalties applied to pairs of icons, for a league size of 48 





Participants were provided with information about the maximum possible 
team score achievable (i.e., 60 points), to motivate continued striving for high scores 
throughout repeated rounds of the game, and were informed that some pairs of 
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monster icons conferred bonuses or penalties, but were not given any information 
about the score distribution (see Figure 5.2b for the probability distribution of scores 


























Figure 5.2b. The probability distribution of monster team scores [-6,60] for a league 
of size 48 and the score distribution displayed in Figure 2a. The mean score in the 
first round (green line), last round (blue line), and overall (red line) for all 






Participants played the learning game in the same group of four participants 
with whom they played the public goods game. In each round, participants could 
choose which of the other three participants they wished to share their previous round 
monster team and score with, and were permitted to copy all, some or none of the 
solutions that the other participants had chosen to share with them, which were 
displayed in a separate area of the game screen (see below, section 5.2.3. Design, for 
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In a between-groups design, I randomly allocated groups of four participants to one of 
two experimental conditions. Participants were informed they would interact with the 
same three people throughout the experiment. In the first condition (the linked identity 
condition, N=40), each participant was assigned a single identity at the beginning of 
the experiment (e.g., ‘Player 1’), which they kept in both the PGG and learning game 
for the duration of the experiment. In contrast, participants allocated to the second 
condition (the unlinked identity condition, N=40) were allocated separate identities for 
each game (e.g., ‘Player 1’ in the PGG and ‘Player Blue’ in the learning game), which 
also remained fixed for the duration of the experiment, but were not linkable between 
games.  Participants interacted anonymously via their computer stations (it was not 
possible to link the player identities in the games to the other people in the room).  
 At the beginning of each session, participants then undertook an extensive 
computer-based tutorial in the rules and mechanics of the learning game (known to 
players as the monster league game) followed by the PGG (known to players as the 
project game), before beginning iterative rounds of interactive gameplay with group 
members (see section 5.2.2. for a description of the games). During the game tutorials, 
participants were also instructed that individual bonus payments of up to £15 would 
be calculated at the end of the experimental session, and would consist of their 
cumulative points earned in both games following a conversion of: 145 points = £1.    
The learning game tutorial included five practice rounds of the game, which 
participants played individually. Participants were instructed that the scores they 
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obtained in the practice rounds would not contribute to their final payment, but that 
they would carryover their score and game information (i.e., monster team) from the 
final practice round into the first round of the interactive game. Following Rand et al. 
(2009), the public goods game tutorial included detailed instructions about the game 
rules, including a series of worked hypothetical examples, but did not involve a 
practice period. Participants were permitted to complete the game tutorials in their 
own time, with those who completed early held in a game ‘waiting room’ until all 
other group members had completed.      
 Participants in the linked identity condition were informed that in each game 
round, one play of the public goods game would always be followed by one play of 
the learning game. Participants were also aware that they would learn of each other’s 
public goods contributions before each play of the learning game, and would have to 
decide with whom they wished to share information from their last attempt at the 
learning game (i.e., their monster team and score from the previous round) in the next 
play of the game (see Figure 5.3a). Participants in the unlinked identity condition 
received the same instructions, with one important exception. After participants in the 
unlinked identity condition had learned of each other’s contributions to the PGG, they 
were reassigned their separate learning game identities, and had their screen positions 
randomly shuffled, before deciding whom they wished to share their last round’s 
monster team with (i.e., individual identities and reputations gained in the public 
goods game could not be linked to identities and directed-sharing decisions in the 








Figure 5.3a. Screenshot example of decision-making screen as seen by participants in 









Figure 5.3b. Screenshot examples of public goods game results screen (i), which was 
immediately followed by identity reassignment and the learning game decision-
making screen (ii), as seen by participants in the unlinked identity condition in each 
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Participants were given 20 seconds to decide which of the other players they 
would share information with, before playing one round of the learning game. While 
playing the learning game, participants had visual access to the scores and monster 
teams submitted in the previous round by group members who had agreed to share 
with them, but the scores and monster teams of group members who had not agreed to 
share remained hidden (see Figure 5.4 for a screenshot example from the linked 
identity condition). Players could copy some or all of their own monster team from the 







Figure 5.4. Screenshot example of the interactive learning game in the linked identity 
condition (Screen as seen by Player 2: Player 1 and 3 agreed to share their previous 
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At the end of every round, participants saw a summary of the round, 
reminding them of the contributions made by each player to the public good, and of 
which players had shared information with them. The summary also detailed the 
participant’s current round points and cumulative points separately for the public 
goods game and learning game.  Participants then began the next round of game play 
until 20 rounds had elapsed, after which the session ended (20 rounds was chosen as 
Wisdom et al. (2013) previously reported a performance plateau in in the learning 
game after 24 rounds). Participants were informed that they would play an unspecified 
number of rounds, and that their behaviour during the game would not affect the total 
number of rounds played, so were unaware of when the game would end (see Figure 

















































Figure 5.5. Schematic of the game stages and progression of participants through 
iterative rounds of the public goods game (PGG) and learning game (LG), in the 
linked identity and unlinked identity conditions  
 





Participants were recruited for a study on ‘Interactive decision-making,’ and those 
who were known to each other were prevented from participating in the same 
experimental session. On arrival, participants were given a verbal and written briefing 
by the experimenter, and provided with an opportunity to ask questions. The 
experimenter then started the experiment on participants’ computers remotely from a 
server computer located in an adjoining room. The experimenter remained in the 
adjoining room with the connecting door open for the duration of the experiment, to 
ensure that no participants communicated. There were no instances of between-
participant communication observed. The experiment lasted approximately 45 
minutes, and after it had ended the experimenter returned to debrief participants and 
answer any remaining questions. Participants were then free to collect their payment 




5.3.  Analyses 
 
All analyses were conducted in R version 3.1.3. Linear mixed models (LMMs) and 
generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) were fitted using package lme4 (Bates et 
al., 2014).  
LMMs were used when the dependent variable measured the public goods 
contribution or the number of points scored in a given round (group means were 
modelled in analyses that investigated outcomes at the level of groups). Model 
standardised residuals were examined for deviations from homoscedasticity and 
normality when LMMs were used. However, GLMMs with a binomial error structure 
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were employed when the dependent variable represented the proportion of agreed 
information transfers that occurred within the learning game.  At the group level, a 
maximum of 12 information transfers could take place between groups of four 
participants in each game round, and the proportion of agreed information transfers 
represented the observed number of transfers divided by 12. In analyses at the 
individual level, the maximum number of information transfers a participant could 
both provide and receive was 3, therefore the proportion of information shares an 
individual received or provided had a denominator of 3. All GLMMs were checked 
for over-dispersion and to ensure that the magnitude of the standardized residuals 
were independent of the fitted values (Bolker et al., 2009).     
For analyses that investigated behavioural decisions and outcomes at the 
individual level, I fitted “individual ID” and “group ID” as random intercepts (factors) 
to account for the non-independence of measures on individuals and groups across 
repeated rounds. When analyses were undertaken at the group level, I fitted “group 
ID” as a random intercept. In all models, a fixed effect was included for round 
number. Additionally, each random intercept was also fitted with an independent 
random slope for the effect of round number, to account for possible variation in the 
slopes of individuals and groups across rounds.  
Unless otherwise stated, analyses of the data collected within each of the 
games (i.e., within the public goods game or the learning game) were conducted on 
the aggregate dataset. Analyses involving data collected across the two games were 
conducted separately for each experimental condition, due to differences in between-
game dynamics between conditions. Significance testing was undertaken by 
likelihood-ratio tests (LRTs) using the anova function. LRTs compare the change in 
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residual deviance (which follows a X2 distribution) that occurs between nested models 




The results are presented in six sections examining: (1) average contributions to the 
public good; (2) information transfers in the learning game; (3) the relationship 
between public goods contributions and access to social information, at the (i) group 
and (ii) individual level (linked identity condition only); (4) performance on the 
learning task, and the influence of (i) information access and (ii) cooperative 
behaviour on learning task performance (at both the group and individual level); (5) 
the effect of participants’ learning task performance on their willingness to share 
information with other group members; and, (6) the relationship between participants’ 
contributions to the public good and their total game-round payoff.  
 
 
5.4.1. Contributions to the public goods game  
 
Contrary to expectations, mean overall game contributions were similar across 
conditions: 11.8 (±SE 0.26) in the linked identity condition and 11.6 (±SE 0.25) in the 
unlinked identity condition. Thus, making visible the PGG reputations of individuals 
during decisions about information transfer did not lead to increases in PGG 
contributions (Group level analysis: LMM: X2(1)=0, p=.96, N=400; see Figure 5.6). 
In both the linked- and unlinked identity conditions, contributions decreased slightly 
over trials (Mean 1st round contribution: 13.0; last round contribution: 10.3; LMM: 
X2(1)= 9.17, p=.002)  











































5.4.2. Information transfers 
 
An analysis to examine the effect of experimental condition on information transfers 
was conducted at the group level. There had been no prior predictions made about 
between-condition differences in information sharing (see 5.1. Introduction). 
Participants in the linked identity condition withheld information more frequently than 
participants with unlinked game identities (GLMM: X2(1)= 10.04, odds ratio=3.98, 
p=.002, N= 400; Figure 5.7). Thus, making participants’ PGG reputations visible 
within the learning game reduced overall levels of information transfer, despite 
extremely similar levels of PG contributions between the two conditions. There was 
no significant effect of round number on information sharing across conditions 
(GLMM: X2(1)= 0.90, odds ratio=0.98, p=.34 , N= 400). 
 



















Figure 5.7. The average number of information shares that participants received  
from group members by round number and condition ±SE (the maximum number of 






5.4.3. Public goods contributions and information transfers 
 
The relationship between cooperative behaviour in the PGG and information transfers 
was examined at the group level for each condition separately. I then examined 
whether more cooperative individuals received greater access to social information 
within groups, using data collected in the linked identity condition only (participants’ 
with unlinked game identities were excluded from this analysis as individual PGG 
reputations were not discernible during learning game decision-making in this 
condition). 
 
Group-level contributions and information transfers 
As predicted, there was a significant positive relationship between average group 
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X2(1)=107.77, odds ratio= 1.2,  p<.001, N=200;  see Fig 5.8a). A weaker positive 
relationship was also observed in the unlinked identity condition (GLMM: 
X2(1)=14.99, odds ratio= 1.1,   p<.001, N=200; see Fig 5.8b), although no prior 
prediction had been made regarding the relationship between contributions and 
information transfers in this condition.  There was no effect of round number on 




























































































Figure 5.8. Scatter plots showing the average contribution to the public good and the 
proportion of all possible information transfers agreed in (a) the linked identity, and 
(b) the unlinked identity condition.  (Dots represent group-level raw data values with 






Individual contributions (reputations) and access to shared information  
The linked identity condition was examined to assess the effect of individuals’ 
contributions to the public good on the proportion of group members who were 
willing to share information with them. As participants’ sharing decisions might show 
greater sensitivity to the relative rather than absolute contributions of other group 
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members, analyses were conducted using both absolute and standardized contribution 
measures (standardized contributions were computed as the number of standard 
deviations of each participant’s contribution from the group mean in a given round). 
Standardized individual scores could not be computed when all members of a group 
contributed equally to the public good, therefore data was excluded from analyses at 
the group level in rounds where there was zero variation in contributions (80 from a 
total 800 observations were removed, leading to analyses conducted on 720 individual 
observations). The amount of information a participant received might also have been 
influenced by the amount of information they had previously shared with other group 
members (i.e., a reciprocal process of information exchange might exist within the 
learning game itself), therefore an additional variable detailing the number of group 
members the participant had shared with in the previous round was included in the 
model. 
 Although both measures were statistically significant, the absolute value of 
participants’ public goods contributions explained a larger amount of variation in the 
number of information shares they received than their standardized contributions 
(ΔAIC= -77), suggesting that absolute rather than relative contributions were more 
influential in decision-making. In line with my predictions, participants who made 
higher contributions received a greater number of information shares from fellow 
group members (absolute contributions: GLMM: X2(1)=207.69, odds ratio= 1.13, 
p<.001, N=720; see Figure 5.9).  The number of information shares participants 
received was not significantly affected by the amount of information they themselves 
had shared in the previous round, nor by round number, after accounting for their 
contribution to the public good (p>.05).  
 
 

























































Figure 5.9. Boxplot of the relationship between participant contributions in the linked 
identity condition and the number of information transfers they received from group 






5.4.4. Performance on the learning task  
 
Performance on the learning task was first examined for differences between 
conditions. Subsequently, I examined the effects of information transfers and 
cooperative behaviour on learning task performance, at the level of both groups and 
individuals.  
 
Learning task performance between conditions 
No a priori predictions were made regarding differences in performance on the 
learning task between conditions. However, in line with previous findings (Wisdom et 
al., 2013), I did expect that higher rates of information transfer would be positively 
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associated with performance. Despite participants in the unlinked identity condition 
engaging in significantly higher levels of information transfer than participants in the 
linked identity condition (see section 5.4.2.), there were no between-condition 
differences in learning game performance (Group level analysis: LMM: X2(1)=0.07, 
p=0.79, N=400; mean score linked identity: 32.6; mean score unlinked identity: 32.8; 
see Figure 5.10), implying that higher rates of information transfer were not 
advantageous at the aggregate level in this experiment. There was a significant, 
positive effect of round number across both conditions, as scores showed cumulative 
improvements over time (Group level analysis: LMM: X2(1)=28.72,$β=0.44,$p<.001, 
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Figure 5.10. Average game-round score by round number and condition. The mean 
score in the linked identity condition was 32.6 [min=1; max=48], and was 32.8 
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Information transfers and learning task performance  
 
To examine the effect of information transfer on learning game performance in more 
detail, analyses were conducted separately for each condition to allow for the 
possibility of different within-condition dynamics in the variables of interest.    
 At the group level, while controlling for round number, a positive relationship 
was found between information transfers and learning task performance in the linked 
identity condition (LMM: X2(1)=8.55, β=0.31,$$p=.003, N=200; Figure 5.11a), but not 
in the unlinked identity condition (LMM: X2(1)=0.39, β=-0.09,$$p=.53, N=200; Figure 
5.11b). Thus, the expected positive association between information transfers and 
learning task performance was confirmed only in the linked identity condition. A 
similar pattern of results was observed across conditions when analyses were 
conducted at the level of individuals (LMM: linked identity: X2(1)=7.45, β=0.6,$$
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Figure 5.11. Predicted relationship between a group’s mean learning game 
performance and the number of within-group information transfers in a given round 
(±95% CIs), for the (a) linked identity condition, and (b) unlinked identity condition 
(adjusted for the effect of game round)    
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Cooperative behaviour and learning task performance  
 
Section 5.4.3 showed that, at the group level, the positive relationship between 
cooperative behaviour and social information transfer was stronger in the linked 
identity condition than in the unlinked identity condition. An analysis conducted at the 
group level, controlling for round number, also confirmed a significant and positive 
relationship between cooperation and learning task performance in the linked identity 
condition (LMM: X2(1)=7.46, β=0.22,$p=.006, N=200; Figure 5.12a), but not among 
groups of participants whose identities were unlinked (LMM: X2(1)=0.22, β=0.03,$
p=.64, N=200; Figure 5.12b). Thus co-operators fared better in the learning game 
when their reputations were revealed, but not when their reputations were hidden, 
supporting the earlier predictions. Data was also analysed at the individual level for 
the linked identity condition only, and showed a similar, positive relationship between 
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Figure 5.12. Predicted relationship between a group’s mean public goods game 
(PGG) contribution and its mean learning game performance in a given round (±95% 
CIs), for the (a) linked identity condition, and (b) unlinked identity condition (adjusted 
for the effect of game round)    
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5.4.5. Performance on the learning task and decisions to share information 
 
To investigate the prediction that participants would be relatively more willing to 
share high-quality information (high-scoring monster teams) when the cooperative 
reputations of the information recipients were visible, an analysis was conducted at 
the individual level, which included an interaction term between condition and the 
score of the monster team available for sharing. Variables detailing the mean current 
round contribution made by other group members, and the number of shares received 
from other group members in the previous round, including their respective 
interactions with experimental condition, were also included in the full model, to 
control for possible confounding effects from these variables (see Section 5.4.3. & 
Section 5.4.4.).  
As predicted, there was a significant interaction between experimental 
condition and the quality of information shared, suggesting that participants in the 
linked identity condition were more likely to share high-quality information than 
participants in the unlinked identity condition, after accounting for between-condition 
differences in sharing behaviour (GLMM: X2(1)=8.45,$p=.004, N=1600; see Figure 
5.13). The average public goods contribution made by other group members also 
exerted a positive main effect on participants’ decisions to share information (GLMM: 
X2(1)=143.01,$ odds$ ratio=1.16,$ p<.001, N=1600), but did not show an interaction 
effect with condition (p>.05).  The number of information shares received by group 
members in the previous round did not significantly influence participants’ decisions 
to share information, nor show an interaction effect with condition (p>.05).  
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Figure 5.13. The predicted proportion of group members shared with (±95% CI) by 
condition and the participant’s previous-round score in the learning game (adjusted 
for the effect of game round and the average public goods contribution made by 






5.4.6. Total game-round payoff relative to public goods contribution 
 
The preceding results sections provided evidence that PGG contributions were 
positively linked with individuals’ access to social information and individual 
performance in the learning game when participants maintained linked identities and 
reputations between games. However, unexpectedly, the benefits conferred to 
cooperative individuals in the linked identity condition did not appear to garner 
increased or sustained levels of public goods contributions relative to a condition 
where participants’ identities and reputations were unlinked between games. This is 
further reflected by the failure to find support for the prediction that individuals’ 
game-round payoff would be higher in the linked identity condition than the unlinked 
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identity condition (LMM: X2(1)=0.0, p=0.98, N=1600; mean game-round score linked 
identity: 64.3; unlinked identity: 64.2).  
One possibility for this finding is that the cost bestowed on free riders in the 
public goods game was not sufficient to offset the benefits gained, and that 
individuals were perceptive to this (i.e., individuals were still incentivised to free 
ride).  To examine this possibility, I analysed the relationship between participants’ 
standardised public goods contributions and their total game-round points (i.e. 
payoff), for each of the conditions separately. Standardised public goods game 
contributions were found to negatively correlate with game-round payoff in both the 
linked identity (LMM: X2(1)=697.49, β=-4.85,$p<.001, N=720; Figure 5.13a) and the 
unlinked identity conditions (LMM: X2(1)=523.03, β=-4.32,$p<.001, N=748; Figure 
5.13b). Thus, across both conditions, individuals still benefitted overall from making 
lower public goods contributions than other group members.  
 
 



























































































































































Figure 5.13. Scatterplots showing participants’ standardized contributions and game-
round payoff (points) during the first 5 rounds and final 5 rounds, for the (a) linked 
identity condition (red) and (b) unlinked identity condition (blue)  (raw data values 








These findings, to my knowledge, provide the first evidence of a direct relationship 
between cooperative behaviour in collective action dilemmas and cultural 
transmission. In this study, individuals who were locally and presently (that is in the 
current round) cooperative received increased access to social information from group 
members, and performed better on a cumulative learning task, relative to free-riders, 
when cooperative reputations were revealed. Thus, this study provides evidence that 
human interactions are subject to reputation-based cultural learning processes (i.e., 
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access to cultural information is moderated by cooperative reputation). Contrary to 
expectations, the increased risk to free riders of being excluded from cultural 
information did not stabilise cooperation relative to a condition that prevented 
individuals from using reputational information in cultural decision-making.  
 The most plausible reason that reputation-based costs failed to stabilise 
cooperation in this study is that participants perceived the overall game-round 
advantage of free riding: free riders still scored higher overall, relative to co-
operators, despite the negative impact of reputational costs on cultural learning and/or 
the symbolic cost of being excluded from information by group members. This result 
contradicts a previous study arguing that participants do respond positively to 
symbolic sanctions in a cooperative dilemma – i.e., of anticipating written feedback 
from the receiver of their offer – increasing their offer as a result (Ellingsen & 
Johannesson, 2008). However, important procedural differences between the two 
studies could easily explain this finding; namely that the economic game used in 
Ellingsen and Johannesson’s study (the ultimatum game) differed in important 
respects from the PGG used here (i.e., player offers could be all-out rejected leaving 
both players with nothing).  
Nonetheless, the results presented here do not invalidate the hypothesis that 
cultural evolutionary processes do play a role in bootstrapping large-scale 
cooperation. For instance, it is conceivable that cultural information exchange can 
also occur in circumstances that do incur considerable costs to the receiver, should the 
information be denied. A hypothetical situation might involve excluding individuals 
from information that would allow them to partake and benefit from a group food 
hunt; or of denying individuals information about an impending danger. Under the 
same dynamics observed in this experiment, it is expected that increasing the cost of 
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being denied information would serve to stabilise or increase cooperation. Future 
studies should assess the effect that varying the cost/benefit of social information has 
on game dynamics and cooperation. Other interesting avenues of research might 
involve manipulating the group-level benefits of cooperation, to address questions 
such as: Can cooperative behaviour still act as a symbolic marker of reputation in 
cultural processes when the benefits of cooperation are negligible?  
Further support of a role for cooperative reputation signalling in cultural 
learning comes from the observation that, after controlling for differences between 
conditions in absolute levels of information sharing, participants in this study were 
more willing to share high-quality information (i.e., high scoring monster teams) 
when they knew the reputation of the information recipient than when they didn’t. 
Thus, participants who could see the reputations of group members were more 
selective overall about whom they shared with (preferentially sharing with co-
operators), but were also relatively more willing to share high-scoring information 
than participants who did not have access to the reputations of their information 
recipients.  
To my knowledge, these results provide the first evidence that humans not 
only use social information selectively (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Morgan et al., 
2012), but also share information selectively too; fine-tuning their decisions 
according to a combination of factors pertaining to both the quality of the information 
available to share, and some evaluation (here of the cooperative reputation) of the 
information recipient. This finding could at least partly explain the observation that 
performance in the learning game was similar between experimental conditions, 
despite higher levels of information transfer in the unlinked identity condition. It could 
also explain the finding that information sharing was positively related to learning 
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game performance when the recipients’ reputations were visible, but not when they 
were hidden.   
Previous theoretical investigations imply that individuals’ reliance on social 
learning should be flexible, and that social learning might only feature prominently in 
learning decisions when individual learning has proven too costly or failed (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1995; Enquist et al., 2007; Laland & Kendal, 2003; Laland, 2004; although 
see Rendell et al., 2010a for a contrary view).The structure of the current learning 
game – namely the stable environment and score distribution experienced throughout; 
the constant availability of participants’ previous best scoring team; and the risk free, 
individual learning practice period – might therefore have reduced participants’ 
feeling of dependency or reliance on social learning and contributed to the unexpected 
null effect of reputation-based learning on cooperation. Future work should also 
examine the interaction between social learning dependence and the reputation-based 
costs of free riding on cooperation.  Interestingly, a previous study suggests that 
individuals who favour increased reliance on social learning, also self-report as being 
more collectivist (Toelch et al., 2014).   
The results presented here complement previous empirical work that indicates 
a relationship between pro-social behaviour and complex culture. For example, Dean 
et al. (2012) present evidence indicative of a link between altruistic information 
transfer and cumulative knowledge gain. Similarly, Hill et al. (2011, 2014) have 
argued that a unique social structure, which enhances large-scale, cooperative 
interactions between non-relatives, has scaffolded and coevolved with cultural 
complexity in human society.  The results of this study extend these previous findings 
by providing mechanistic evidence of a reciprocal relationship between cooperative 
reputation and cultural information transfer. Information provision within groups or 
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societies of learners is not indiscriminate; rather, the cooperative reputation of the 
information recipient might be just as important as the cooperativeness of the 
information donor, or indeed network of donors, in many situations.  
Of course, there are many situations where cultural information exchange 
itself might constitute a cooperative or information-sharing dilemma (Cabrera & 
Cabrera, 2002; Rendell et al., 2011b): individual learners are sometimes faced with 
the conundrum of contributing useful information for the collective benefit of the 
group, or withholding that same information to maintain a competitive edge over 
others. Likewise, teaching and language – key instruments of human cultural 
exchange (Morgan et al., 2015a; Tomasello, 1999) – are themselves considered major 
cooperative feats in their own right (Sterelny, 2003). Indeed, many of the cultural 
skills that emanate from cumulative learning (e.g., learning to make stone tools) 
require sustained and repeated interactions between learners and their expert teachers 
(Stout, 2002); plausibly, the learner’s reputation is key in maintaining this process 
across kinship boundaries in the absence of formal institutions. Thus, reputation-based 
social transmission is likely ubiquitous and intrinsic throughout the complete set of 
processes and interactions that together constitute our cultural matrix.  
 An important final consideration in light of these results is of course the extent 
to which it is possible for individuals to control the flow of cultural information 
within and between group members. Whilst it is certainly the case that some forms of 
cultural information are not monopolisable, it is equally the case that many forms of 
cultural learning are dependent on active demonstration and communication. 
Moreover, even cultural information that is freely available for all to learn may still 
hinge on individuals maintaining close and cooperative spatial relations, to enable 
social transmission to occur (Hill et al., 2014; Rand et al. 2011).  
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In sum, these data provide evidence that cultural transmission processes are governed 
not only by selective learning biases present in the learner, but also biases determining 
when knowledgeable individuals are willing to transmit (or share) valuable 
information. In this study, individuals were more likely to actively share information 
with individuals they knew had contributed cooperatively to a public good. Moreover, 
when reputation-based decision-making was possible, public cooperation showed a 
positive relationship with group and individual performance in a cultural learning 
game.  
It still remains to be proven whether the reputation-based costs inherent in 
cultural learning processes can serve to stabilise or increase cooperative behaviour. 
The benefits conferred by free riding in this study were not offset by the increased risk 
of being denied access to cultural information. However, given that reputation-based 
sharing is likely pervasive throughout the multiple forms of information exchange that 
scaffold human cultural behaviour, it is highly conceivable that many exchanges do 
risk considerable costs, and therefore do discourage free riders.   
 Within the cultural dynamics described here, it is easy to imagine a 
coevolutionary process between increasingly cooperative societies and increasingly 
powerful culture, with the roles of sanctioning free riders and distributing cultural 
knowledge eventually being supported by the emergence of cultural norms and formal 
institutions (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). It is further conceivable that this relationship 
would lead some cultural groups to triumph over others during times of inter-group 
conflict and competition, should enough variation exist between groups, further 
amplifying the evolutionary process (e.g.,  Bell et al., 2009; Bowles, 2006; Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2004b).  
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In the previous chapters, I presented data examining the role of learning mechanisms 
in high-fidelity social transmission, the role of learning biases in ‘over-imitation’, and 
a series of experiments examining the interaction between human social learning and 
cooperation. In this chapter, I will first provide a recap of these findings. I will then 
consider some broader implications of the work presented, and some areas where 
future research is required, including two follow-up projects that are already 
underway.           
 
 
6.1.  Summary of findings 
 
The focus of Chapters 2 and 3 sits broadly within the topic of high-fidelity social 
learning, and is relevant to discussions concerning the importance of high-fidelity 
transmission in cultural ratcheting. The ability of individuals to engage in accurate or 
high-fidelity social transmission is considered necessary to both initiate and fuel the 
cultural ratcheting process (e.g., Lewis & Laland, 2012; Tomasello, 1999). The 
psychological and behavioural mechanisms thought to underpin high-fidelity learning 
(e.g., imitation) have also been proposed, and investigated across a range of species 
(frequently using the two-action paradigm; Dawson & Foss, 1965). While the focus 
has been on instrumental or technological cultural ratcheting, attempts to link the 
proposed mechanisms underpinning fidelity to increases in the faithful transmission of 
instrumental goals have been neglected, and the few studies attempting to examine 
this relationship have returned inconsistent results (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; 
Fredman & Whiten, 2008; Morgan et al., 2015b) 
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 In Chapter 2, I contributed to answering this question using results obtained 
from a meta-analysis conducted across primate social learning studies that had been 
conducted using the two-action paradigm. This analysis showed that matching the 
demonstrated process of task solution (i.e., imitative or emulative learning – 
mechanisms associated with high-fidelity transmission) is not necessary for successful 
transmission of instrumental goals (i.e., reward retrieval) when the puzzle is simple, 
but becomes increasingly necessary as task complexity increases.  This result 
remained whether human subjects were included or excluded from the analysis, and 
provides support for the view that mechanisms resulting in greater behavioural fidelity 
to the demonstrated process (i.e., imitation/emulation) are required, and have been 
selected for, in the evolution of instrumental culture.    
‘Over-imitation’ describes the propensity of humans to blanket copy even 
actions that are manifestly irrelevant to achieving an instrumental outcome. It has 
been proposed that this puzzling phenomenon might represent a special case of high-
fidelity learning in humans that operates to ensure the transmission of causally opaque 
artefact functions, despite sometimes leading to causally inefficient behaviours being 
copied (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007). However, in Chapter 3 I 
presented evidence that questions this interpretation, suggesting instead that children 
might copy or discard the demonstration of irrelevant actions in a manner that is 
compatible with the operation of selective and adaptive learning heuristics. Adopting 
a cultural evolutionary approach, I found that children copied the majority behaviour 
selectively, showing a bias for the majority’s solution in all instances where it 
represented behavioural efficiency, but not when it involved copying causally 
irrelevant actions. Children’s copying of the irrelevant action also showed sensitivity 
to the frequency of demonstrators who performed it, in a manner consistent with 
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social rather than causal explanations of ‘over-imitation’ (e.g., affiliative or normative 
motivations, e.g., Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Kenward, 2012). Using my results, I argued 
that children’s tendency to copy irrelevant actions might be more compatible with the 
operation of a learning heuristic that produces ‘optimal-’ rather than ‘over-’ imitation.     
In Chapters 4 and 5, the focus of the thesis shifted towards the relationship 
between cultural transmission and cooperation, and the role of this interaction in 
sustaining complex culture, using experimental investigations with adult human 
participants. In the General Introduction, I argued that enhanced cooperativeness and 
enhanced cultural complexity had likely coevolved in humans, in a mutually 
reinforcing, reciprocal manner, but that this relationship was currently under-
investigated experimentally.  
In Chapter 4 I attempted to test the hypothesis that increases in cooperative 
rapport can lead to increases in imitative behaviour (of gestures and mannerisms) 
between interaction partners (van Baaren et al., 2009; Heyes, 2012a), using a series of 
three experiments. There are already a number of empirical studies offering support 
for the reciprocate of this relationship – that leading from imitation to increased 
cooperation (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2013; van Baaren et al., 2004) – and it has been 
argued that these two processes are engaged in a mutually reinforcing circle of 
cooperation and imitation, which might act as a springboard for the emergence of 
more complex forms of cultural learning (Heyes, 2012a).  
  In the first experiment, imitation was positively associated with a measure of 
the quality of participants’ cooperative interaction (i.e., cooperative task 
performance). Moreover, individuals in a control condition, who performed the task 
alone, later imitated their interaction partner more if they themselves had performed 
poorly on the task, consistent with the hypothesis that experiencing failure increases 
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individuals’ desire to affiliate with others through imitation (Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003). However, this initial finding was not replicable in later experiments. The 
experiments also failed to detect the expected increase in imitative behaviour among 
participants who cooperated, relative to the control group, despite a series of 
incremental experimental modifications designed to enhance participants’ cooperative 
experience. This finding contrasts with a previous study showing an increase in 
imitative behaviour in participants primed with cooperative words (Leighton et al., 
2010). It is possible that the relationship between cooperation and imitation is more 
nuanced than the behavioural interactions permitted in my experiments, preventing 
the detection of replicable and expected results.  
In Chapter 5, I presented data investigating the role that cultural transmission 
might play in helping to sustain cooperation. Using a micro-society approach 
(Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008), involving groups of participants playing a networked 
computer game, I examined whether free riders in a public goods game dilemma were 
more likely to be excluded from receiving potentially useful social information in a 
separate but linked learning game. Moreover, I was interested in whether the threat of 
reputation-based exclusion from social information could serve to discourage free 
riding and increase cooperation, relative to a control condition where reputation-based 
social transmission was not possible. I reasoned that humans’ extreme dependence on 
social information might serve to encourage the maintenance of cooperative 
reputations, if access to beneficial social information was at stake, and could 
potentially provide a cheaper mechanism for sustaining cooperation than costly 
punishment or reward.  
The results of this experiment showed that participants did exhibit biases 
regarding whom they were willing to share social information with, preferentially 
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sharing with co-operators and withholding information from free riders, as predicted. 
There also appeared to be evidence suggesting that individuals were relatively more 
willing to share high-value information with recipients whose reputations were 
visible, relative to when recipients’ reputations were hidden. However, contrary to 
expectations, the operation of reputation-based access to social information in this 
experiment did not increase or stabilise cooperative behaviour, relative to the control 
condition. A closer examination of game-round payoffs offered an explanation for 
these contradictory findings, suggesting that the cost associated with exclusion from 
social information was not large enough to offset the benefit of free riding within the 
game set up employed, and that participants likely perceived this. The symbolic cost 
of experiencing targeted exclusion from information was not enough by itself to deter 
free riders.  However, the fact that reputation-based access to information still 
appeared to be operating is indicative that this mechanism could still plausibly 
function to sustain cooperation if exclusion from social information carried more 
significant social or survival costs; a situation that is conceivable both over the course 
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6.2. Broader considerations 
 
 
High-fidelity social transmission 
The work presented in both Chapters 2 and 3 is of relevance to discussions concerning 
the evolution of high-fidelity social transmission, and its role in cultural complexity. 
Chapter 2, in addition to providing support for a relationship between learning 
mechanisms and instrumental learning success, highlights again the difficulty of 
differentiating between imitative and emulative learning mechanisms, and again raises 
the question of whether this distinction is useful in discussions of instrumental social 
learning that utilise current paradigms.  
 My own opinion is that the imitation-emulation dichotomy, as it currently 
stands in assessments of instrumental social learning, is not especially useful, leads to 
conflation and confusions in terminology, and likely serves to muddy our 
understanding of where the differences between human and non-human copying truly 
lie. The observation that this dichotomy is being conflated by even those authors who 
stress its importance (e.g., Tennie et al., 2009), further indicates that currently we lack 
the evidence, and also the necessary experimental paradigms, to demarcate human 
versus nonhuman learning on the grounds of an imitation/emulation learning 
dichotomy.  Chapter 2 indicates that both human and non-human primates are able to 
exhibit fidelity to a demonstrated process of task solution, and that this fidelity 
becomes increasingly necessary for the transmission of instrumental outcomes as task 
complexity increases. This finding supports the common assumption that mechanisms 
such as imitation/emulation afford higher fidelity transmission of cultural learning 
goals and outcomes than mechanisms such as stimulus/local enhancement.  The use of 
conditions offering reduced social information, such as ghost conditions, appear to 
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result in a reduction in learning performance for both human and nonhuman species, 
yet these manipulations have been criticised for unrealistically distorting the natural 
process of social learning (Byrne, 2002), and still fail to provide an accurate 
assessment of the relative contributions of different learning mechanisms when 
learners have all options available (i.e., during a complete demonstration). Our current 
experimental paradigms lack the empirical resolution to make the imitation-emulation 
distinction accurately.  
 Indeed, it would appear that our knowledge of the catalogued learning 
mechanisms, including of the psychological and neural mechanisms on which they 
hinge, is still rather limited (Heyes, 2012b; Hoppitt & Laland, 2008). Even within the 
category of imitation – the most studied and discussed type of copying – there is still 
uncertainty regarding whether the different types of simple imitation (e.g., behavioural 
mimicry, response facilitation, automatic imitation) arise from the same or different 
neural circuits, and of exactly where simple imitation ends and complex imitation 
begins (Heyes, 2011). Elsewhere, the presumed cognitive superiority of imitative 
relative to emulative learning has been challenged, along with the assumption that the 
two mechanisms result from different underlying cognitive processes (Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2008). Recreating a pattern of observed object movements, or recreating an 
end product, could conceivably be as cognitively complex, or even more cognitively 
complex, than matching a demonstrator’s action topography. The point is that, while 
the distinction between emulation and imitation might be an important one, this is still 
very much an open empirical question.  My own hunch is that humans have evolved 
enhanced abilities in both domains, and that the relative importance of imitation and 
emulation as mechanisms of social learning (both in instrumental and in social/ritual 
contexts), varies systematically dependent upon the details of the learning goal. Until 
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the development of experimental paradigms that allow the relative role of each 
mechanism to be deciphered, the current dogma surrounding the imitation/emulation 
dichotomy (e.g., Tennie et al., 2009) is unlikely to be a useful one.  
 Of course, increasingly the role of other socio-cognitive abilities – such as 
intentional teaching through verbal instruction and pro-social interactions – 
considered particularly enhanced in humans (Tomasello, 1999), are coming to the fore 
in explanations of uniquely human cultural affairs, offering pathways to high-fidelity 
transmission and cultural ratcheting that supplement and supersede those offered by 
imitation and emulation alone (e.g., Dean et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2015a; Zwirner 
& Thornton, 2015). Future research must seek to elucidate further the complete suite 
of socio-cognitive abilities that operate to furnish our species with culture (Tomasello, 
1999).   
 It is proposed that ‘over-imitation’ in humans, or perhaps more accurately 
‘over-emulation’ or ‘over-copying’, functions to ensure the high-fidelity transmission 
of opaque artefact functions and behaviours that frequently characterise human 
culture (e.g., Lyons et al., 2011). According to this hypothesis, humans display an 
evolved tendency towards automatic or blanket copying, which usually functions to 
ensure that all functional properties of a behavioural sequence are adopted, but can 
also occasionally result in manifestly irrelevant behaviour being copied. The evidence 
presented in Chapter 3 challenges this view, suggesting that causally irrelevant action 
copying is selective, and instead might function to serve social (e.g., 
affiliative/conventional) rather than instrumental goals, in line with an alternative 
body of literature on this topic (e.g., Keupp et al., 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over 
& Carpenter, 2012). There is still clearly more work required in unravelling exactly 
why humans copy causally irrelevant actions; the suggestion that multiple 
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explanations exist, which are underpinned by different psychological learning 
mechanisms and vary in relevance according to learning context, is certainly plausible 
(Kenward, 2012).  
However, claims that irrelevant action copying results from a misguided 
tendency to blanket copy actions with high-fidelity during causal learning – i.e., 
instances that truly depict ‘over-imitation’ – need to be distinguished from cases 
where the irrelevant action has incorporated a socially relevant function or 
significance, which I earlier argued is better depicted as ‘optimal-’ rather than ‘over-’ 
imitation. There is also a need to clarify and better quantify the so-called behavioural 
costs incurred when individuals copy irrelevant actions; which might be relatively low 
or negligible despite being what has elevated ‘over-imitation’ to its position as a topic 
of high interest. While previously it was argued that over-imitation persists despite 
substantial costs of performing the irrelevant action (Lyons et al., 2011), a more 
recent study found that children’s propensity to copy irrelevant actions decreased as 
the cost incurred from doing so became increasingly substantial (Keupp et al., 2016). 
A further issue that confuses interpretation arises when the causally irrelevant actions 
offered in claims of ‘over-imitation’ are not in fact causally transparent or manifestly 
irrelevant – here evidence of causally irrelevant action copying is better described as 
part of the normal causal learning process (Kenward et al., 2011). There is clearly a 
requirement in research on ‘over-imitation’ for a more detailed outline on what 
exactly ‘over-imitation’ is and isn’t. However, with the above considerations in mind, 
and the additional finding that selective learning biases likely filter irrelevant actions 
adaptively (Chapter 3), my guess is that instances of blanket copying causally 
irrelevant actions, for causally functional reasons (i.e., truly over-imitating), are likely 
few and far between, both in the ‘real world’ and in the laboratory.      
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Social learning strategies 
A recent series of articles has taken issue with what the authors have interpreted as the 
depiction of cognitively fixed and inflexible social learning heuristics in the current 
literature (e.g., Heyes & Pearce, 2015; Heyes, 2016). While this depiction of the 
current literature is itself a moot point, the results presented in Chapter 3 argue to the 
contrary: that social learning heuristics or strategies are in fact highly flexible, and 
subject to substantial alteration in learning contexts that involve irrelevant information 
(which also plausibly extends to other forms of disadvantageous or context-irrelevant 
information). Indeed, a recent review argues that, rather than assuming species-typical 
learning heuristics, a growing body of evidence implies much individual-level 
variability in social learning, which plausibly results from a range of influencing 
factors; including heritable differences in social learning, but also differences 
resulting from developmental, individual learning experiences, and, in humans, 
cultural learning experiences (Mesoudi et al., 2016).    
 Selective or strategic copying biases have been identified across a range of 
different species (See General Introduction, Section 1.4). In humans, it is believed 
they play a fundamental role in cultural evolutionary processes at the population level, 
such as in ensuring the stability of culture and in guiding learning towards the local 
optima (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Chudek & Henrich, 2011).  The challenge now 
facing researchers is to elucidate how selective copying in humans has evolved to be 
different from that observed in other animals, in ways that foster increasing cultural 
complexity. Recent simulations undertaken on this issue have indicated that increases 
in highly selective and refined copying strategies, along with a greater reliance on 
social information more generally, are two such candidate factors (Rendell et al., 
2010a).  
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One prime candidate for how humans might achieve more refined and selective 
copying heuristics is through the operation of human-specific, metacognitive 
decision-making processes in social learning (Heyes, 2016); an understudied area ripe 
for future research.  Another obvious area of consideration is in the uniquely human 
capacity for culturally honed and transmitted rules of social learning (Mesoudi et al., 
2015), including the ways in which our specialised ‘norm psychology’ fashions social 
transmission (Chudek & Henrich, 2011).  
In addition to understanding the processes by which individuals choose whom 
to copy from, there may also be a requirement to understand the operation of biases 
that influence to whom one should award access to cultural information. Chapter 5 
identified the operation of reputation-based biases in information sharing: individuals 
preferentially shared information with co-operators and withheld information from 
free riders (as determined by behaviour in a public goods game). It is plausible that a 
number of different biases might operate regarding to whom one should supply 
cultural information; in addition to the reputation-based biases identified in Chapter 5, 
kin- and prestige-based information-sharing biases would seem other likely 
candidates.  Further investigation of these potential biases, and consideration of their 
likely impact on cultural evolutionary processes, are required in future.  
 
Cooperation and culture  
The work presented in Chapter 5, which utilised a public goods game linked to a 
separate learning game, is currently undergoing extension and follow up (see Section 
6.3, below). Of relevance to the current and follow up study is a recent series of 
experiments which question the use of laboratory-based economic games in 
investigations of cooperative behaviour (Burton-Chellew & West, 2013; Burton-
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chellew et al., 2016). Specifically, Burton-Chellew and colleagues take issue with the 
view that participant behaviour in economic games – namely the tendency of 
participants to initially cooperate at much higher levels than is individually or 
economically rational – indicates the evolution of strong pro-social tendencies in our 
species, arguing instead that this behaviour more likely results from an initial 
misunderstanding of the game rules about how to maximise individual payoffs. As the 
primary purpose of my investigation was to examine the occurrence of reputation-
based access to social information and its role in stabilising cooperation, the debate 
about whether humans can correctly be characterised as ‘irrationally’ pro-social is of 
secondary importance to my question.  However, the issues raised do illustrate the 
need to assess individuals’ understanding of game dynamics when interpreting the 
patterns of decision-making that emerge from laboratory experiments, and when using 
these patterns to make inferences about behaviour in the ‘real world’.    
 On a related note, the field of cultural evolutionary studies has been criticised 
for being over-reliant on theoretical modelling approaches that are frequently not 
validated in real-world settings (Mace, 2014). I think this same concern, or caution, is 
also relevant to laboratory-based micro-society approaches to the study of cultural 
evolution, which I adopted in Chapter 5. While the micro-society approach offers an 
extremely valuable and logistically feasible tool for investigating the mechanisms and 
processes that might underpin the evolution of large-scale behavioural patterns 
(Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008), the results that emerge from these microcosms, and that 
often appear in high profile journals (e.g., Derex et al., 2013; Derex & Boyd, 2016), 
might frequently depend, as is also the case in theoretical investigations, on the way in 
which we have created or parameterised our model of the ‘micro’ world. Taking the 
example of my own study (Chapter 5), if it is shown that reputation-based access to 
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social information can stabilise or increase cooperation, but only when experimental 
parameters are such that the value of receiving social information, relative to free 
riding, is high (see Chapter 5), we can conclude that this mechanism might have been 
important during the coevolution of cultural complexity and large-scale cooperation. 
However, the question we are then left with is:  Is the value of receiving social 
information high enough, relative to free riding, to sustain this dynamic in the ‘real 
world’? Answering this type of question is not easy, but recent attempts to shift the 
methods of economic and social learning experiments into ‘real world’ (or field) 
settings, with ‘real world’ commodities, are a step in the right direction (e.g., Lamba 
& Mace, 2011; Lamba, 2014).  
 
  
6.3. Further work 
 
Work already underway  
Two studies that follow from the work presented in previous chapters are already 
underway. The first involves an extension of the work presented on ‘over-imitation’ in 
Chapter 3.  The previous protocol involved presenting the task using outcome-
oriented language, to emphasise the instrumental end-goal (Clegg & Legare, 2015), 
finding that children did not show majority-biased copying if the majority performed 
an irrelevant action. However, in the current follow-up study, children’s tendency to 
copy irrelevant actions performed by a majority is compared across conditions that 
emphasise either an instrumental or a normative stance. Majority-biased or conformist 
copying can serve to guide both instrumentally driven and socially motivated learning 
goals, described in social psychology as informational and normative conformity 
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respectively (Morgan & Laland, 2012). In line with the idea that children might be 
better viewed as ‘optimal-imitators’, it is expected that when the majority behaviour is 
presented using normative cues, children will show majority-biased copying of the 
irrelevant action, as this now incorporates socially relevant functional properties, but 
will continue not to show majority-biased copying when the goal is instrumental.  
 The second follow-up study, involves an extension of the work presented in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 5 found that, although participants’ access to social information 
appeared to be mediated by their reputation in a linked public goods, the cost to free 
riders of being denied social information was not sufficient to discourage free riding 
and stabilise cooperation. In the follow-up study, the original social learning game 
(i.e., the Monster League Game) has been replaced by a different custom-made 
computer game – the Food Hunt Game – which involves players ‘hunting’ for ‘food 
items’ and ‘tools’ upon a virtual memory board. In this game, players are permitted to 
sample game board locations before making performance-related game decisions, and 
are awarded points for locating complementary ‘food’ and ‘tool’ items, but can also 
lose points if they uncover ‘dangerous’ items.  Players are permitted to share 
information about ‘food’, ‘tool’ and ‘dangerous’ game locations, as per the previous 
experimental design.  Critically, the new game design offers the option of varying the 
costs and benefits of receiving social information (e.g., the possibility of losing a large 
number of points when sampling dangerous locations results in social information 
about these locations becoming particularly valuable), which is expected to permit a 
more detailed and refined assessment of the potential interaction between cooperative 
behaviour and cultural transmission. It is predicted that reputation-based access to 
social information will act to stabilise cooperation when the value of receiving social 
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information outweighs the benefits of free riding, but not when the value of social 
information is relatively low.  
 
The need for more fine-grained studies of learning and behaviour  
A recurrent theme throughout this thesis has been to contrast the emphasis placed on 
the specific mechanisms underpinning learning (e.g., imitation/emulation) with the 
inadequacy of current experimental methods to accurately categorise the learning 
process.  More refined and detailed studies are clearly required to unravel and 
document the precise learning mechanisms and processes that underpin social 
transmission, and to determine more accurately how these might differ between 
species. One approach that might prove useful in future is the implementation of 
sophisticated eye tracking technology, which would allow researchers to track and 
document exactly where, and how much, individuals focus their attention during 
social learning – e.g., on object movements (emulation) or body movements 
(imitation) – across a range of different learning objectives.  Such methods could also 
be expanded, at least in humans, to include a more holistic consideration of the 
learning dynamic that occurs between individuals and their cultural models, 
incorporating a detailed evaluation of the role played by behaviours such teaching, 
verbal communication and joint attention, in supplementing social learning 
mechanisms during cultural transmission. While the development and implementation 
of such an experimental framework is likely to be complex, it might prove essential if 
we wish to develop a deeper understanding of the suite of learning processes that 
underpin human culture.  
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6.4. Conclusions  
 
The work presented in this thesis contributes to two main themes that are of relevance 
to understanding the evolution of human cultural uniqueness. The first theme involves 
the evolution of high-fidelity cultural transmission, while the second theme concerns 
the interaction between cultural transmission and cooperation. This thesis supports 
previous, but largely untested, claims that learning mechanisms associated with 
increased fidelity to a cultural model’s behaviour (i.e., imitation/emulation) are 
required to learn and transmit complex instrumental cultural end-goals successfully. 
However, it also questions the current dogma of casting humans as ‘imitators’ and 
nonhumans as ‘emulators’, in light of the current evidence available in social learning 
research.  This thesis also questions the depiction of human beings as ‘over-imitators’, 
and the suggestion that ‘over-imitation’ represents an adaptation for the high-fidelity 
transmission of causally opaque cultural behaviours. Instead, it finds evidence that the 
demonstration of causally irrelevant actions might substantially alter the operation of 
adaptive learning biases, in ways that likely reduce or eliminate ‘over-imitation’, and 
show sensitivity to imitation’s social, rather than causal, functions.  In later chapters, 
the thesis finds only limited support for a positive relationship between cooperative 
interactions and automatic imitation, which is hypothesised to function in maintaining 
cultural group cohesion; a result that might reflect nuances in this relationship that 
were missing from the experimental design. Finally, the thesis finds support for the 
hypothesis that access to cultural information is mediated by an individual’s 
cooperative reputation, and argues that this interaction could plausibly serve to help 
scaffold the evolution of both large-scale cooperation and complex culture, if being 
denied access to cultural information frequently carries considerable costs. The 
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overarching message presented throughout this thesis is that understanding human 
cultural uniqueness hinges upon understanding a complex of individual- and 
population-level processes, from individual learning mechanisms to large-scale 
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